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Assessing Am erican Objectives to the International Criminal Court (253 pp.)
Director: Forest L. Grieves
In 1998, the United Nations finalized an International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute.
The purpose o f this Statute is to create an international tribunal through which the
international com m unity could investigate, and, if required, prosecute crim es o f
genocide, war crim es, and crim es against humanity. An overwhelm ing m ajority o f the
U nited Nations delegates signed the treaty Statute, with the U nited States being one o f
only seven states to oppose the Statute. This study exam ined the thesis posited by the
United States that deficiencies in the institutional structures o f the ICC will render the
criminal court unable to accomplish its stated objectives o f punishing and deterring the
worst forms o f international criminal atrocities. The study’s scope was lim ited to
exam ining four aspects o f the Statute: the jurisdiction, the criminal subject matter, the
Prosecutor’s office, and the role assigned by the ICC for the United N ations Security
Council.
The greatest developments in international criminal law come from the two world
wars and the efforts they inspired to punish war criminals. W orld W ar E ’s Nuremberg
trials overturned the centuries old practice o f granting international crim inal im m unity to
heads-of-state through the conviction o f Nazi w ar criminals. After Nurem berg, for the
first time in international law, individuals could be held crim inally liable for crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.
Unlike the Nazi trials at Nuremberg, which were made possible by the occupation o f
Germany by the victorious Allies, the ICC m ust rely on state cooperation to investigate,
apprehend, and prosecute defendants. An independent prosecutor, with the pow er to
investigate information from all sources and decide which cases to try, will complicate
the functioning o f the ICC. Additional problems for the ICC are created by the lack o f
specificity o f the crim es defined within the Statute. As the only institution capable o f
forcing states to com ply with the dictates o f the world criminal court, the Security
Council must protect citizens from their own governments by referring the m ost heinous
international atrocities to the ICC for prosecution.
The m ost serious weakness o f the ICC Statute, the ICC jurisdiction exposes
peacekeeping forces operating in foreign countries to potential ICC prosecution, yet
allows states to exem pt its forces from war crimes prosecution while charging another
country for those same crimes. W hile purporting to preserve national sovereignty, the
Statute actually allows the ICC to sit in judgm ent o f national courts. The result m ay be
disastrous as states, unwilling to allow their courts to be judged, refuse to cooperate with
the ICC, resulting in an ineffective international criminal court unable to prosecute or
deter war crimes.

11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter
1.

IN T R O D U C T IO N ...................................................................................................1

2.

IMPETUS FOR A PERM ANENT INTERNATIONAL
CRIM INAL COURT (IC C )................................................................................ 14
The Laws o f War; Beginnings o f C o d ificatio n ......................................... 15
W orld W ar I and W ar Crimes T ria ls ...........................................................27
Inter-W ar Period: To N u rem b erg ................................................................ 44

3.

THE LEGACY OF N U R E M B E R G ................................................................. 54
Control Council No. 10 W ar Crimes T rials................................................67
The Far Eastern Com mission and the
International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far E a s t........................................68
Comparison o f the Legal Bases for Setting up the
IMT, CCL 10 and IM T F E ............................................................................. 72
Post-W orld W ar II to the Present:
Developments Toward the Creation o f the IC C ........................................85

4.

ASSESSING AM ERICAN OBJECTIONS TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIM INAL C O U R T ..................................................... 96
U.S. Positions Prior to the 1998 Rome C onference.................................96
The Rom e Statute E m e rg es......................................................................... 105
Overview o f the ICC Statute: Structure and Functioning
o f the International Criminal C o u rt........................................................... 108
Assessing The U.S. Objections to the ICC Statute
Jurisdictional O b jectio n s..............................................................................I l l
iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Role and Function o f the Office o f the Prosecutor......................... 120
The Role o f the Security C o u n c il............................................................... 131
5.

ASSESSING U.S. OBJECTIONS FROM A
THEORETICAL P E R S PE C T IV E .................................................................. 134
The Problem: D efining Crimes W ithin the ICC S tatute........................ 135
The Inner M orality o f L a w ...........................................................................137
Criminal Liability for Ill-D efined C rim e s................................................ 141
Problems o f D efin itio n ................................................................................. 146

6.

CO N C LU SIO N ....................................................................................................157

APPENDIX
ROM E STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIM IN AL C O U R T ................................................... 177
REFERENCE L IS T .................................................................................................... 243

IV

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHA PTER 1
INTRODUCTION

On July 17, 1998, as the Final A ct o f the United Nations Diplom atic Conference
o f Plenipotentiaries on the Establishm ent o f an International Crim inal Court, one hun
dred and twenty nations voted for the adoption o f the Statute creating a perm anent In
ternational Criminal Court (the “ICC” or the “Court”).’ The U nited States joined six
other nations in voting against the treaty, while twenty-one nations abstained in the
vote. The Statute enters into force after sixty states officially ratify it. Thus far, over
twenty nations have ratified the treaty.^ U.S. leaders have made it clear their nation will
not be one o f them.^
The United States objects to perceived legal deficiencies in the Statute that the
U.S. claims will ultim ately underm ine the effectiveness and purpose o f the ICC.'’ This
study examines the thesis postulated by the United States that certain deficiencies in the

’ United Nations, “Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court,” 17 July 1998,
United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f an
International Criminal Court. U.N. GAOR, 53"^ sess., 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9
(hereafter cited as ICC Statute; See copy o f Rome Statute in appendix.)
^ United Nations, “Rome Stamte o f the International Criminal Court, Ratification
Status,” United Nations Official W ebsite, [ratification status on-line]; available from
http://www.un.org/ law /icc/statute/status.htm; Internet; accessed 16 May 2001.
^ Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Interna
tional Operations, Is A U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?
105"" Cong, 2"*^ sess., 23 July 1998, 1-65.
'’ ibid.
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ICC Statue will produce a flawed criminal court that will be unable to achieve its objec
tives o f punishm ent and deterrence for the worst forms o f international crim inal atroci
ties. The scope o f the thesis is lim ited to exam ining four aspects o f the ICC Statute that
form the core o f the U.S. objections:
( 1)

The jurisdiction o f the ICC;

(2)

The authority and powers o f the Office o f the Prosecutor;

(3)

The role o f the United Nations Security Council; and,

(4)

The crimes that the ICC will be enforcing.

U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for W ar Crimes Issues, David Scheffer, who led his
country’s delegation at the Rome Conference, described the U.S. objections as follows:
Unfortunately, a small group o f countries, m eeting behind closed doors in
the final days o f the Rome conference, produced a seriously flawed take-it-orleave-it text, one that provides a recipe for politicization o f the Court and risks de
terring responsible international action to prom ote peace and security. M ost prob
lematic is the extraordinary way the C ourt’s jurisdiction was framed at the last
moment. A country whose forces com m it w ar crim es could jo in the treaty but es
cape prosecution o f its nationals by “opting out’’ o f the C ourt’s jurisdiction over
war crimes for seven years. By contrast, a country that does not join the treaty but
deploys its soldiers abroad to restore international peace and security could be vul
nerable to assertions that the Court has jurisdiction over acts o f those soldiers.
Under the treaty, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over a crim e if either
the country o f nationality o f the accused or the country where the alleged crime
took place is a party to the treaty or consents. Thus, with only the consent o f a
Saddam Hussein, even if Iraq does not join the treaty, the treaty text purports to
provide the Court with jurisdiction over American or other troops involved in in
ternational hum anitarian action in northern Iraq, but the Court could not on its
own prosecute Saddam for m assacring his own people.^
In an address to the UN Sixth Com m ittee, he said:
^ David Scheffer, “Am erica’s Stake in Peace, Security and Justice,’’ 31 August
1998; quoted in Leila Sadat W exler and others, “Panel discussion: Association o f the
American Law Schools Panel on the International Criminal Court,’’ American Criminal
Law Review 36 (1999): 260.
2
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All o f us in Rome shared a comm on goal that an international court should
be able to prosecute tyrants who comm it mass m urder, mass rape, or m ass torture
against their own citizens, while at the same tim e not inhibiting States from con
tributing to efforts to help protect international peace and security. The irony o f
the Rome outcom e on Article 12 is not lost on us.
Consider the following. A State not a party to the treaty launches a cam 
paign o f terror against a dissident m inority inside its territory. Thousands o f inno
cent civilians are killed. International peace and security are imperiled. The
United States participates in a coalition to use m ilitary force to intervene and stop
the killing. Unfortunately, in so doing, bombs intended for m ilitary targets go
astray. A hospital is hit. An apartment building is dem olished. Some civilians
being used as hum an shields are m istakenly shot by U.S. troops. The State re
sponsible for the atrocities demands that U.S. officials and com m anders be prose
cuted by the international crim inal court. The dem and is supported by a small
group o f other states. U nder the terms o f the Rom e treaty, absent a Security
Council referral, the court could not investigate those responsible for killing thou
sands, yet our senior officials, comm anders, and soldiers could face an interna
tional investigation and even prosecution.^
The U.S., while supporting the ICC in principle, rem ains opposed to its creation.’
The U.S. objects to the overly broad scope o f the C ourt’s jurisdiction and the authority
o f the prosecutor, and the inadequate role assigned to the United Nations Security
Council. The concern o f the U.S. is that an unrestrained Prosecutor’s Office will be
drawn into political controversies within intrastate and interstate conflicts.^ A ddition
ally, prospects for the IC C ’s success are made more difficult by definitional problem s
within the criminal subject m atter o f the Court.

^ David Scheffer, “The International Criminal Court Remarks Before the
Com 
mittee o f the 53"* General Assembly,” 21 October 1998; quoted in W exler, “Panel D is
cussion,” 260.
’ David J. Scheffer, “Developments in International Criminal Law: The United
States and the International Criminal Court,” The American Journal o f International Law
93 (January 1999): 13.
^ Ibid., 14.
3
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In regard to the ICC’s jurisdiction the thesis exam ines the following question;
Does the jurisdictional scheme o f the ICC support the U.S. contention that the w orst
forms o f interstate violations o f hum anitarian law will be largely outside the jurisdiction
o f the ICC, while exposing a nations’ peacekeepers operating in a hum anitarian m ission
to the potential risk o f prosecution by the ICC?
The thesis also assesses the U.S. claim that the ICC Prosecutor’s authority is
overly broad and contains too few checks and balances. Furthermore, the thesis as
sesses the U.S. contention that too little authority is given to the Security Council in de
term ining what cases come before the Court. Finally, the thesis examines theoretical
problems associated with the lack o f clarity and preciseness in the IC C ’s definition o f
crimes that may undermine perceptions that the ICC is operating under the Rule o f
Law.^ The research will be on two levels. First, the research will review the history o f
w ar crim es trials following the First and Second W orld W ars to gain a greater under
standing o f the unique issues, problem s and difficulties associated with international
criminal trials. Second, the research will analyze the language o f the disputed articles
o f the ICC Statute that are the source o f U.S. objections.
Chapters 2 and 3 describe the historical background behind the IC C ’s creation.
Chapter 2 is in three sections. The first section exam ines the nature and scope o f the
laws o f war that form the foundation o f the law that the ICC is enforcing. The second
section examines the post-W orld W ar I efforts to punish German and Turkish suspected
war crim inals for violations o f the laws o f war. The third section o f chapter 2 exam ines
^ William K. Lietzau, “Checks and Balances and Elements o f Proof: Structural Pil
lars for the International Criminal Court, ” Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999):
478.
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the developments o f international crim inal law during the interwar period betw een the
First and Second W orld Wars.
Chapter 3 describes the successful post-W orld W ar II w ar crim es trials that prose
cuted German and Japanese nationals for w ar crimes. The trials exam ined include the
judicial prosecutions o f the International M ilitary Tribunal (IMT), better know n as the
Nuremberg trials, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East (IM TFE), or the
Tokyo trials, and the A llied prosecutions conducted in Germany under Control Council
N um ber 10.’° Chapter 3 concludes with the developments in international crim inal law
in the period following W orld W ar II leading up to the initiation o f proposals to estab
lish the ICC in the late 1980’s.
The purpose o f Chapters 2 and 3 is to introduce to the reader the concept o f inter
national war crimes tribunals while highlighting the unique legal and political issues
and difficulties involved in creating such courts. These two chapters will also trace the
developments of substantive international law in the last century that form the legal
foundation upon which the ICC is based. This discussion sets the context for an exam i
nation o f the U.S. objections to the International Criminal Court created by treaty in
Rome in 1998.
Chapter 4 assesses specific U nited States objections to the ICC Statute. The chap
ter opens with a summary o f the official U.S. position regarding the type o f court sought
by the U.S. prior to the start o f the Rom e Conference in 1998. Next, the chapter de
scribes the key U.S. positions on the IC C ’s jurisdiction, the Prosecutor, and Security
M. Cherif Bassiouni, “From Versailles To Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The
Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court,” Harvard Human Rights
Journal 10 (Spring 1997): 11-12.
5
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C ouncil’s relationship with the ICC. Chapter 4 then describes the general institutional
features o f the ICC Statute as finalized at the Rom e Conference. Finally, the chapter
exam ines the actual language o f articles pertaining to the jurisdiction, the Prosecutor’s
functions, and the role o f the Security Council. The goal o f analyzing the language o f
the IC C ’s Articles is to assess the validity o f U.S. claim s about how the Court will func
tion, or as the case m ay be, how the Court w ill malfunction. Specific articles exam ined
include Articles 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 124.
Chapter 5 focuses on problems o f the IC C ’s crim inal definitions with respect to
the principle o f legality. In particular, the chapter exam ines the problem o f the IC C ’s
crimes from a theoretical perspective using legal theorist Lon Fuller’s analysis o f the
rule o f law. In the context o f the theoretical problem s with the IC C ’s definition o f
crimes, the critique o f M ajor W illiam K. Lietzau, the Deputy Legal Counsel to the
Chairman o f the U.S. Joint Chiefs o f Staff is explored. M ajor Lietzau has raised con
cerns that the lack o f clarity and preciseness in the IC C ’s definition o f crim es will cast
doubt that the ICC is operating under the Rule o f Law. ' ' Such a determ ination w ould
underm ine international confidence in the Court and weaken its effectiveness. Chapter
6 presents the conclusion o f the assessm ent and restates the m ajor points o f each chap
ter.
The IC C ’s creation is the culm ination o f a century long developm ent in interna
tional law. At the first Hague Conference in 1899, a Russian proposal to establish a
compulsory court to resolve international disputes had been roundly opposed, not ju st

" Lietzau, 478.
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by the U.S., but also by all the m ajor world powers.'^ Nearly a hundred years later, the
U.S. is again opposed to the idea o f an international court, only this time the U.S. is
nearly alone in its opposition.'^ The passage o f two world wars, the Nurem berg trials,
genocide in Rwanda, and mass war crim es in Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s has radi
cally altered world opinion regarding the viability o f a world crim inal court.
The Rome Conference and the adoption o f the ICC Statute represented a truly ex
traordinary achievement both in terms o f actual drafting and com position o f the treaty
and the developments it portends in international crim inal law. One scholar described
the Statute’s creation, in a phrase borrowed from international legal expert Richard
Falk, as a “Grotian m oment” in international law; the Statute’s creation w as a m om en
tous leap forward in the progress o f the law o f nations.
From a purely compositional and technical standpoint the task o f finalizing the
Statute was Herculean. The Court Statute was finalized and adopted in ju st over a
month, from June 15 to July 18, 1998.'^ One hundred and sixty countries, 137 non
governmental organizations, and 2000 delegates worked sim ultaneously in six lan-

W hile the Russian plan’s tenth article introduced at the First Hague Conference
in 1899 called for the powers to submit m inor quarrels to arbitration, thus ferreting out
issues o f “high politics” from judicial review, the radical element o f the proposal was its
compulsory nature which made the submission o f disputes obligatory upon all nations.
See Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and The First Hague Peace Conference
(Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1962), 146-213.
Although the final vote on July 17, 1998 for the adoption o f the ICC Statute was
non-recorded, after the vote the U.S. State Department announced in a press conference
that the U.S. had voted against the treaty. See United States, Department o f State, Dallv
Press Briefing 20 July 1998, available from http://www.secretary.state.gov/ briefings
/9807/980720db.html; Internet; accessed 16 May 2001.
Wexler, “Panel Discussion,” 235.
“ICC Statute.”
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guages with a 173-page draft statute containing 116 articles and 1,300 brackets for op
tional provisions and word choices.'^ The result was, admittedly and expectedly, a
Court that is not a perfect institution.
Professor Leila Sadat W exler, a participant at the Rom e conference, has stated
that “the first thing one observes in glancing at the Statute is how com plicated it is.” ’’
W ith 128 articles it dwarfs the Nurem berg Charter, which only contained thirteen arti
cles. As an example o f the Statute’s complexity, bringing an indictm ent before the ICC
requires referring to Articles 12, 13, 17, 53 and 56.'® Nevertheless, the IC C ’s creation
contains elements that have the potential to influence dram atically international law.
These elements include supranational judicial, enforcement, and quasi-legislative
m echanisms and functions that will place state and non-state actors in an international
judicial body with the authority to put “real people in real jails.” '^
The Statute adopted in Rome produces a comprehensive judicial organization pro
jected to secure convictions for violations o f the most serious international crimes. The
Statute begins with a Preamble that provides historical reasons for the establishm ent o f
an International Criminal Court and sets forth the intention o f the Statute:
C onscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced to
gether in a shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate m osaic m ay be shat
tered at any time.

Leila Sadat Wexler, “A First Look at the 1998 Rome Statute for a Permanent
International Criminal Court: Jurisdiction, Definition o f Crimes, Structure and Referrals
to the Court,” in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed. International Criminal Law . 2d ed., 3 vols.
(New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1999), 3: 655.
W exler,“Panel Discussion,” 235.
'® Ibid.
Wexler, in Bassiouni. International Criminal Law. 3: 656.
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M indful that during this century millions o f children, wom en and men have been
victims o f unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience o f hum anity,
R ecognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being o f
the world,
A ffirm ing that the m ost serious crimes o f concern to the international com m unity
as a whole m ust not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution m ust be
ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international
cooperation?®
The ICC, while being the first perm anent international crim inal court, is not a new
idea. In 1474, Peter von Hagenbach was brought before the judgm ent o f 27 judges o f the
Holy Roman Empire, and found guilty for w ar crimes against civilians com m itted by
troops under his command.^' Similarly, in 1815 a British naval squadron captured the
international fugitive Napoleon Bonaparte. However, N apoleon’s fate, unlike von
H agenbach’s, was exile, and not prosecution before an international crim inal court.
Yet, while international crimes and tribunals have existed far back into hum an
history, it was the events o f the twentieth century that gave rise to deliberate attem pts to
establish a permanent international criminal court to prosecute effectively international
w ar crimes. The tremendous destruction o f lives and property in the two world wars
drew public demands for trials to prosecute those responsible.^^
Numerous scholarly treatm ents o f the evolution o f the proposal for an international
criminal court document the difficulty o f transposing the idea into reality.^'’ All attest to the

“ICC Statute,” Preamble.
Paul D Marquardt, “Law W ithout Borders: The Constitutionality o f an Interna
tional Criminal Court,” Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 33 (1995): 76-77.
Economist, 19 July 1997,45.
Howard Ball, Prosecuting W ar Crimes and Genocide (Kansas: University Press
o f Kansas, 1999), 17-25.
Ibid.; 78-148; Bassiouni, “From Versailles To Rwanda, 11-12; Bassiouni, Interna
tional Criminal Law, 3 vols.; Colleen R. Donovan, “The History and Possible Future o f
9
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fact that, until recently, the proposal has had a long and largely disappointing history. M ost
notable is the dismal failure o f the post-W orld W ar I efforts to prosecute German and Turk
ish nationals suspected o f w ar crimes.
Following the aborted W orld W ar I war crimes trials various proposals for a world
criminal court were introduced by the International Law Com m ission and other scholars
throughout the 1920’s and 3 0 ’s, all o f which m et with failure.^^ Even the successful postW orld W ar II Nurem berg and Tokyo trials o f German and Japanese w ar criminals raised
moral and legal controversies over accusations o f victor's iustice.^^ Nevertheless, antic ip a-

Intemational Criminal Law,” Brookings Journal o f International Law 13 (1987): 89-90;
John B. Anderson, “An International Criminal Court - An Emerging Idea,” Villanova
Law Review 15 (1991): 433-434; Telford Taylor, The Anatomv o f the Nuremberg Trials
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 8; James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The
Politics and Diplomacy o f Punishing W ar Criminals o f the First W orld W ar (London:
Greenwood Press, 1982), 5.
Willis, 1-176.
For example, in 1924 the International Law Association adopted a resolution for
an international criminal court providing that "in [its ]... opinion ... the creation o f an In
ternational Criminal Court is essential in the interests o f justice, and ... a matter o f ur
gency.” Several objections were raised and the proposal was defeated. The idea was re
vived after the assassination o f King Alexander o f Yugoslavia in 1934, and in 1937 a
convention was opened for signature on the creation o f an international criminal court that
would try persons accused o f an offence established in the Convention for the Prevention
and Punishment of Terrorism. See Leila Sadat W exler, “The Proposed Permanent Inter
national Criminal Court: An Appraisal,” Cornell International Law Journal 29 (1996):
571-573.
In regard to victor’s justice Immanuel Kant noted that “where no tribunal em 
powered to make judgments supported by the power o f law exists,” judgm ents would be
determined by might and power as “neither party can be declared an unjust enemy and the
outcome o f the conflict determines the side on which justice lies.” In Plato’s Republic.
Thrasymachus says “[E] verywhere justice is the same thing, the advantage o f the
stronger.” W W E General Curtis LeMay, who targeted sixty-three Japanese cities for
American bombs remarked, “I suppose if I had lost the war, I w ould have been tried as a
war criminal. Fortunately, we were on the winning side.” Quoted in Gary Jonathon Bass,
Stay the Hand o f Vengeance: The Politics o f W ar Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000), 9.
10
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tion was high in various quarters that the international legal precedents set at N urem berg
would translate into the creation o f a perm anent war crimes tribunal. The N urem berg and
Tokyo tribunals served as both inspiration and as potential m odels for the idea o f a perm a
nent criminal court. However, that anticipation faltered in the post-W orld W ar II reality o f
the Cold War. At that time, neither the U SSR nor the United States was particularly inter
ested in establishing an international judicial body with the pow er to scrutinize their foreign
policy military decisions.^®
During the Cold W ar period the idea o f a perm anent international crim inal court
was kept alive m ostly due to the efforts o f international legal scholars. The idea gained
renewed support with the breakup o f the former U SSR and the reports o f w ar crimes
and genocide coming out o f the Balkans in the early 1990’s. The collapse o f the Soviet
Union and the creation o f ad hoc war crimes tribunals in the form er Y ugoslavia and
Rwanda gave momentum to the 1989 proposal by Trinidad and Tobago for a perm anent
international criminal court,^^ In 1989 the UN General A ssem bly seized upon the idea
and commissioned the International Law Com mission to produce a draft o f such a
court.^®

Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Versailles,” 39; Marquardt, 85.
The idea for a permanent international criminal court was revived by Trinidad
and Tobago who argued for the merits o f such a court to combat international drug traf
ficking and other transnational crimes. See United Nations, Letter dated 21 August 1989
from the Permanent Representative o f Trinidad and Tobago to the Secretary-General. UN
General Assembly Official Records, 44* Sess., Annex 44, Agenda Item 152, 1989, UN
Doc. A/44/195, as cited in Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, “Developments in International
Criminal Law: The Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court,” The American
Journal o f International Law 93 (January, 1999), 22.
United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 44/39, UN General Assembly Of
ficial Records, 44* Sess., Supp. No. 48, 1989, UN Doc.A/44/195, 311.
11
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The reports o f atrocities in the former Yugoslavia led to the creation in 1993 by
the United Nations Security Council o f a war crim es tribunal to investigate and prose
cute suspected war criminals. One year later genocide in Rw anda led to another Secu
rity Council created w ar crim es tribunal. The General Assem bly took advantage o f the
favorable international support for an ICC and took steps tow ards its creation.^'
Following the UN General A ssem bly’s requests, events toward the establishm ent
o f a w orld criminal court m oved rapidly. In 1994, the ILC reported back to the General
Assem bly with an initial draft.

On Decem ber 9, 1994 the General A ssem bly created

an Ad Hoc Committee to initiate a review o f the unresolved substantive and adm inistra
tive issues needed to bring the ILC ’s draft o f the ICC to treaty form.^^ In 1995, the
General Assembly, following a recommendation o f the Ad Hoc Com m ittee, created a
Prepatory Committee (PrepCom) to hold a series o f meetings to assist in the work o f
establishing the ICC. In December 1996 the General Assem bly scheduled a date to
convene a diplomatic conference to finalize the ICC draft statute and produce a perm a
nent ICC. The international comm unity accepted Italy’s offer to host the event, and the
conference was set to convene in Rome in July 1998.^'*
Four years after the completion o f the ILC’s first draft for the ICC, delegates from
countries all over the world, along with over 3,000 non-govem m ental organizations,
W illiam S. Shepard, “Restraining Gulliver; American Exceptionalism and the In
ternational Criminal Court,” Mediterranean Ouarterlv 11 (2000), 56.
United Nations, Report o f the International Law Commission on the W ork o f the
Forty-Sixth Session, UN General Assembly Official Records, 49*’’ Sess., Supp. No. 10,
1994, UN Doc. A/49/10, 44.
United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 49/53. UN General Assembly Of
ficial Records, 49*'’ Sess., Supp. No. 49, 1994, UN Doc. A/49/49, 239.
Ball, 195.
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m et in Rome in June and July o f 1998 to finalize the draft statute and create a treaty es
tablishing the w orld’s first perm anent international crim inal court. In the last h a lf o f the
last decade o f the twentieth century the international com m unity accom plished in under
a decade what it could not accomplish in seventy-five years.

13
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CHAPTER 2
IMPETUS FOR A PERM ANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIM INAL COU RT

Throughout the twentieth century proponents o f a perm anent international crim i
nal court have sought to m ake their vision o f establishing such a court a reality. Fol
lowing the First and Second W orld W ars efforts were m ade to create international tri
bunals to prosecute w ar crimes com m itted during those wars. The W orld W ar II war
crimes tribunals in Nuremberg, Germany, marked the first time in the m odem era that
the international comm unity attempted to hold individuals and states accountable for
serious violations o f international law.* The legacy o f Nurem berg made the Interna
tional Criminal Court (ICC) possible.^ The purpose o f this chapter is to explore the
evolution o f the twentieth century efforts to create a perm anent international crim inal
court by exam ining their development through history. This discussion will set the
context for an exam ination o f the U.S. objections to the International Criminal Court
created by treaty in Rome o f 1998.^

‘ Paul D Marquardt, “Law W ithout Borders: The Constitutionality o f an Interna
tional Criminal Court,” Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 33 (1995): 83.
^ United Nations, “Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court,” 17 July
1998. United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
o f an International Criminal Court. U.N. GAOR, 53'^'* sess., 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
183/9 (Hereafter ICC Statute or Rome Statute).
^Ibid.
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The following chapter contains three sections. The first section examines the na
ture and scope o f the laws o f war. The second section studies the post-W orld W ar I
efforts to punish German and Turkish suspected w ar criminals. Section three explores
the developments o f international crim inal law during the interw ar period between the
First and Second W orld W ars. The purpose o f this chapter is to describe the historical
background o f the post-W orld W ar I attempts at conducting international w ar crimes,
and to explore the developing law these courts were endeavoring to enforce.

T he L aw s o f W a r: B eginnings o f C odification
The remarkable events o f the twentieth century that have led to a perm anent
world criminal court are best punctuated by the two W orld W ars and the post-w ar at
tempts to introduce international accountability for crimes com m itted in the conduct o f
those wars. The more successful o f the efforts to punish w ar crim inals followed the
Second W orld W ar with the Nurem berg and Tokyo w ar crimes tribunals. The Interna
tional Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, the International M ilitary Tribunal in the
Far East (IMTFE), and succeeding Allied prosecutions provided significant interna
tional legal precedents necessary for the IC C ’s creation.'*
But what law were these international crim inal tribunals enforcing? National le
gal systems are based on laws created by sovereign nations. International tribunals, in
cluding the IMT, are not the products o f any national system. The IMT was created by
the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, and the laws adjudicated

'* M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed. International Criminal Law. 2d ed., 3 vols. (New York:
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1999), 1: 21-23.
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by the IMT were based on international “laws o f w ar,” breaches o f which are referred
to as “war crimes.” However, Nurem berg while alm ost synonymous with “w ar
crim es” in our culture, is not the source o f these “laws o f w ar.”
Traditionally, international law governed relations among nation-states, not indi
viduals.* Thus, while nation-states could be held liable to pay reparations for breaches
o f international law, national leaders that authorized the violations were considered be
yond its jurisdiction. Criminal law systems were largely confined to national law, even
if the criminal actions were international in nature. Consequently, crim inal jurisdiction
was territorially based, and state jurisdiction was limited to acts com m itted on its terri
tory or vessels flying its flag. *
Nevertheless, certain international conduct by individuals has long been univer
sally recognized as criminal, thus enabling states to prosecute even in the absence o f
territorial jurisdiction. It was typically the case that if a country could gain custody o f
an individual then a trial could occur. The problem then becam e one o f apprehending
the accused. Two o f the earliest crim es recognized as perm itting universal jurisdiction
for state prosecution are piracy and the slave trade. Piracy in international law is
considered outside the protection o f any state such that any state m ay arrest and

* Colleen R. Donovan, “The History and Possible Future o f International Criminal
Law.” Brookings Journal o f International Law 13 (1987): 89-90
Interna
John B. Anderson, “An International
Criminal Court - An Emerging Idea,” Villanova Law Review 15 (1991): 433-434
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prosecute individuals for acts o f piracy no m atter where they are fo u n d / Violations o f
the laws o f war also warrant state prosecution o f individuals even if the conduct oc
curred outside o f a nation’s territory. ®
However, up until the twentieth century prosecution for these few international
crimes was limited to national criminal courts. International crim inal tribunals were
virtually non-existent.^ The First and Second W orld W ar changed that fact. Out o f the
aftermath of the suffering and destruction wrought by the two W orld W ars grew the
idea o f creating a perm anent international criminal court to try individuals for viola
tions o f the laws o f war.
The twentieth century, beginning one year after the first Hague Convention in
1899, is infamous as both the deadliest century in recorded human history, and the cen
tury in which humanity did the m ost to create laws and institutions to protect hum anity
from the barbarity o f their fellow man. It was most remarkable for crim inalizing the

^ While piracy has long been viewed as a serious international problem meriting
universal condemnation, criminal prosecution and prevention poses numerous practical
and legal difficulties for nation-states. See Rupa Bhattacharyya, “Establishing a Rule-ofLaw International Criminal Justice System,” Texas International Law Journal 31. no. 57
(1996): 66.
* The Romans and Greeks prohibited certain actions in the conduct o f war. For
example, the Greeks prohibited poisoning o f springs and wells. See “Remigiusz Bierzanek. W ar Crimes: History and Definition,” in Bassiouni, International Criminal Law.
3: 87.
^ There have been exceptions, but they have been rare. In 1474, an international
tribunal consisting o f 22 judges firom the Holy Roman Empire condemned Peter von
Hagenback to death for permitting his troops to attack civilians. See Robert B. Rosenstock, “ 1994 Mclean Lecture on W orld Law: The Proposal for an International Criminal
Court,” University o f Pittsburgh Law Review 56 (Winter 1994): 271; Possibly the first
recognition in "modem times" that an international tribunal might be useful in fighting
international crime was at the Congress o f Vienna in 1815 during discussions on the sup
pression o f the slave trade. See Anderson, 433.
17

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

very notion o f war, thus turning back centuries o f state and society acceptance o f war
as a state prerogative, a sentim ent m ost eloquently espoused by Clausewitz when he
wrote, “W ar is the continuation o f politics by other m eans.” ’®
W ithin this revolutionary change in crim inalizing war, three m ajor developments
in international law occurred. First, international law prior to the twentieth century had
legally recognized states as having complete sovereignty, which meant they w ere not
bound by any outside authority or law for which they did not grant their consent. This
meant that the laws o f one nation could not bind another. Force alone determined if
one nation ruled over another.”
Ancillary to this principle is that states enjoyed complete freedom within their do
mestic jurisdiction in that nations could not intervene in the affairs o f other states re
gardless o f how states treated their nationals. Second, individual actions performed
through state sanction were immune from international prosecution with one exception,
that being the laws o f piracy on the high seas, which was universally condem ned and
punishable. Therefore, heads-of-state and m ilitary comm anders were not crim inally
liable in international law for the actions o f their militaries. This principle o f sovereign
immunity for heads o f state prevented their prosecution for conduct com m itted while

’®Carl von Clausewitz, On War, quoted in David Marcella, “Grotius Repudiated:
The American Objections to the International Criminal Court and the Com mitment to
International Law,” Michigan Journal o f International Law 20 (W inter 1999): 341.
” H. Lauterpacht, The Function o f Law in the International Community (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1933); reprint Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1966), 1-21 (page citations
are to the reprint edition).
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serving in their official capacities. Third, the laws o f w ar at the beginning o f the cen
tury only applied during armed conflict in war. Yet, as the century progressed the laws
o f war expanded to include the protection o f individuals, both com batants and noncombatants, within the context o f officially declared wars, as well as outside official
state declaration o f hostilities against another state.
The Treaty o f W estphalia (1648) at the conclusion o f the Thirty Years W ar
(1618-1645) is generally acknowledged as the starting point for the emergence o f the
m odem state system. Usage and practice o f m les governing the exercise o f hostilities
gradually became the laws o f war. The core elements o f the laws o f war were m ostly
unwritten and known as “customary law .” Prior to the nineteenth century these cus
tomary laws o f war were largely u n c o d i f i e d . A m o n g the first attem pts to codify and
embody the laws o f war into an officially adopted code occurred in the United States
during the Civil War.*"*
Francis Lieber, a German émigré to the U.S., is credited w ith the first codification
o f the law o f war. A fter emigrating from Germany to Am erica, he becam e a legal
United States citizen in 1832. He later becam e a professor in South Carolina before
moving to New York in 1857, where he secured a professorship at the newly created
Columbia Law School. A visit to a wounded son in Tennessee led to a chance m eeting

'^Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and M ark R. Shulman, eds.. The
Laws o f War: Constraints on W arfare in the W estern W orld (New Haven: Yale Univer
sity Press, 1994), 1-11.
Telford Tavlor. The Anatomv o f the Nuremberg Trials (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1992), 8.
Ibid., 8; Howard, Andreopoulus, and Shulman, 6.
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with General Henry W. Halleck, who was im pressed with L ieber’s combination o f le
gal, political, and military interests.'^
Later, upon becom ing military advisor to President Lincoln, Halleck, him self the
author o f an international law treatise, appointed Lieber to draft “a code o f regulations
for the governm ent o f [U.S.] Armies in the field o f battle authorized by the laws and
usages o f w ar.” '^ The results were issued by President Lincoln as General Orders No.
100, entitled “Instructions for the Governm ent o f Arm ies o f the United States in the
Field.” ’’ For over h alf a century they rem ained the official United States arm y code o f
conduct on the laws o f land warfare. As the first com prehensive codification o f the
laws o f war, the Lieber Code figured significantly in the first international codification
for W ar Crimes at the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899.’^
The Hague Conference in 1899 is notable for two m ajor developm ents in interna
tional relations and law. The first m ajor developm ent was the internationalization o f
the laws o f war, or at least what passed for international at that tim e.’^ The 1899
conference produced the first general international codification on the laws o f land

Taylor, 9.
Ibid; Howard, Andreopoulus, and Shulman, 6.
” Taylor, 9.
Ibid., 10; W . Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, The Laws o f War: A
Comprehensive Collection o f Primary Documents on International Laws Governing
Armed Conflict (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 131.
Only twenty-six states, predominately European, participated in the 1899 con
ference. Inis Claude Jr., referred to this “international” gathering o f heads o f state as a
“Board o f Directors o f the European corporation.” Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into
Plowshares: The Problems and Progress o f International Relations. 4th ed. (New York:
Random House, Inc., 1971), 29.
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warfare ever concluded in the form o f a m ultilateral t r e a t y . T h e “Convention with
Respect to the Laws and Customs o f W ar on Land” was signed by the United States,
M exico, Japan, Persia, Siam, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and fifteen other
European nations.^' The 1899 conference also produced a Convention on M aritim e
W ar, and three prohibitory declarations on the use o f explosives dropped from bal
loons, on the use o f asphyxiating gases released from projectiles, and on expanding
dumdum bullets.^^
The second m ajor development represents the m ost ambitious effort at the 1899
Hague c o n f e r e n c e . T h e third com m ittee at the 1899 conference labored from late
M ay to the close o f July to address the proposal to create a perm anent international
court. On May 26, the second m eeting o f the third com m ittee had their first serious
discussion o f the plan for that session, o f which the first sentence read:
The contracting nations will m utually agree to submit to the International
Tribunal all questions o f disagreem ent betw een them, excepting such as m ay re
late to or involve their political independence or territorial integrity.^"*
Additionally, the idea was proposed that states should accept obligatory jurisdiction, a
non-voluntary and compulsory m ethod o f forcing states to resolve their disputes before

^*^Adam Roberts, “Land W arfare: From Hague to Nuremberg,” in Howard, An
dreopoulus, and Shulman, 121.
Taylor, 10.
Reisman, 49, 57-58, 130-132.
Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and The First Hague Peace Confer
ence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 137.
24

James B. Scott, The Hague Peace Conference, vol. 2 (Boston: Ginn, 1910), 2:
15; quoted in Davis, 137.
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a neutral arbitrator.^^ The proposal never had a realistic chance o f being approved.
The United States was opposed to any international court that would sit in judgm ent o f
its actions, claiming as a defense the principle o f national sovereignty.^^ N or was the
U.S. the only state unw illing to sacrifice national sovereignty to an international or
ganization.^® The European states likewise were unw illing to forego their sovereign
rights as a nation to be the ultim ate judge o f their own actions.
In 1907 at the second Hague Convention forty-four nations attended, including
the majority o f Latin American states. The second conference constituted the most
universal gathering o f nations to date as stated by the president o f the conference: “This
is the first time that the representatives o f all constituted States have been gathered to
gether to discuss interests which they have in common and which contemplate the good
o f all mankind.^^
Many believed that the two Hague Conferences marked the first stage in the
gradual evolution o f global cooperation among s t a t e s . T h e Am erican delegate, Jo
seph H. Choate, comm ented on the expectation o f regular and future conferences;
Friends o f peace, friends o f arbitration, m ay now depend upon it that every
seven to eight years there will be a sim ilar conference, and that where the last
conference left the work unfinished the new conference will take it up, and so
progress from time to tim e be steadily made...^'
Davis, 137.
Ibid.
Ibid., 138.
Ibid., 138-140.
Claude, 29.
Ibid., 32
James B. Scott, ed. American Addresses at the Second Hague Peace Conference.
(Boston: Ginn, 1910), xxv., as quoted in Claude, 31.
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However, the First W orld W ar shattered the expectation by Choate and others for a fu
ture conference in Hague in 1915.
Yet, while the Hague Conferences failed to secure a lasting peace, they did set a
precedent for international organization designed to solve difficult problem s o f interna
tional cooperation and peace through the creation o f institutions to aid in the regulation
o f conduct between nation-states.^^ The Hague approach, which recognized the need
for international cooperation among nation-states, dom inated international relations in
the twentieth century.^^
Still, at that time the two Hague conferences were considered by many to be a
complete failure.^"* The London Tim es new spaper wrote that the 1907 conference “was
a sham, and has brought forth a progeny o f sham s, because it was founded on a
sham.”^^ Nonetheless, the Hague meetings are considered to be a turning point in in
ternational efforts to use the rule o f international law to regulate war.^^ Although ef
forts to reduce armaments ended in failure, the conferences did produce a num ber o f
agreements to internationalize both preexistent and new laws and regulations for fight
ing wars.^^ There was never real consideration o f governm ents relinquishing their sov-

Claude, 35.
” Ibid.
34

Davis, 209-213; For an alternative perspective, see Willis, 3-6.

Scott, ed. American Addresses at the Second Hague Peace Conference, xiii; as
quoted in Claude, 29.
Claude, 28-34; Davis, 209-213; Taylor, 8-11; James F. W illis, Prologue to
Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy o f Punishing W ar Criminals o f the First W orld
W ar (London: Greenwood Press, 1982), 5.
Claude, 30; W illis, 6.
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ereign legal right to make war, but the establishm ent o f a Perm anent Court o f A rbitra
tion and a Convention for the Pacific Settlement o f Disputes advanced the still radical
concept o f states seeking peaceful rem edies for the resolution o f disputes rather than
resorting to redress o f grievances by armed force and w ar/^
The greatest achievements o f The Hague conferences were in developing laws
designed to mitigate the more horrific effects o f m odem warfare through the laws gov
erning the use o f force in war.^^ Custom ary international law restraining excessive vio
lence on the battlefield had been recognized for centuries, and efforts at codification o f
these laws o f war had been underway even prior to the national m ilitaries adopting
such rules o f war, the first being Lieber’s United States General Orders No. 100 drafted
for guidance o f Union armies during the A m erican Civil War.
Comprehensive international agreements on the laws o f war were adopted for the
first time by governments at the Hague conferences.'^^ The two Hague Conventions on
the Laws o f W ar on Land in 1899 and 1907 included num erous provisions that forbade
actions such as the bombing o f undefended towns, the use o f poison gas, the declara
tion o f no quarter, misuse o f the flag o f truce, assaulting soldiers that have surrendered,
mistreatment o f prisoners o f war, the destruction o f enem y property, and perm itting
occupying armies to abuse enem y civilians.'^' The Convention on the Rights and Du-

Davis, 137-145
Taylor, 11.
Ibid., 10.
“Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs o f W ar on Land, with
Annex o f Regulations, 18 October 1907, reprinted in Bums H. W eston, Richard A. Falk,
and Anthony D ’Amato, Basic Documents in Intemational Law and W orld Order. 2d ed.
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ties o f Neutral Powers and Persons in W ar on Land o f 1907 provided certain protec
tions to neutral states, including an assurance o f the inviolability o f territorial integrity
o f a neutral state.'*^
The problem s o f im plem enting the Hague Conventions relating to the conduct o f
war, which First W orld W ar combatants w ould grapple with, were num erous/^ One
problem is the doctrine o f m ilitary necessity and reprisal/'* Reprisals are actions con
ducted by states to redress a grievous during times o f a peace. The doctrine o f m ilitary
necessity and reprisal grants to states the right to exceptions from strictly obeying the
laws o f war when retaliating against an enemy or pursuing a m ilitary objection.'*^
However, as individual nation-states are left to interpret their own use o f reprisals and
acts o f military necessity, the problem o f varying interpretations and circum ventions is
introduced.
There was also the problem o f enforcement. The Hague Conventions contained
no criminal sanctions in the event o f violations, only claims for compensation. Article
3 o f the Convention on the Laws and Custom s o f W ar on Land in 1907 m ade belliger
ent parties in violation o f the laws o f w ar “liable to pay com pensation,” and to be “re-

(St. Paul: W est Publishing Co., 1990) , 128-135 (hereafter cited as 1907 Hague
Convention).
Ibid., 130.
Taylor, 11.
Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, Intemational Law and the Use o f
Force (New York: Routiedge, 1993), 17-18; Willis, 6; Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford
Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and Hans Smit, eds., Intemational Law Cases and M aterials 3'^'*
ed. (St. Paul: W est Publishing Co., 1993), 570, 870-871.
Ibid.
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sponsible for acts comm itted by persons forming part o f its armed forces.”'*^ Individual
soldiers would be punished as they had been in the past, in accordance with the m ili
tary laws and courts o f each state.
Participants at The Hague conferences never conceived o f creating an intem a
tional criminal court to prosecute w ar crimes.'*^ Instead, the 1907 Conference created
an Intem ational Prize Court for the resolution o f disputes betw een states arising out o f
captured merchant ships and cargoes in w ar at sea, but the court was never established.
The failure to establish the Prize court was due to govem m ents’ reluctance to sacrifice
state sovereignty. This fundamental problem weakened the effectiveness o f the Hague
Conventions. The inherent problem o f limiting the power o f sovereign states through
intemational law is captured by John Randolph, who stated, “You m ay cover whole
skins o f parchment with limitations, but power alone can lim it pow er.”"**
Thus, when the First W orld W ar broke out in Europe no acknowledged intem a
tional law existed that made states or individuals crim inally liable for violating the laws
o f war. But the Hague Conventions had internationalized the subject o f lim iting war
through intem ational laws and opened up the possibility o f lim iting state sovereignty, a
m ajor breakthrough in the development o f intem ational relations and crim inal law.
The Hague conference had also laid the foundation for extraordinary developm ents that
were to take place in the political and public m indset regarding war crim es during and
after the First W orld War.

Ibid., 130.
Davis, 137-140.
John Randolph as quoted in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. 6*’’.
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W orld W ar I and W ar Crimes Trials
The First W orld W ar represented a significant departure from previous wars for a
num ber o f reasons. It was the first war since the two Hague conferences o f 1899 and
1907, and called into question many, although not all o f the agreem ents o f the Hague
Conventions. It was the w orld’s first total war, involving over 65 million combatants
from thirty-two nations."*^ W ar was fought on the European continent, the Balkans,
Africa, the M iddle East, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and the North Sea. Twenty
one million men were wounded, and nine m illion were killed.
Administratively, the w ar required increased m obilization o f soldiers through
conscription and massive coordination o f state and industrial re s o u rc e s .T e c h n o lo g i
cally, the war was fought with improved battlefield com m unications, newer, deadlier
weapons, and improved methods o f destruction, including trench and subm arine w ar
fare, poison gas, barbed wire, aerial bom bardm ent, m achine guns, powerful long-range
artillery, tanks, and airplanes.^' It was the first m ajor industrial w ar that gave rise to
the m ilitary industrial complex involving state and industrial cooperation o f such large
companies as Dupont in the United States, Krupp in Germany, Vickers in Great Brit
ain, and France’s Cruesot company.^^

ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1948), 189.
49

Howard Ball, Prosecuting W ar Crimes and Genocide (Kansas: University Press
o f Kansas, 1999), 17.
^«Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Finally, the war had a strong ideological component that fostered a storm o f en
emy propaganda/^ The Germans in the early months o f the w ar had managed to gen
erate a considerable amount o f hostile w orld public opinion against them.

First they

had attacked neutral Belgium as a m eans to outflank French defenses in violation o f the
Belgium neutrality t r e a t y . T h e German invasion o f Belgium brought w ith it reports
o f atrocities and ruthless destruction. The ancient city o f Louvain was sacked, and its
world-fam ous library was set afire; civilians were taken hostage, some o f w hom were
shot; and, invading soldiers were alleged to have raped wom en and killed children.
Shortly thereafter, comparable reports were com ing in from France regarding alleged
German brutalities in that country.^*^
In January o f 1915, German zeppelins began bom bing raids over England, which
resulted in over 200 civilian deaths by the end o f the year.^^ In February 1915, G er
many declared a “war zone” around the British Isles and began sinking ships with no
warning using their submarines. In April, the passenger ship, the Lusitania was sunk in
the Atlantic, and 1,200 lives were lost. That same m onth the Germans used poison gas
for the first time in the battle o f Ypres. Later in 1915, the Turkish government, an ally
o f Germany, began the ruthless deportation and extermination o f the Arm enians in the
Syrian Desert. Then in October the British public was further outraged upon hearing o f

Ibid.
54

Ibid., 17-18,
Ibid., 18.

L. Mirman, G. Simon, and G. Keller, Their Crimes (London: Cassel and Com 
pany, Limited, 1917).
Taylor, 11-12;; Ball, 16-19.
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the execution o f Edith Cavell, the director o f a Brussels nursing school. The night after
CavelTs execution was reported, a Germ an zeppelin raid killed 175 people in Great
Britain.^^
The list o f alleged German and Turkish actions was long and sordid, and earned
for the Germans the invidious label o f “H uns” and their m ilitary policies as “frightfulness.”^^ However, in nearly every case, there were serious evidentiary or legal ques
tions” that cast doubt on whether or not the Central Pow ers’ actions constituted “w ar
crim es.”®® As it turned out, m any o f the reports regarding German atrocities in Bel
gium, including indiscriminate m urder, rape, and infanticide, were exposed as fraudu
lent propaganda stories®' The neutrality treaty o f Belgium, violated on the first day o f
the war by Germany, bore no crim inal sanctions, and when Belgium citizens resisted
occupation they ceased to be regarded as a neutral country.
The execution o f Edith Cavell was the result o f her public admission that she had
assisted Allied soldiers trapped behind enemy lines to escape. The punishm ent o f Cav
ell, while severe, did not constitute a legal violation o f war crimes. The destruction o f
Louvain was clearly in contravention o f several Hague Convention provisions, but tak
ing and even killing o f hostages did not so constitute a violation o f the Hague Conven
tions.®^

Ibid.
Ball, 18.
®®Taylor, 13.
®' Ibid.
®^ Ibid.
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The zeppelin raids similarly, fell between the gaps o f the w ar crim es violations.
The Hague Convention on land warfare prohibited the bom bardm ent o f undefended
cities, but London was not an undefended city. The declaration o f the 1907 Hague
Convention prohibiting the discharge o f explosives from “balloons, or by other new
methods o f a sim ilar nature” had never been ratified by Germany, and therefore were
not in force.^^ There were no agreem ents regarding the restriction o f subm arine w ar
fare, excepting protection for hospital sh ip s.^
The use o f poison or asphyxiating gas, while m uch less defensible, could be ar
gued as being permissible since the Hague Convention on land warfare only prohibited
their diffusion by “the use o f projectiles.” The Germans could argue they had used cyl
inders, not projectiles.^^ The exterm ination o f the Armenians by the Ottoman Em pire
was inapplicable to the Hague Conventions as the Armenians were citizens o f the O t
toman Empire, and thus were not protected under the terms o f any existing convention
or treaty. The Hague Conventions were silent regarding the treatm ent o f a nation’s
own citizens.^^ Thus, how the Ottom an Em pire treated its own citizens, the A rm eni
ans, was the prerogative o f the Ottoman Empire.
In one o f the m ost detailed studies o f the First W orld W ar and war crim es, James

63 “ J 9 0 7 Hague Convention,” reprinted in Weston, Falk, and D ’Amato, 128-135.
^^Ibid.

Ibid.
Ibid.
The long established principle o f territorial sovereignty involves the exclusive
right o f nation-states to exercise power autonomously within their territory free from ex
ternal authority or interference. See Henkin, Pugh, Schachter, and Smit, 1-50.
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W ilford Garner concluded that with respect to a wide range o f state conduct during the
war, “the existing conventions are either silent, inadequate, or out o f harm ony with pre
sent-day conditions. There is hardly one o f the Hague conventions that cannot be
greatly improved in light o f the experience o f the recent w ar.”^®
Nevertheless, three main factors contributed to the favorable political clim ate for
conducting w ar crimes trials against the Axis powers at the end o f the First W orld
War.®^ First, the public and political leaders in Great Britain and France had been sen
sitized to the idea o f war crimes by A llied and Central Pow ers’ w ar crimes trials con
ducted during the war. The French tried German soldiers for the com m ission o f crim i
nal activity in the plunder o f Rheim s Cathedral and failing to grant quarter to French
soldiers.

German courts tried French and British prisoners o f w ar for their alleged

criminal activity, and the British tried German sailors for the waging o f unrestricted
submarine warfare, treating captured Germans not as prisoners o f war, but as w ar
criminals.^'
Second, the fierce propaganda against the German “Huns”, the brutality which
Germany conducted the war, and the alleged w ar crimes com m itted by the Central
Powers nations created a public outcry for their punishm ent, particularly Germany.

James W ilford Gamer, Intemational Law and the W orld War. 2 vols. (London;
Longmans, Green, 1920) , 2: 463, as cited in Roberts, “Land Warfare: From Hague to
Nuremberg,” in Howard, Andreopoulus, and Shulman, Andreopoulos, and. Shul
man, 153.
Ball, 19.
Ibid.
” Ibid.
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Third, the Hague Conventions had internationalized and legitim ated acceptance o f the
idea o f lim iting warfare and punishing transgressors o f the laws and customs o f war.
Thus, the war crimes issue became the first action o f the peace settlem ent discus
sions at Versailles in 1919/^ At the insistence o f B ritain’s Lloyd George and France’s
George Clemenceau, the Com m ittee o f Enquiry into the Breaches o f the Laws o f W ar,
comprising fifteen intem ational law jurists from the Allied countries, was created on
the first day o f the conference on January 18, 1919/^ The Com m ission was charged
with looking at and reporting back to the peace conference delegates on three issues:
(1)
(2)
(3)

The facts surrounding the responsibility for starting the world war;
W hether the Central Powers had violated the Hague Conventions or other
laws o f war; and,
Proposing a process o f trying accused w ar criminals.^"*

Robert Lansing, the Am erican Secretary o f State, chaired the Com mission. Lans
ing was skeptical regarding the efficacy o f intem ational law and opposed punishing
Kaiser W ilhelm II or establishing a w ar crim es court.^^ In M arch 1919, the Com m is
sion reported back its findings. The Com m ission charged Germany and the Central
Powers with widespread violations o f the laws o f w ar.’^ The report also charged that

Willis, 68; Taylor, 15.
Willis, 69.
Ball, 21.
Willis, 74.
“Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors o f the W ar and on Enforce
ment o f Penalties,” 29 March 1919, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Confer
ence, American Journal o f Intemational Law 14 (1920): 95-96 (hereafter cited as 1919
Commission Report).
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the Central Powers had acted with prem editation to launch a “w ar o f aggression” in
violation o f treaties/^
However, the report took notice that launching an aggressive w ar violated no in
tem ational laws, but in the future such conduct should be condem ned and m ade a penal
offense. In advocating the trial o f the Kaiser, the report m ost notably repudiated the
defense o f sovereign imm unity for state officials in the conduct o f warfare. The French
and British believed G erm any’s head o f state, Kaiser W ilhelm H, “was responsible for
intemational crimes and that superior orders might not serve as a defense in every case;
[these views] added a new dim ension to legal developments in intem ational penal
law.”^^
To implement the war crimes trials, the report recom mended creating an intem a
tional criminal court consisting o f judges from all Allied nations to try German and
Turkish heads o f state and top military comm anders for violating the laws o f w ar and
the laws o f humanity

The laws o f hum anity were prim arily derived from the Pream 

ble to the Hague Convention o f 1907, referred to as the M artens Clause, nam ed after
the distinguished Russian intem ational law jurist.*^ The Com m ission charged that the

Ibid.
Ball, 19.
Willis, 75; M. C herif Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five
Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent Intemational Criminal Court,” Harvard Hu
man R idits Journal 10 (Spring 1997): 35.
Ibid.; “ 1907 Hague Conference,” reprinted in Weston, Falk, and D ’Amato, 128.
The M artens’ Clause contained in the Preamble o f the 1907 Hague Convention reads:
Until a more complete code o f the laws o f war has been issued, the High Contract
ing Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the
33
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Central Pow er’s leadership had violated the laws o f war by ordering their m ilitaries to
com m it illegal acts or had failed to prevent them. The final report listed som e 895 al
leged war criminals for prosecution, which ultim ately were incorporated into the Ver
sailles Peace Treaty in Sections 227 to 230.^' For the first time in history the Versailles
Treaty established the precedent that punishm ent o f w ar crimes could follow the cessa
tion o f hostilities, rather than the traditional granting o f general amnesty for civilian
and m ilitary personnel and leaders.^^
The 1910 Com mission Report, while unanim ous, contained L ansing’s resounding
“reservations,” which in effect am ounted to a dissent.®^ President W ilson was con
cerned about “victor’s justice,” and instructed Lansing to issue a m inority report reject
ing the creation of a High Tribunal and the trial of the Kaiser.*"* However, Lloyd
George was adamant in announcing he would not sign a peace treaty that did not pro
vide for the trial of the Kaiser. The two sides achieved a compromise, em bodied in

rule o f the principles o f the law o f nations, as they result fi"om the usages established
among civilized peoples, fi*om the laws o f humanity, and the dictates o f the public con
science.
*' Sources conflict as to the num ber o f alleged war criminals listed for prosecution.
Telford Taylor stated that the Allies presented a list o f 854 individuals. See Taylor, 17;
Bassiouni stated that the Allies named 895 war criminals; see Bassiouni, “From Rwanda
to Versailles,” 26; Remigiusz Bierzanek, “W ar Crimes: History and Definition,” in Bas
siouni, Intemational Criminal Law. 3 vols. (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1999):
34. Bierzanek states that the num ber o f individuals listed was 901.
82

Ball, 22.
Taylor, 15.
Ibid.
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Articles 227 to 230 o f the Treaty o f Versailles.®^ The com prom ise however, was not
without its detractors. These war crim es sections o f the Versailles Treaty were referred
to as the “shame paragraphs,” or the Schmachparagraphen by Germany.®^ A ttem pts by
the post-war German governm ent to im plem ent the “shame paragraphs” resulted in
violent political upheavals that threatened to topple the government.®^
Article 227 called for the creation o f a five-m em ber tribunal to try the Kaiser,®®
One judge from each o f the five countries o f the United States, Great Britain, France,
Italy, and Japan would comprise the five-m em ber tribunal. However, the K aiser was
not charged with war crimes, but rather “a supreme offence against intem ational moral-

®^ Willis, 80; Carnegie Endowm ent for Intemational Peace, “The Treaty o f Ver
sailles,” The Treaties o f Peace, 1919-1923. 2 vols. (New York: Camegie Endowment for
Intemational Peace, 1924), 1:121-122.
®^ Ball, 23.
®’ The leader o f the British M ission at the Leipzig Trials reported that the post-war
German Government convinced the Supreme Council that an attempt to arrest many o f
those named on the Allies' list o f war criminals would bring down the govemment.
Claude Mullins, The Leipzig Trials: An Account o f the W ar Crim inals’ Trials and a
Studv of German Mentality. (1921): 9, as cited in Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Ver
sailles,” 19; Ball, 23; Willis, 85.
®®“Treaty o f Versailles,” Article 227, The Treaties o f Peace. 1919-1923. 1:121;
Article 227 reads:
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign W illiam II o f Hohenzollem,
formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against intemational morality and the
sanctity o f treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby as
suring him the guarantees essential to the right o f defense. It will be composed of five
judges, one appointed by each o f the following Powers: namely, the United States o f
America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. In its decision the tribunal will be
guided by the highest motives o f intemational policy, with a view to vindicating the sol
emn obligations o f intemational undertakings and the validity o f intemational morality.
It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed. The A l
lied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Govemment o f the Netherlands
for the surrender to them o f the ex-Em peror in order that he may be put on trial.
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ity and the sanctity o f treaties.”®^ Additionally, the Netherlands, who had granted asy
lum to the Kaiser, was requested to “surrender to them [Allies] the ex-Em peror in order
that he may be put on trial.”’® Articles 228, 229 and 230, called for trials o f “persons
accused o f having com m itted acts in violation o f the laws and customs o f w ar” before
military tribunals and required the Germ an govem m ent to “hand over” the accused to
the Allied nations for prosecution.” Com parable provisions to that o f Articles 228-230
were also written into peace treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria.
Section 228 required the German govem m ent to “recognize the right o f the Allied
and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused o f having
committed acts in violation o f the laws and customs o f war.” Such persons, if found
guilty, were to “be sentenced to punishm ents laid down by law.”’^ Section 229 out
lined the process o f prosecution for the accused, and Section 230 required Germany
and other defeated nations to “fum ish all documents and information o f every kind, the
production o f which m ay be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge o f the

Ibid.
Ibid.
“Treaty o f Versailles,” Article 228, 229, and 230, Treaties o f Peace, 1919-1923.
1:121-122. Article 228 states:
The German Govem m ent recognizes the right o f the Allied and Associated Powers
to bring before military tribunals persons accused o f having committed acts in violation
o f the laws and customs o f war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to pun
ishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding any proceedings
or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of her allies. The German
Govemment shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one o f them
as shall so request, all persons accused o f having committed an act in violation o f the
laws and customs o f war, who are specified either by name or by the rank, office or em
ployment which they held under the German authorities, (emphasis added)
Ibid.
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incriminating acts, the discovery o f the offenders and the just appreciation o f responsi
bility.”^^
The trial o f the K aiser never m aterialized as the Dutch refused to turn over the
K aiser for trial. The Dutch refused on the grounds that the charge against the K aiser
was unknown to Dutch law, and was not contained in any treaties which H olland had
ratified. The Allied powers were divided over the wisdom o f pursuing the m atter fully
through formal extradition procedures. M eanwhile, Holland attem pted to discourage
the Allies from m aking a formal extradition request. Holland was also bolstered in
their refusal by diplom atic indications that the Allied request to hand over the Kaiser
would not be backed by coercion.^"*
Netherlands could justify its refusal based on a num ber o f valid legal reasons.
The language o f Article 227 only requested that the Dutch “surrender” the Kaiser, and
contained no formal extradition language. Article 227 also charged the K aiser for a
crime that was not contained in any intem ational criminal convention. Extradition,
properly understood, was a formal legal process that required specification o f a crime
contained in a formal extradition treaty whereby one person may be transferred from
one nation’s jurisdiction to another country’s jurisdiction to stand trial for that crime.^^

“Treaty o f Versailles,” Article 229, and 230; Treaties o f Peace.. 1919-1923.
1:122.
Taylor, 16.
Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Versailles,” 19.
Over a decade later in 1933, the U.S. Supreme Court in Factor v. Laubenheimer.
290 U.S. 276, 287, 54 S.Ct. 191, 193, 78, L.Ed, 78 L.Ed 315 (1933), the court stated that
‘[t]he principles o f intemational law recognize no right to extradition apart from treaty.
While a govemment may, if agreeable to its constitution and laws, voluntarily exercise
power to surrender a fugitive from justice to the country to which he has fled...the legal
37
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W ithout a specific treaty governing the crime charged to K aiser W ilhelm n , the Dutch
were under no legal obligation to turn over the Kaiser to the Allies. Therefore, the
Dutch could characterize the charges brought against K aiser W ilhelm II as “political”
and thus, the Dutch G ovem m ent had valid legal grounds to reject Allied calls for the
K aiser’s surrender. Consequently, the Dutch refused to turn over the Kaiser, and he
never left Holland — rem aining there until his death in 1941 at his castle in Doom.
Article 227 highlights the highly politically sensitive nature o f war crim es issues.
It enabled the Dutch legally to refuse com pliance with Allied demands, while placating
the public who desired punishm ent o f the German Kaiser.^^ Yet, public outcry in
France, Belgium, and Great Britain rem ained strong for the punishm ent o f German na
tionals for atrocities com m itted during the war. However, Lloyd George and Clem 
enceau were also aware that German anger and resentm ent to Article 228, which called
for Germany to surrender its own citizens for foreign prosecution, was potentially
strong enough to topple the fragile W eim ar Republic govemment.^® Faced with a dif
ficult choice, George and Clem enceau chose to implement Article 228, and presented

right to demand his extradition and the correlative duty to surrender him to the demand
ing country exist only when created by treaty,” as cited in Henkin, Pugh, Schachter, and
Smit, 1111.
Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Versailles,” 19.
The leader o f the British Mission at the Leipzig Trials reported that the post-war
German Govemment convinced the Supreme Council that an attempt to arrest many o f
those named on the Allies' list o f war criminals would bring down the govemment.
Claude, Mullins, The Leipzig Trials: An Account o f the W ar Crim inals’ Trials and a
Study o f German Mentalitv. (1921): 9, as cited in Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Ver
sailles,” 19; Ball, 23; W illis, 85.
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Germany with a list o f over 800 individuals to stand trial, including many German
m ilitary heroes and political leaders.^^
Reaction in Germany was one o f fierce indignation and defiance. The political
crisis was resolved by the German proposal to try the accused individuals before the
German Supreme Court in Leipzig. Lloyd George, sensing an opportunity to appease
public desires for w ar crimes trials while helping preserve the fragile W eim ar Repub
lic, impressed upon the French the advantages o f accepting the proposal. The French
agreed with George, and on February 17, 1920, the Germans were duly notified that the
Allies had accepted their comprom ise proposal.’®®
Germany, in order to satisfy Allied demands, passed legislation creating national
laws to prosecute accused offenders before the Supreme Court. The Allies initially
submitted a list with forty-five nam ed individuals to stand trial before the German Su
preme Court. Under German law, the Procurator General o f the Supreme Court had
discretionary authority to decide which cases to bring to trial.’®'
The Leipzig trials, as they are com m only referred, began on May 23, 1921 with
four German enlisted m en named by the British. Three men were accused o f beating
British prisoners with rifle butts. Three o f the m en were convicted and sentenced to six
to ten months in prison. The fourth individual nam ed by the British was a German U-

Willis, 117.
’®®Taylor, 17; see note 81.
101

Taylor, 17.
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boat subm arine comm ander who was acquitted o f the charge o f sinking a British hospi
tal ship on the defense o f following superior orders.
The next case involved a charge brought by the Belgians against a German m ili
tary policem an accused o f torturing young children the policem an had arrested for al
leged sabotage. The defendant was acquitted. The outraged Belgians condem ned the
trials and recused them selves o f any further involvement. A sim ilar response was pro
voked in the French whose case against General Stenger and four lower ranking m ili
tary officers resulted in the acquittals o f the General and three o f the other four defen
dants. During the trials the German public spat upon the French delegates, who w ith
drew their delegation in protest and also refused further participation.'®^
O f the forty-five individuals named for prosecution in the initial list drawn up by
the Allies, only twelve military officers were ultim ately prosecuted before the German
Supreme C o u r t . F o l l o w i n g the initial list o f forty-five, the Allies did not participate
in, nor held any proceedings against, any o f the other 895 individuals named by the
1919 Commission. On January 6-7, 1922, the Germans were informed o f a joint Allied
declaration that the Leipzig court’s decisions would not be considered as valid prosecu-

Ibid.
Ibid.
Sentences for the convicted ranged from six months to four years. However,
several o f those convicted had their sentences suspended. The German crowd assembled
outside the courtrooms cheered the accused during the trials, hailing the men as heroes
and victims o f foreign oppression. Consequently, the attempt to use the trials as a deter
rent to future violations o f humanitarian law failed, and instead devolved into a rallying
point for nationalistic sentiment against perceived persecution and humiliation o f Ger
mans by the Allies. See Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Versailles,” 20.
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tions under the term s o f the Versailles T r e a t y . T h e declaration also announced that,
while repudiating the validity o f the Leipzig trials, the Allies reserved all rights under
Articles 228-230 o f the Versailles Treaty to prosecute suspected German w ar crim i
nals.*®^
Thus, articles 228 to 231 continued to be a source o f contention and anim osity
between Germany and the Allies, especially France.*®^ The A llies found the German
w ar crimes trials at Leipzig highly unsatisfactory, and the retaliatory actions taken by
France against Germany agitated Franco-Germ an relations throughout the 1920’s. The
Allies had good reason to believe that Germ any had failed to m ake good faith efforts to
prosecute their own war crim inals.’®® The German Supreme Court - the Reichsgericht
- convicted only a few defendants, and the two most notorious convicted w ar criminals
escaped and disappeared. Even these two convictions were later overturned in a secret
session o f the Reichsgericht. Great Britain was satisfied to let the m atter o f w ar crim es
go, favoring reconciliation with Germ any over punishm ent.’®^ But Belgium and
France pushed ahead for further punishment.

’®^ The Inter-Allied Commission on the Leipzig Trials was responsible for report
ing on the progress o f the trials. After two days o f discussion on January 6 and 7, 1922
they issued their report calling the Leipzig trials “highly unsatisfactory.” See W illis, 140,
quoting the New York Times. 15 January 1922, 19.
'®^ Ibid.
’°^ Ibid.; W illis, 142.
'®®Ibid.
'®®A majority o f British politicians wanted to see the issue o f war crimes trials dis
appear, reflecting the view o f a British m ilitary intelligence report on the subject: “every
body concerned - most o f all the Attorney-General - is only too anxious to let the whole
war criminals question sleep. It only brings us trouble both with the French & with the
Germans.” See W illis, 140, quoting Foreign Office, “Minute by R. F. Wigram on dis41
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Subsequently, France and Belgium conducted hundreds o f trials against German
w ar crime suspects. The two countries also used the w ar crimes issue as a diplom atic
weapon to force Germ any to comply with the terms o f the Versailles Treaty, particu
larly the w ar reparations.'

The Belgium and French trials ended com pletely in 1925

when the Locarno pact form ally established German, French, and Belgium borders.
Nevertheless, France continued to denigrate Germany by refusing to allow convicted
Germans from entering French territory until 1929. German politicians, m ost notably
Adolph H itler w ould use these French slights as political capital to engender nationalis
tic fervor against the Allies in the interwar years. Germany bitterly resented having its
soldiers convicted as w ar criminals by French and Belgium courts, and actively strove
to erase the national hum iliation they felt at the hands o f their Allied victors in W orld
War I .'"
The Com mission also charged Turkish officials and other individuals with
“crimes against the laws o f hum anity” for the 1915 massacres o f A rm enians."^ The
charge o f violating the laws o f hum anity was based on the M artens Clause included in
the Preamble o f the 1907 Hague Convention. The M artens Clause states;

patch [sic] from Captain W oolcombe to C.H. Tufton,” 14 October 1921, Great Britain.
Papers o f the Foreign Office. Public Record Office. 371/5864, C 20103/29/18.
A new French Govemment, headed by Premier Poincaré took a harsher view
toward German war guilt than former Prem ier Briand. Poincaré sought the courtmarshal over 2,000 Germans, and used the issue as diplomatic pressure to continue
French occupation o f the Ruhr and as means to exact unfulfilled reparation payments
from Germany. See Willis, 143.
Willis, 145.
“ J 9 J 9 Commission Report,” reprinted in American Journal o f Intemational
Law. 95-96.
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Until a more complete code o f the laws o f war has been issued, the High Con
tracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them , the inhabitants and the belligerents rem ain under
the protection and the rule o f the principles o f the law o f nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws o f humanity,
and the dictates o f the public conscience.'
Turkey, in response to Allied pressures, convicted two individuals in April 1919 for
m urdering Arm enians."'* However, the Turkish nationalist m ovem ent was growing,
and Greek atrocities against Turks during that time elicited charges o f hypocrisy for
prosecuting Turkish individuals while excusing Greek crim es.'

A long with charges

o f hypocrisy, continued political instability in Turkey prevented further efforts to bring
to justice those who had m assacred the Arm enians in 1915.
On a legal note the case involving the Arm enians had serious legal problem s as
all the potential witnesses were among the massacred, in which case the prosecution
was overly dependent on the cooperation o f the uncooperative Turkish governm ent."^
As a result o f these issues, the Allies declined to seek crim inal prosecution, and in 1923
the Treaty o f Lausanne officially shielded the A rm enians’ killers from prosecution with
a grant o f am nesty."^

"3

“ 1907

Hague Convention,” reprinted in W eston, Falk, and D ’Amato, 128.

""T ay lo r, 18.
"^Ib id .
"^ Ib id .
Ibid; Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 17.
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Inter-W ar Period: T o N u r e m b e rg

Despite the failure o f the war crimes provisions o f the Versailles Treaty, the sav
agery o f W orld W ar I provoked public demands for new m ethods o f lim iting the exces
sive violence associated with m odem warfare. Political leaders at the Paris Peace Con
ference understood how ever that any new m easures would likely face stiff political op
position from nations more concerned with nationalist self-interests and self-defense.
Nevertheless, the interwar period witnessed several efforts aimed at controlling the un
restricted waging o f war. The m ost notable o f these efforts were attempts at strength
ening the Hague Conventions, defining and outlawing aggressive warfare, codifying
international war crimes, and creating a perm anent international criminal court. These
four issues and the problem s they pose for establishing an international crim inal justice
system are the same ones facing the establishm ent o f the ICC nearly seventy-five years
later in the last decade o f the twentieth century."®
A meeting o f the Advisory Com mittee o f Jurists in 1920 to draft a statute for the
Perm anent Court o f International Justice also looked into the possibility o f establishing
a perm anent crim inal court. The Advisory Com mittee offered as the rational for setting
up a perm anent crim inal court that only a perm anent judicial institution w ould be
largely immune to the political problem s that had plagued A llied attempts at pursuing
war crimes trials follow ing W orld W ar I.'

"® Willis, 164-176; Ball, 30-34; Taylor, 18-20.
"^ W illis, 167.
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Albert de Lapradelle argued for the m erits o f an institution that could impartially
“take action against those guilty o f crimes against international justice, no m atter what
nation they belonged to.” '^° Lord Phillimore, who had drafted the first official British
plan for the League o f Nations, supported such a court believing it would contribute to
the League’s goal o f reducing international violence. Raoul Fernandes o f Brazil, said
in a statement that nearly echoes the present day U.S. position opposing the ICC, that
“serious technical and political difficulties,” unless adequately addressed, m ay actually
be “a menace to peace.” '^'
Am erican jurist Elihu Root, while opposed to granting to the League or its ju d i
cial institutions de facto authority o f a “super-state,” favored a gradual approach that
allowed an international criminal tribunal to grow as states became more confident in
the new system ’s ability to f u n c t i o n . R o o t thought that the m anner in which the
slave trade was increasingly suppressed could serve as a prudent model for how nations
might approach the outlawing o f international criminal activities.
Although the Advisory Com mittee was acutely aware o f the political and legal
difficulties involved in such a proposal, they nevertheless recom m ended to the newly
formed League the creation o f a High Court o f International Justice to try violations o f
international law.'^^ The League’s Assem bly ignored the com m ittee’s report and ac-

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.; Benjamin Ferencz, An International Criminal Court: A Step Toward
W orld Peace - A Documentary History and Analysis. 2 vols. (New York: Oceana Pub
lishers, 1980), 1:196-224.
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cepted it without debate. As the report was subm itted at the first m eeting, it was not
surprising that the Assembly m embers did not wish to consider a measure that pro
posed such sweeping changes to the international political system prior to the League’s
dem onstrating its ability to f u n c t i o n . S o v e r e i g n t y , newly acquired by some nations
and so dearly preserved by others during the world war, w ould not quickly be sacri
ficed to the altar o f an untested, and potentially oppressive, authoritarian international
judicial body:’^^
The League was strongly imbued with the W ilsonian conviction that the na
tion is the natural and proper unit o f world politics, and that the only sound and
moral basis for international order is a settlem ent which enables peoples to
achieve autonomous existence within a system dedicated to the sovereignty o f na
tions. Sovereignty was not a naughty word for the League; it was a symbol o f
liberty in international relations, com parable to democracy as a symbol o f dom es
tic freedom.
Thus, in the 1920’s discussions and debates concerning an international criminal tribu
nal failed to materialize in the League or among governments.
Instead, the idea was preserved through study by private organizations composed
o f international lawyers, including Hugh H. Bellot, Vespasien V. Pella, Nicolas Politis,
Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, M égalos Caloyanni and Quintiliano Saldana.*^’ These
international lawyers drafted statutes for an international crim inal court and code, pub
lished materials on the subject and advocated for the adoption o f their proposals.
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In 1925, one o f Pella’s proposals was approved by the Interparliam entary Union, and
the International Law Association in 1926 favored B ellot’s draft statute. Later in 1926,
the A ssociation internationale de droit pénal was founded by several o f these scholars
to further advance the study o f the issue.
The first post-war efforts aimed at lim iting arm aments m et w ith failure. A t the
five-power W ashington Conference o f 1922, the attendees found it impossible to for
mulate a treaty limiting aerial warfare,'^® Elihu Root, the Am erican jurist, was o f the
opinion that the conference m issed a great opportunity to initiate an international
criminal code. R oot’s proposal to outlaw unrestricted subm arine warfare by equating it
with piracy, and thus universally enforceable by any nation, was m et with derision by
military representatives.'^'
Largely due to the influential and widely read book Command o f the A ir (1921)
by Italian air general Giulo Douhet there were no significant treaties regulating air w ar
f a r e . D o u h e t ’s book, which preached the supremacy o f air power in future wars, was
viewed favorably among British and United States m ilitary commanders who conse
quently were investing heavily in the production o f aircraft bom bers for defense pur
p o s e s . T h e r e f o r e , the failure o f governm ents to reach agreem ents limiting aerial
combat was not surprising.'^''
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However, the 1925 Geneva Protocol successfully prohibited poison gas. A m a
jority o f nations signed the poison gas prohibition Protocol, and thus it was considered
legally binding upon signatory nations. The United States failed to ratify the Protocol
until 1975 largely due to objections over its application regarding tear gas and herbi
cides.'^^
In 1930, the London Treaty for the lim itation o f naval arm am ents was signed by
eleven nations. The London Treaty provided that, “with regard to merchant ships,
submarines must conform to the rules o f International Law to which surface vessels are
subjected,” and explicitly prevented the sinking o f m erchant ships unless the m erchant
ships had refused to stop or attacked the subm arine and the “passenger, crew and ships
papers” had first been put “in a place o f safety” in consideration o f location and sea and
weather. In 1936, these rules were circulated to all other nations for the purposes o f
ratification, and thus at the onset o f W orld W ar II, forty-eight countries had accepted it,
including Germany and all other m ajor powers.
Despite the enormous political and legal hurdles associated with creating institu
tional m echanism s to preserve peace, punish international w ar crimes, and codify w ar
crimes, several international jurists worked diligently to produce international treaties
and agreements towards these ends. Am ong the scholars working on the problem o f
defining and outlawing the waging o f aggressive warfare was Nicolas Politas, the

Ibid.
Ibid.
48

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

prom inent Greek am bassador to France. Politas, on account o f his close governm ental
ties, was keenly aware o f the political difficulties associated with the outlawing o f war
and the creation o f an international crim inal tribunal. Speaking before Columbia U ni
versity in 1926 Politas recognized that “there was no use blinking the fact that any in
novation in this direction tends to upset the ingrained habits o f centuries.” ' P o l i t a s
along with m any other international legal scholars viewed aggression in the form o f
warfare as the greatest evil from whose source sprang all other w ar crimes. Therefore,
tackling the problem o f aggression becam e the centerpiece o f m any o f the efforts at this
time in form ulating m echanism s for the preservation o f peace.
An early attem pt to define and outlaw aggressive w ar was the 1924 Protocol for
the Peaceful Settlement o f International disputes, which Politas helped draft. The Pro
tocol created a relatively simple formula for defining aggression. I f any state resorted
to war rather than except compulsory arbitration, as required by the Protocol, that state
was designated as an aggressor nation and therefore subject to the im position o f sanc
tions by m embers states o f the League o f Nations. The treaty w as accepted by all the
League m embers and was poised to go into effect when a newly elected conservative
British government balked at the idea citing concerns over practicality and national se
curity. W ith the refusal o f the British to join, the Protocol was dead.'^^

W illis, 169.
Ibid., 170.
Benjamin Ferencz, Defining International Aggression: The Search for W orld
Peace, A Documentary History and Analysis, 2 vols. (Dobbs Ferry, NY : Oceana Publica
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Given the difficulty o f defining aggression, the League adopted a different tactic.
Instead, the League adopted resolutions in 1925 and 1927 denouncing aggression as an
international crime w ithout defining aggression per se.’"*® The Pan A m erican Confer
ence, m eeting in Havana in 1928, resolved that a “w ar o f aggression constitutes an in
ternational crim e against the hum an species.” ''^' Although these devices indicated the
evolving international climate o f a moral aversion to war, they were not backed by any
political o r legal means o f enforcement, and thus they were ineffective at preventing
nation-state aggression.
W ithout exception the m ost notable o f the interwar attem pts at outlawing w ar was
the Peace Pact o f Paris o f 1928, more widely known as the K ellogg-Briand treaty,
which attem pted to outlaw w ar outright.''*^. The Kellogg-Briand treaty was produced
in the clim ate o f international amity that occurred between France and Germ any in the
mid-to-late 1920’s.''^ The Locarno Pact o f 1925 had finally guaranteed the borders
between the two nations. At that time France withdrew from the Ruhr, and Germany
had begun m aking w ar reparations again, thus earning adm ittance to the League o f N a
tions in 1926. For their efforts, the Foreign ministers o f both countries, France’s Aris-

WilUs, 170.
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tide Briand and Germ any’s Gustav Stresseman, had shared the Nobel Peace Prize in
1926.
W hen the tenth anniversary o f the United States entry into W orld W ar I was cele
brated on April 6, 1927, France’s Briand proposed honoring the date with a m utual re
nunciation o f war between France and the United S t a t e s . U n d e r public enthusiasm
and pressure, American Secretary o f State Frank B. Kellogg sought to extend their bi
lateral treaty to allow other nations to join. On August 27, 1928, representatives o f fif
teen nations met in Paris to sign the international treaty for the Renunciation o f W ar as
an Instrum ent o f National Policy, m ore popularly referred to as the Kellogg-Briand
t r e a t y . F o r t y - f o u r nations ultim ately signed the treaty including all the Great Pow 
ers, among them, Germany, with the exception o f the Soviet Union.
W hile the treaty was lauded for its universal condem nation o f war as an instru
ment o f national policy, whether or not it m ade waging w ar criminal was debatable.'"*^
By failing to offer any specific remedies or crim inal sanctions for its violation, the
treaty legally resembled more o f a non-binding resolution than a legally binding treaty
backed with enforcement provisions.
In summary, at the start o f W orld W ar II in 1939 as Telford Taylor notes in his
book The Anatomy o f the N urem berg Trials, the laws o f w ar were essentially the same
as those established in the Hague and Geneva conventions, w ith the exception o f treaty
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provisions on poison gas and s u b m a r in e s .H o w e v e r , one m ajor shift that had oc
curred was the internationalization o f the subject o f war and peace that was motivated
by the ideals o f establishing a w orld com m unity.’"'^
The First W orld W ar had exposed the political and legal difficulties, including
the substantial gaps in international law, regarding the successful prosecution o f war
c r i m e s . T h e First W orld W ar had also developed in the m inds o f the public and o f
statesm an the possibility that nation-states could be held accountable for their actions
in the course o f a war.
Furthermore, the idea o f preserving the peace through international organization,
cooperation and international law, which helped regulate the conduct between nations
during war and peace, had gathered enough support to sustain the creation o f the
League o f Nations. As Professor Inis Claude has written “the League was the m anifes
tation o f a reform movement, an effort to improve the procedures and assist the opera
tion o f the world political system .”

It was not intended to replace the m ultistate sys

tem. O n the contrary, the League was “established in the faith that the goals o f peace
and security were to be achieved not by the revolutionary repudiation o f sovereignty,
but by the fulfillment o f the constructive and cooperative potential o f sovereign, selfgoverning peoples.” '
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As the failed attempts at post W orld W ar I war crimes trials demonstrated, the
foundational principles o f the multistate system inhibited the successful prosecution o f
the violators o f the laws o f war. Heads-of-state and military leaders still enjoyed sov
ereign immunity from international prosecution. Sovereign nations were under no ob
ligation to cooperate with international prosecutions. There was neither uniform ity nor
universality regarding the international laws o f war. N or was their uniform and uni
versal agreement on the political and legal wisdom o f establishing international war
crimes tribunals. However, the legal thought behind the idea o f holding individuals
accountable for their actions in international community existed. In order to succeed,
the post-W orld W ar II w ar crimes trials would need to challenge and alter those foun
dational principles o f the m ultistate system.
In short, the international legal precedents established by the Nurem berg trials
are built upon the idea o f international w ar crim es tribunals arising out o f the failed A l
lied attempts after W W I. The legal precedents established by the Nurem berg trials
were created in the crucible o f the Second W orld W ar whose brutality and barbarity
exceeded even that o f the First W orld W ar. As a result, the conclusion o f the Second
W orld W ar proved to be quite different from the events that followed the First W orld
War.
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CHA PTER 3
THE LEGACY OF NUREM BERG

On August 8, 1945, the four occupying powers o f France, Great Britain, the Soviet
Union, and the United States issued the London Charter establishing the International
M ilitary Tribunal (IMT), m ore com m only referred to as the Nurem berg trials.’ The tri
als were named after the geographical location where they were held in Nurem berg,
Germany. More than one year later on October 18, 1945, U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Robert H. Jackson opened the Nurem berg trials with the following words:
The privilege o f opening the first trial in history for crim es against the peace
o f the world imposes a grave responsibility. The wrongs which we seek to con
demn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that
civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their b e
ing repeated. That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung w ith injury,
stay the hand o f vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enem ies to the
judgm ent o f the law is one o f the m ost significant tributes that Pow er has ever
paid to reason.^
The abortive efforts at punishing w ar criminals after the First W orld W ar influ
enced Allied decisions to prosecute German and Japanese individuals follow ing W orld
W ar

n.

Individual scholars in favor o f punishing w ar criminals o f the Second W orld

’ United Nations, “Prosecution and Punishment o f Major W ar Criminals o f the
European Axis,” 8 August 1945, United Nations Treaty Series 279, 59, 1946, Stat. 1544:
82 (hereafter cited as London Charter).
^ Telford Taylor, The Anatomy o f the Nuremberg Trials (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1992), 167.
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W ar studied the legal precedents and political difficulties o f that earlier experience and
wrote num erous articles articulating the lessons learned from the first attem pt to prose
cute w ar c rim es/
Further discussion for an international criminal tribunal was stim ulated by the ru
mors o f widespread N azi atrocities. The earliest calls for the creation o f an interna
tional court during W orld W ar II came in 1941 from the London International Assem 
bly o f Parliamentarians.'* The A llies issued comm itm ents for w ar crimes trials in the St.
James Declaration o f January 1942. On the following day the Allies issued the M oscow
Declaration pledging to prosecute Nazi leaders before an international court, while re
m anding for national courts lesser war criminals. On that day Churchill, Roosevelt, and
Stalin warned “let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood
beware lest they join the ranks o f the guilty, for m ost assuredly the three allied powers
will pursue them to the utterm ost ends o f the earth and will deliver them to their accus
ers in order that justice may be done.”^ In October o f 1943 created the United N ations

^ James F. W illis, Prologue to Nuremberg; The Politics and Diplomacy o f Punish
ing W ar Criminals o f the First W orld W ar (London: Greenwood Press, 1982), 173.
Paul D Marquardt, “Law W ithout Borders: The Constitutionality o f an Interna
tional Criminal Court.” Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 33 (1995): 81.
^ United States, “Declaration on German Atrocities,” 30 October 1943, Documents
on American Foreign Relations, vol. VI. Julv 1943-June 1944 (Washington, D C.: Gov
ernment Printing Office 1945): 231-232, cited in Bryan F. MacPherson, “Building an In
ternational Criminal Court for the 2U* Century,” The Connecticut Journal o f International
Law 113 (W inter 1998): 8.
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W ar Crim es C om m ission (UN W CC) to investigate w ar crim es violations and explore
proposals for creating a w ar crim es court.*^
The international lawyers and governm ental representatives assigned to the
U N W CC drew heavily on the w ar crim es investigative w ork o f the 1919 Com m ission
Report^ in their deliberations. In fact, the U N W CC was designed w ith the prem ise that
the m istakes o f lack o f preparation and agreem ent, that had been the fatal flaw o f the
First W orld W ar attem pts at w ar crim es trials, w ould not be repeated. The C hairm an o f
the UN W CC stated that everyone concerned with that organization was m indful not to
repeat the “fiasco o f the Leipzig trials.”^
A s the U N W CC collected evidence, the Four M ajor A llied Powers deliberated on
how to deal with the issues o f w ar crim es prosecution, as called for in the M oscow D ec
laration signed in 1943 by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. British leaders, particularly
W inston Churchill, who had first hand experience with the issue o f w ar crim es in W W I,
wanted to avoid those earlier m istakes, and thus, favored sum m ary execution o f highranking w ar crim inals, like H itler or Him m ler. British leaders believed that “their ‘guilt
was so black’” it w as “beyond the scope o f any judicial process.”^ British Foreign M in-

* Ibid.; C herifM . Bassiouni, “From Versailles To Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years:
The N eed to Establish a Perm anent International Criminal Court,” Harvard Hum an Rights
Journal 10 (Spring 1997): 21-23.
^ “Commission on the Responsibility o f the Authors o f the W ar and on Enforce
m ent o f Penalties,” 29 M arch 1919, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Confer
ence, American Journal o f International Law 14 (1920): 95-96 (hereafter cited as 1919
Commission Report).
* United Nations W ar Crimes Com mission, History o f the United Nations W ar
Crimes Commission and the Development o f the Laws o f W ar (London: His M ajesty’s
Stationary Office, 1948), 2-3,10-11, 111, 170-171; cited in W illis, 174.
®Taylor, 29.
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ister A nthony Eden told the W ar Cabinet, “I am convinced that we should avoid com 
m itm ents to ‘try the w ar crim inals’ and to ‘hang the K aiser (alias H itler).’” *® C onse
quently the British favored sum m ary executions for captured leaders and court-m artial
by national tribunals o f lesser offenders upon conclusion o f the war.* * Great Britain
feared G erm an defendants w ould use the trial as a platform for propaganda to justify
their m isdeeds.'^
President Roosevelt and the French disagreed w ith the British, and instead leaned
tow ard the necessity o f holding international w ar crim es trials for suspected w ar crim i
nals. The A m ericans and French w anted the tribunal to record history, educate the
world, and serve as a future deterrent.*^ An unlikely ally, Jo sef Stalin also strongly fa
vored w ar crim es trials for suspected w ar criminals.*'* Stalin, as early as the St. Jam es
Declaration in 1942, advocated having international w ar crim es trials following the
war.*^
The A m ericans believed that their isolationism in the years following W orld W ar I
and their failure to jo in the League o f N ations were contributing factors in the causes o f

*®United Kingdom, “Action o f the German Authorities in Occupied Territory;
M emorandum by the Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs,” 5 October 1941, Papers o f
the Cabinet. 66/19, W.P. 41 (London: Public Record Office): 264; cited in W illis, 174.
** W illis, 173.
*^ Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 24.
Howard Ball, Prosecuting W ar Crimes and Genocide (Kansas: University Press
o f Kansas, 1999), 54.
*'* Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 23. However, within their territory the
U SSR was dealing with alleged w ar criminals by summary execution. See Taylor, 52.
*^ Taylor, 25.
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W orld W ar II.'* Thus, the A m ericans were determ ined to not m ake the sam e m istake
twice, opting instead for a strongly international interventionist position in their foreign
policy as a m eans for preserving w orld p e a c e . T h e United N ations was an integral
part o f the U.S. vision for how to translate the m istakes o f the League o f N ations into
the new organization’s vital role in preventing future wars.'*
The A m erican international position w as strongly advocated by Secretary o f W ar
Henry L. Stim son.'^ Stim son, a protégé o f Elihu Root, vociferously supported the crea
tion o f w ar crim es tribunals to try suspected German and Japanese w ar crim inals. Stim 
son w as opposed how ever by Treasury Secretary Henry M orgenthau, who rejected the
war crim es trials approach, preferring the British view o f sum m ary executions for Axis
m ilitary leaders.^® M orgenthau also authored a radical proposal to deindustrialize the
German industrial zone in R uhr by destroying factories and closing down the m ines to
force the region to becom e pastoral and agrarian.^' That proposal, although soundly
defeated, displayed the level o f frustration by M orgenthau and others toward German
aggression and the potential for future aggression.^^ In the end, Stim son and R oose
velt’s views prevailed am ong the U .S. governm ent and in Great Britain, and the four
m ajor Allied pow ers created the IM T to punish German w ar criminals.

'* W illis, 174.
' ’ ibid.
'* Ibid.
Ibid.; Ball, 46.
Ibid.
Ball, 46.
Ibid.
58

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

How ever, the Allied decision to establish an international criminal court was only
the first step. The drafting o f the Charter o f the International M ilitary Tribunal had to
overcom e procedural and legal h u r d l e s . O n e difficulty was the four m ajor A llied
Pow ers had different national crim inal procedures. The British and the U nited States
shared com m on law and adversarial judicial systems, but France used a civil law sys
tem , and the Soviet U nion relied upon a unique “socialist justice” judicial model.^"* The
solution to the problem o f different legal system s created a m ixed system.
The IM T and its Charter were established jointly by the London Agreem ent o f
August 8, 1945.^^ The legal com prom ise contained both advantages and disadvantages
to defendants, issues that w ould resurface in the operation o f the International Criminal
Court for the Form er Y ugoslavia (ICCFY).^^ A ccording to Justice Jackson, the m ixed
legal Charter worked to the defendants’ advantage as they could choose either to take
the stand or testify under oath in their ow n defense, or they could present an unsw orn
statem ent - an affidavit— at the end o f the trial without having to be cross-examined.^’
However, the Charter worked to the defendants disadvantage by denying them the right
to confront and cross-exam ine w itnesses available to the prosecution, a right guaranteed

Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Versailles,” 24-25.
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“Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment o f the M ajor W ar Criminals o f
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in U nited States crim inal law.^* Instead, defendants had to rely on affidavits from the
witnesses.
The London C harter contained seven articles and an annex.^^ The annex set forth
the Charter o f the International M ilitary Tribunal, w hich consisted o f seven parts and
thirty articles. The C harter first stipulated the com position o f the IM T as comprising
the four Allies, France, Russia, Great Britain, and the U nited States. The Core o f the
IM T ’s jurisdiction w as contained in Article 6:
[The IMT] shall have the pow er to try and punish persons who, acting in the
interests o f the European A xis countries, w hether as individuals or as m em bers o f
organizations, com m itted any o f the follow ing crim es for w hich there shall be in
dividual responsibility;
(a) Crimes aeainst peace; nam ely, planning, preparation, initiation or wag
ing a w ar o f aggression, or a w ar in violation o f international treaties, agreements
o r assurances, or participation in a comm on plan or conspiracy or the accom 
plishm ent o f any o f the foregoing.
(b) W ar C rim es; namely, violations o f the laws or custom s o f war. Such
violations shall include, but not be lim ited to, m urder, ill-treatm ent or deportation
to slave labor or for any other purpose o f civilian population o f or in occupied ter
ritory, m urder or ill-treatm ent o f prisoners o f w ar or persons on the seas, killing o f
hostages, plunder o f public or private property, wanton destruction o f cities,
towns, o r villages, or devastation not justified by m ilitary necessity.
(c) Crim es against hum anity, namely, m urder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhum ane acts com m itted against any civilian populations,
before or during the war; or persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds in
execution o f or in connection w ith any crime w ithin the jurisdiction o f the tribu
nal, w hether or not in violation o f tho dom estic law o f the country where perpe
trated.^®
Article 7 rejected the defense o f sovereign imm unity, or “head o f state” and article 8
stated “the fact that a defendant acted pursuant to [an] order o f his Governm ent or o f a
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superior shall not free him from responsibility, but m ay be considered in m itigation o f
punishm ent i f the Tribunal determ ines that justice so requires.”^’
The novel international concept o f crim inal conspiracy w as included in article 9
and 10: “A t the trial o f any individual m em ber o f any group or organization the Tribu
nal m ay declare that the group or organization o f w hich the individual was a m em ber
was a crim inal organization.”^^ The crim inal conspiracy concept meant that once the
IM T found a N azi organization to be crim inal, at the trial o f individual m em bers o f that
organization, “the crim inal nature o f the group or organization is considered proved and
shall not be questioned.”^^
Each o f the four A llied nations supplied their own chief prosecutors and staff that
were responsible for the investigation, collection, and presentation o f all evidence, in
cluding the exam ination o f w itnesses, the preparation and filing o f indictm ents o f the
defendants. Article 9 guaranteed to the defendants a fair trial, w hich consisted o f the
procedural due process right to counsel, or to defend them selves, to have available for
their scrutiny all evidence presented against them , and to present evidence at the trial
“in support o f defense, and to cross-exam ine any witnesses called by the prosecution.”^^
Article 24 laid out the procedural process o f how the trials w ould proceed. It set
forth the following order o f the trial:
(a)
Ô))

The Indictm ent shall be read in court.
The Tribunal shall ask each D efendant w hether he pleads “ guilty” or “not
guilty.”
Ibid., Articles 7 and 8.
Ibid., Articles 9 and 10.
Ibid.
Ibid., Article 9.
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(c)
(d)

(e)

(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
Ô)
(k)

The prosecution shall m ake an opening statement.
The Tribunal shall ask the prosecution and the defense w hat evidence (if
any) they w ish to subm it to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall rule upon the
adm issibility o f any such evidence.
The wim esses for the Prosecution shall be exam ined and after that the w it
nesses o f the Defense. Thereafter such rebutting evidence as m ay be held by
the Tribunal to be adm issible shall be called by either the Prosecution or the
Defense.
The Tribunal m ay put any question to any witness and to any Defendant, at
any time.
The Prosecution and the Defense shall interrogate and m ay cross-exam ine
any w itnesses and any D efendant who gives testimony.
The Defense shall address the court.
The Prosecution shall address the court.
Each Defendant m ay m ake a statem ent to the Tribunal.
The Tribunal shall deliver judgm ent and pronounce sentence.^^

The m ost challenging task o f the four A llied nations was defining the criminal subject
m atter o f the w ar crim es trials.^^ Article 6(b) on w ar crim es proved the easiest to define
as they had the strongest legal standing in international law.^^W ar crimes in Article
6(b) included custom ary law contained in the 1907 Hague Conferences and conven
tional law as created by the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatm ent o f Pris
oners o f War.^®

Ibid., Article 24.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 25-26.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 26.
“Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs o f W ar on Land, with
Annex o f Regulations, 18 October 1907, reprinted in Bum s H. W eston, Richard A. Falk,
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o f W ar,” 27 July 1929, 118 League o f Nation Treaty Series 343,47, Stat. 2021.
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D efining “crim es against hum anity” was m ore difficult legally as this categoiy
w as not a part o f treaty law ?^ Therefore, the A llies avoided adopting a rigid legal inter
pretation o f the principles o f legality to avoid an ex post facto charge that could be chal
lenged in c o u r t I n s t e a d “crim es against hum anity” under A rticle 6(c) existed through
a com bination o f sources o f international law, specifically conventions, custom, and
general principles o f law.

Therefore, the legal rationale for “crim es against hum anity”

w as based on the theory o f jurisdictional extension o f w ar crim es. Jurisdictional exten
sion o f w ar crim es legally reasoned that since w ar crim es applied to certain protected
people, nam ely civilians, during tim e o f war, “crim es against hum anity” m erely ex 
tended the sam e protections as “w ar crim es” to the sam e protected people w ithin a par
ticular state provided that state action was tied to the initiation, and waging o f an ag
gressive w ar or to w ar crimes.
The m ost controversial and m ost difficult to define w as the category o f “crim es

Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 26.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “ex post facto” as “A law passed after the oc
currence o f a fact or comm ission o f an act, which retrospectively changes the legal conse
quences o r relations o f such fact or deed. See Black’s Law Dictionary. 4'^ ed. Rev.
(1968), 662.
Ibid.
Due to the fact that crimes against hum anity required linking evidence for these
crimes with the initiation and/or conducting o f aggressive war, and that evidence was
lacking, allegations o f German crimes committed before 1939 were excluded. See Bas
siouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 26.
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against peace.”^^ Form erly referred to as the crim e o f aggression, or w aging o f an ag
gressive w ar, “crim es against peace” w as without precedence in international law, ex
cepting the failed attem pt to prosecute K aiser W ilhelm H under Article 227 o f the V er
sailles Treaty.'*^ A rticle 6(a) defined “crim es against peace” as the directing or partici
pating in a w ar o f aggression against other nations in violation o f treaties and the prin
ciples o f international law. The definition represented the strongest legal rationale that
could be m ade by the Allies. The Soviet U nion wanted to add the wording, “by the
European A xis” as to lim it prosecution only to European nations and so prevent any
possible prosecution o f Soviet actions."*^ Justice Jackson, representing the U nited States
at the London Conference refused. H e argued that the crime o f aggression was univer
sal, and lim iting it in the fashion proposed by the Soviets w ould am ount to a “bill o f at
tainder,” and thus constitute a clear violation o f the U.S. Constitution to which the U.S.
could not allow.'*^

Ibid.
^ Ibid.
Ibid. Professor Bassiouni believes the rationale behind the Soviet U nions’ desire
to limit crimes geographically to Europe was due in part to two things. One, the Soviets
had no desire to codify a broad definition o f crimes against peace that might be used later
in the future against them. Second, they wished to avoid being held criminally liable for
their 1940 invasion and occupation o f Poland as a result o f their secret Pact o f NonAggression between the U SSR and Germany. See also Taylor, 56-77.
U.S. Constitution, a rt.l, sec 10. A bill o f attainder is “a legislative act, directed
against a designated person, pronouncing him guilty o f an alleged crime, (usually treason)
without trial or conviction according to the recognized rules o f procedure, and passing
sentence o f death and attainder upon him .” See Black’s Law Dictionarv. 4* ed. Rev.
(1968), 162.
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The U.S. position to m ake waging an aggressive w ar a crim e under international
law had clearly changed since W orld W ar

A fter W W I the U.S. held it was not a

crim e recognized by international law, but after WWn, they believed it was an interna
tional crime. The U .S. w ould retreat fi'om their post-W W U position due to the political
realities o f the Cold W ar, once m ore holding the position that aggressive w ar was too
difficult to define to be effectively outlawed.*** Instead the Cold W ar era international
com m unity prohibited the use o f force as set forth in the U nited Nations C harter except
in cases o f self-defense, in which case the use o f force was perm issible. The lack o f a
definition for aggression allowed nations to claim self-defense as a justification for use
o f force w ithout any definition to constrain them .
Regarding the developing laws o f war, the IM T Charter in Article 7 and 8 ex
panded and codified international law by rem oving the defense o f “obedience to supe
rior orders.”^^ The defense o f “superior orders” had previously allowed individuals to
plead that their actions were justified as they w ere obligated to follow the orders o f a

Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 27.
*** Ibid. In fact, an international convention explicitly making aggression an inter
national crime has never existed. The General Assembly’s resolution in 1974 defining
aggression, and adopted through consensus, is the only definition o f its kind that exists.
However, General Assembly resolutions are non-binding upon nation-states. See United
Nations, General Assembly Res. 3314. U.N. GAOR, 29' Sess., Supp. No. 31, 1974, U.N.
Doc. A/9631: 143. Consequently, its definition has posed problems for the 1996 Prepara
tory Conunittee on the Establishment o f an International Criminal Court. See United N a
tions, “Second Session o f the Preparatory Com mittee on the Establishment o f an Interna
tional Criminal Court,” Report o f the Prenatorv Committee on the Establishment o f an
International Criminal Court. Vol. I, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, paragraphs
212-93,1996, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (hereafter cited as Preparatory Committee Report).
“The London Charter,” Articles 7 and 8, reprinted in Taylor, 645-653.
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superior.^® How ever, the judgm ents o f the IM T did not adhere strictly to Article 8, and
allowed the defense o f superior orders when the subordinate had no m oral choice in re
fusing to carry out the order.
As the trial opened, tw enty-four persons were initially indicted.^’ O f those,
twenty-two were prosecuted. Three defendants were acquitted, the rest w ere found
guilty. Twelve defendants were sentenced to death by hanging; three were sentenced to
life im prisonm ent, and the rem aining defendants found guilty were sentenced to prison
term s ranging from ten to twenty five years. Herm ann G oering com m itted suicide
hours before his sentence o f death by hanging could be carried out. A ll tw enty-four de
fendants w ere Germ an, and no other defendants from the European A xis powers were
tried before the IMT. The proceedings, while generally considered to be ju st to the ac
cused, w ere one-sided in that no A llied individuals were indicted or tried for alleged
w ar crim es com m itted against Germany.^^

“Superior orders,” was the defense used in the trial o f Peter von Hagenbach in
1474 for various crimes comm itted under his command, and was the defense most com
m only used in w ar crimes trials following W orld W ar H. V on Hagenbach’s plea that he
was merely following the commands o f his m aster the Duke o f Burgundy was rejected.
Instead, he was found guilty and sentenced to death. See How ard S. Levie, “Criminality
in the Law o f W ar,” in M. C herif Bassiouni, ed. International Criminal Law. 2d ed., 3
vols. (New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1999), 1: 381; See also Louis Henkin,
Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and Hans Smit, ed.. International Law Cases
and Materials 3"^ ed. (St. Paul: W est Publishing Co., 1993), 383-384.
Taylor, 571-611; Victor Bernstein, The Holocaust - Final Judgment. (New
York: Bobbs-M erril Co., Inc., 1980); Richard Gallagher, T hird Reich on Trial, (New
York: W .W . N orton & Co., 1961); W hitney R. Harris, Tvrannv on Trial: The Evidence at
Nuremberg. (Dallas: Southern M ethodist University Press, 1954).
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 29.
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Control C ouncil N o. 10 W ar Crimes Trials
In addition to the prosecutions o f German nationals under the IM T Charter, G er
m ans w ere also brought to stand trial by separate proceedings authorized by A llied C on
trol Council Law No. 10.^^ CCL 10 perm itted the A llies to prosecute Germans in the
territories within Germ any that each nation occupied and controlled. Thus, each o f the
four Allied m ajor pow ers conducted trials under the authority derived from CCL 10.
The proceedings o f CCL 10 were different than the IM T proceedings, although they
were patterned after the IM T ’s Charter.^"* The U.S. trials were conducted before a civil
ian judge, while France, G reat Britain, and Russian held m ilitary trials.
From a legal perspective, prosecutions conducted under CCL 10 were dom estic
rather than international prosecutions. Due to Germ any’s unconditional surrender, the
Allies had complete control over Germ an-occupied lands and resources. Therefore, in
theory CCL 10 trials in A m erican occupied zones were exercising U.S. sovereign au
thority.^^ The same legal condition applied with respect to France, Great Britain and
Russia.

“Allied Control Council Law No. 10 Punishment o f Persons Guilty o f W ar
Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Humanity,” 20 December 1945, Official Ga
zette o f the Control Council for Germany. No. 3, Berlin, January 31, 1946, reprinted in
Benjamin Ferencz, An International Criminal Court: A Step Toward W orld Peace —A
Documentary History and Analysis. 2 vols. (New York: Oceana Publications, 1980), 488
(hereaflff tcited as CCL 10).
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 29.
Ibid., 30.
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The Far Eastern C om m ission and the
International M ilitary T ribunal for the Far East
The Far Eastern Com m ission (EEC) w as established in M oscow in D ecem ber
1945 for the purposes o f form ulating a policy for the A llied occupation o f Japan and to
oversee A llied policies in the Far East. The Com m ission, whose seat was in W ashing
ton, w as composed o f eleven states, w ith veto pow er granted to the four m ajor Allies.
The Com m ission created an advisory group know n as the Allied Council for Japan,
w hich consisted o f the U nited States, G reat Britain, China and the U.S.S.R., to whom
the Com m ission reported its directives.
The EEC was essentially a political body, not an investigative body.^^ However,
the Com m ission did serve an im portant function in granting political credibility for d i
recting policies for the purposes o f prosecution o f suspected Japanese w ar crim inals,
their trials, the sentencing o f those found guilty, and their release. In the final analysis
how ever, “the far Eastern Com m ission becam e little m ore than a debating society, and
w hen a peace treaty was finally signed w ith Japan, it died a quiet death."^^
General Douglas M acA rthur in his official capacity as the Supreme Com m ander
for the Allied Powers (SCA P) in the Pacific Theater, had control over Japanese occupational matters. M acA rthur's political view s dom inated virtually every aspect o f justice
in the Far East.^*

Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 31-35.
Ibid., 31.
Ibid.

68

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

General M acA ithur opposed the F E C ’s establishm ent as it allow ed the U .S.S.R to exer
cise too great o f a role and influence prim arily through its pow er to veto any EEC action
it deem ed objectionable. As he stated, “The very nature o f its com position and proce
dures eventually m ade the Far Eastern Com m ission ineffective.”^^
General M acA rthur, by virtue o f his authority as the SCAP in the Pacific Theater,
established the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East on January 19, 1946, on
b eh alf o f the FEC.^® A s a result the IM TFE, unlike the IM T w as not a treaty-based tri
bunal. Pursuant to his authority. General M acA rthur also established the U nited States
M ilitary Com m issions to try Japanese M ilitary personnel in the Philippines and other
areas o f the Far East M ilitary Theater o f Operation. M acArthur, despite his alm ost dic
tatorial pow er in establishing the Far East w ar crim es tribunals, attem pted to rem ain de
tached from the various legal proceedings, although his success in this m atter rem ains
suspect.®* The IM TFE granted General M acA rthur the ability to grant clemency, reduce
sentences and release prisoners on parole, a pow er that was com pletely absent from the
IM T and CCL 10 Charters.®^
The IM TFE form ally arraigned 28 defendants on 55 counts on May 3, 1946. On
N ovem ber 11, 1948, tw o years after the IM T's decisions, the IM TFE’s judgm ent w as
rendered.®^ The defendants w ere charged w ith "crimes against peace,” "war crimes,"

Ibid., 32.
®®“The IMTFE Charter,” reprinted in Minear, 185-192.
®‘ Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 32.
®^ Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 34.
®^ Phillip R. Piccagallo, The Japanese on Trial (Austin, TX: University o f Texas
Press, 1979), 14; Minear, 23-26.
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and "crimes against hum anity” ju st like the defendants in the Nurem berg tria ls.^ H ow 
ever, unlike the Nurem berg trials, which arraigned organizations like the N azi SS, no
organizations were sim ilarly charged in the Tokyo trials.*^^ A ccused w ar crim inals were
divided into Class A, B, and C. The first IM TFE proceedings were against 28 senior
Japanese officials considered Class A suspected w ar criminals.
The proceedings o f the IM TFE, and the w ork o f the FEC, w ere quite dissim ilar to
the IMT, and the other w ar crim es trials conducted in Germany, which gave rise to a
considerably greater am ount o f criticism tow ard the IMTFE.^^ Am ong the first m ajor
differences is that, unlike the IM T, m em bers o f the FEC were not acting in their indi
vidual capacity, but rather as representatives o f their country’s government. This led to
a degree o f politicization not felt in the IM T, w hich affected the internal functioning o f
the FEC and IMTFE, and the quality o f legal justice produced by the IMTFE.^^
In 1949, the FEC issued a form al request to all nineteen A llied powers in the Far
East that the war crim es trials for the Japanese should begin not later than Septem ber
30, 1949. Subsequently, forty-eight states signed the Treaty o f Japan in San Francisco

^ “The IMTFE Charter,” reprinted in M inear, 185-192.
The lone exception in the Far East trials was the Netherlands’ military courts
which prosecuted Japanese criminal groups for the commission o f specific w ar crimes.
See Piccagallo 177.
R.B. Pal, International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East: Dissentient Judgment
o f Justice R.B. Pal. M.A., LL.D (Calcutta, India: P C . Ray, 1953): Minear, 1-229, Bas
siouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 33.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 33-36.
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on Septem ber 8, 1951.^® The treaty provided in A rticle 2 for the transfer o f all con
victed w ar crim inals to Japan to finish serving the rem ainder o f their sentences under
SC A P’s control.^^ As a result, in the Far East betw een 1951 and 1957, all convicted
w ar crim inals w ere released from prison before serving their full sentences as a condi
tion o f being paroled or by com m utation o f their sentences.’®
The constitution o f the FEC and the IM TFE led to proceedings fraught w ith pro
cedural irregularities and judicial indiscretions. Consequently, the Japanese did not
view individuals convicted o f w ar crim es as outcasts, as happened in Germany, but
rather as victim s o f unjust crim inal proceedings.’ * For the Japanese, the IMTFE, and

Ibid., 34.
Ibid.
’®Ibid.
” In fact, several Class A w ar criminals found guilty by the IMTFE were chosen as
m embers o f Cabinet and one even became Prime Minister:
“Shigemitsu M amoru, a career diplomat, who was Foreign M inister in Tojo
M idelki's W artime Cabinet and who signed on behalf o f Japan the Instrument o f Surren
der on September 2, 1945, on board the [U.§. battleship] USS Missouri, was sentenced by
the IM TFE to seven years imprisonment. He was released on parole 21 Novem ber 1950,
and in Novem ber 1951 he was given clemency. Shigemitsu became Foreign M inister in
D ecem ber 1954. During his two years as Minister, he w as instrumental in obtaining the
Allies' clemency and ultimately, in 1957, the release o f all Japanese held in captivity. On
7 April 1957, the Japanese Government announced that with the concuirence o f a major
ity o f the Allied Powers represented on the IM TFE, all m ajor Japanese w ar criminals
were granted clemency and unconditionally released forthwith. Kishi Nobusake, another
Class A criminal suspect, was tried and convicted in further proceedings after the first
Tokyo Trial, but later became Prime M inister in January 1956 and served until July 1960.
He also held the portfolio o f the M inistry o f Foreign Affairs for some time in 1956.”
Letter from Dr. R. John Pritchard to M. C herif Bassiouni, Jan. 30,1996 (on file
with the author); reprinted in Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 34.
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the other w ar crim es trials were not victors’ justice, but v ictors’ vengeance disguised as
v ictors’ ju stice.’^

Comparison o f the Legal Bases for Setting up the IM T, CCL 10 and IM TFE
A com parison o f the different legal m echanism s used by the various ad hoc tribu
nals created after the Second W orld is useful for sum m arizing the m ost im portant his
torical developm ents o f international crim inal law produced by these tribunals. Conse
quently it becom es apparent that the divergent legal m echanism s used in the three dif
ferent judicial proceedings produced divergent results in regard to substance and proce
dure.
The IM T and IM FTE Charters w ere essentially the sam e with a few exceptions.
Both Charters prosecuted and punished accused w ar crim inals for “crim es against
peace,” “w ar crim es,” and “crim es against hum anity.”’^ However, one exception is
found in Article 5(c) o f the IM TFE Charter. A rticle 5(c) allowed the prosecution for
those “crim es against hum anity” com m itted on the basis o f persecution on political and
racial grounds, w hereas Article 6(c) o f the IM T C harter included religious grounds as
well.^'* The principle reason for including religious grounds in the IM T Charter was the
H olocaust - the N azi pogrom against those o f prim arily Jew ish descent - and therefore
the IM T contained a uniquely religious element.^^

Ibid., 35.
Ibid., 37.
“The IM TFE Charter,” Article 5(c), reprinted in M inear, “V ictor’s Justice,” 186187; “C C L 10,” Article 6(c), reprinted in Ferencz, An International Criminal Court, 488.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to R wanda,” 37.
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In addition, w ith respect to “crim es against hum anity,” the IM T Charter provided
that inhumane acts com m itted against any civilian population” could be prosecuted.
The IM TFE expanded the class o f protected persons beyond civilians by elim inating the
w ording “against any civilian population.”’^ The broadening o f the definition was re
portedly designed “to m ake punishm ent possible for large-scale killings o f m ilitary per
sonnel in an unlaw ful w ar.””
Identical to the IM T and IM TFE Charters, CCL 10 also relied on the prosecution
and punishm ent o f crim es against peace," "war crimes," and "crimes against hum an
ity."’* However, w hereas the IM T w as established by treaty and the IM TFE by a m ili
tary order, the CCL 10 conducted its proceedings pursuant to consensus decision by the
four m ajor Allies - France, G reat Britain, the U SSR and the United States - w ho occu
pied German territory at the conclusion o f the war. The legal justification for CCL 10
was that the Allies were perform ing analogous governm ental functions o f the German
governm ent.’^ In effect the A llies w ere acting as the de facto German governm ent in
the absence o f the recently defunct N azi Reich. Therefore, this m eant that the law the
Allies were enforcing in the CCL 10 proceedings was German dom estic law. But as
each nation was in fact using their ow n judicial systems to orchestrate proceedings, the

“The IMTFE Charter,” Article 5(c), reprinted in Minear, 186-187.
” Ibid.
’* Ibid.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 37.
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national law w as not Germ an, but rather the national law o f each o f the respective A l
lied powers.^®
C C L 10 was nearly identical to the IM T Charter. Additionally, the three crimes
identified in Article 2 o f the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East (IM TFE)
w ere the sam e for CCL 10 and A rticle 6 o f the IM T ’s Charter.** The m ajor difference
betw een the definition o f crim es in the Far East trials and the IM T proceedings is found
in A rticle 2(c), concerning “ crim es against hum anity.” In the IM TFE trials “crim es
against hum anity” did not require the nexus o f initiating an aggressive war or w ar
crim es in order to charge individuals for crim es com m itted against protected persons.*^
The CCL lO’s definition o f “crim es against hum anity” differed fi-om the IMT and
IM TFE Charters in tw o ways. Article 2(c) o f the CCL 10 expanded the list o f crim es to
include rape, im prisonm ent, and torture.*^ Second, it rem oved the requirem ent that
“crim es against hum anity” be linked to the w ar by elim inating the words, “before or
during the w ar,” contained in Article 6(c) o f the IM T ’s Charter.*"* M oreover, the CCL
10 broadened the principles o f legality w ith respect to “persecution.” The C CL 10
C harter expanded the category o f “crim es against hum anity” by om itting the require-

Ibid., 38.
** Ibid.
“Special Proclamation: Establishm ent o f an International Military Tribunal for
the Far East,” 9 January 1946, Treaties and Other International Act Series. No. 1589,3,
reprinted in Richard H. Minear, V ictors’ Justice: The Tokvo W ar Crimes T ria l. (Prince
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 183-184 (hereafter cited as IMTFE Proclam a
tion).
“CCL 10,” Article 2(c), reprinted in Ferencz, An International Criminal Court.
488.
*"* Ibid.
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m ent that “crim es against hum anity” be in the “execution o f or in connection with any
crim e within the jurisdiction o f the Tribunal.”®^ Therefore, persecution as defined by
CCL 10 could take place w ithout requiring a connection to another crime.
As for the ability to com m ute sentences, the IM TFE granted that authority to General
M acArthur, a pow er that was com pletely absent from the IM T and CCL 10 Charters.
However, General M acA rthur did not use that authority.^^
The separate m ilitary tribunals in the Far East proceedings were created by the
FEC, and were in that regard sim ilar to the CCL 10.®^ The respective A llied pow ers
were responsible for prosecuting Japanese and persons o f other nationalities w ho were
their prisoners o f war. How ever, each A llied pow er created its own procedures and ap
plied its own laws in the operation o f their m ilitary tribunals. U nlike the CCL 10, there
existed no treaty or uniform ly agreed upon law defining crimes. The largest point o f
difference was the legal authority wielded by General M acA rthur far surpassed any
sim ilar authority w ielded by one individual in the European Theatre. As Suprem e A l
lied Com m ander o f the Pacific, G eneral M acA rthur was the sole executor o f the policy

Article 6 o f the IMT Chart defines “crimes against humanity” as those prohibited
acts, “and other inhumane acts comm itted against any civilian population, before or dur
ing the w ar " (emphasis added). See “The London Charter,” Article 6 (c), reprinted in
Taylor, 645-653. W hereas, CCL 10, Article 2(c) eliminates the nexus between interna
tional conflict and the com m ission o f w ar crimes. However, the preamble o f CCL 10 did
contain a jurisdictional link to the IM T Charter, which contained the war nexus. There
fore, the CCL 10 tribunals were divided over whether individuals could be prosecuted for
the comm ission o f crimes against hum anity against their own citizens in the absence o f an
international armed conflict. See M argaret M cAuliffe deGuzman, “The Road from
Rome: The Developing Law o f Crimes against Humanity,” Human Rights Quarterlv 22
(2000): 355-356.
Ibid.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 32.
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set forth by the FEC. As sole executor o f policy regarding Japan, General M acA rthur
w as able to achieve political goals sought by the U nited States in the Pacific Theater
follow ing the Japanese surrender.*® P ro o f o f G eneral M acA rthur’s authority as sole ex
ecutor o f policy w as evident in the FEC's decision to end prosecutions by 1950 and to
repatriate to Japan by 1953 all those w ho w ere convicted.
One o f the m ost revolutionary legal concepts produced by the German and Japa
nese w ar crim es trials w as the charge o f initiation o f aggressive war. Supreme Court
Justice Robert H. Jackson m ade the case for provisions to charge German and Japanese
leaders with aggression, explaining that “sentim ent in the United States and the better
w orld opinion have greatly changed since M r. Jam es Scott and Secretary Lansing an
nounced their views on m atters o f w ar and peace,” with obvious reference to the First
W orld War.*’
The post-W orld W ar II w ar crim es trials reflected the Am erican view that initiat
ing a w ar o f aggression had risen to becom e part o f custom ary international law which
states were bound to follow. The progression o f the outlawing o f aggressive w arfare as
an uncodified w ar crime had occurred by virtue o f a series o f events that began w ith the
Versailles Treaty’s attem pt in Article 227 to try the Kaiser, the passing o f resolutions
condem ning aggression by the League and other international organizations, and the
adoption o f the K ellogg-Briand treaty outlaw ing w ar.’®

**Ibid„ 33.
*’ W illis, 174.
’®Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 26-28.
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The N urem berg tribunal m em bers o f the Nazi com m and structure were held to be
individually accoimtable and were charged with the follow ing substantive crimes: (a)
crim es against peace; (b) w ar crim es; (c) crim es against hum anity, and waging an ag
gressive war.
In addition to the favorable public and political clim ate for setting international
legal precedents at N urem berg, A llied legal responses to defenses put forth by Nazi
w ar crim inals’ also provided an impetus for creating international law at Nuremberg.
As a response to N azi defendants’ challenges to A llied jurisdiction, fundamental inter
national legal principles were form ulated to address these challenges:
1. The m axim nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine leee states that there is
“no crim e w ithout punishm ent,’’ and “no punishm ent w ithout law.” These m axim s form
the principle o f law that holds that where no doubt exists that the defendants knew that
they w ere com m itting a w rong condem ned by the international community, then it is
not a violation o f the principles o f justice to punish them despite the absence o f a highly
specific international law.
2. Individuals are held responsible for their ow n actions even when their actions
are justified as acts com m itted on the authority o f the state.^'
3. The fact that dom estic law perm its a person’s actions is no defense for viola
tions o f international law; the international law trum ps dom estic law.
T hese principles form the foundation o f individual crim inal responsibility for violations
o f international law and therefore form the core o f the Statute creating the ICC.

91

Marquardt, 81-82.
77

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

N urem berg w as also responsible for developing other substantive norm s and prin
ciples o f international crim inal law.®^ First, Germ an officials w ere held crim inally li
able for acts com m itted against their ow n nationals, as well as nationals o f other nation
states. Thus, with the N urem berg trials the precedent was set that individuals and states
are responsible under international law for acts com m itted entirely w ithin a states na
tional boundaries. N o longer did the principle o f dom estic sovereignty perm it nations to
do absolutely w hatever it w ished to its citizens w ithout a guarantee o f non-interference
fi*om the international community.^^
Second, the charge o f w aging aggressive w ar brought to an end the centuries old
unqualified right o f a nation to go to war. However, the charge o f aggressive w ar also
produced the greatest concerns for A llied nations who questioned its legality and le
gitimacy. In the end, despite their m isgivings, the A llies went ahead with the decision
to prosecute Nazi Germ any for the crim e o f aggression. Bernard V.A. Roling, the
N etherlands judge assigned to the Tokyo trials, stated that once the Allies had charged
G erm any w ith initiating an aggressive w ar, they felt com pelled to m ake the sam e charge
against Japan in the Tokyo tria ls.^
A s a result o f using th e charge o f aggression against Japan, the Tokyo trials gener
ated the m ost dissent out o f all the W orld W ar H w ar crim es trials.

Ibid., 82-83.
Ibid; Taylor, 612-641.
Marquardt, 82-83.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 31- 37; Minear, 3-182; Pal, 1-701.
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First, Judge Roling partially dissented from the charge o f the convictions against Japa
nese political leaders for their failure to prevent the war. Roling argued that om issions
on the part o f Japanese leadership for failing to stop the w ar did not establish their
guilt.^^ Second, Indian Judge R. B. Pal dissented from all the convictions at Tokyo on
the grounds that it w as im possible to assess the “guilt” o f states from a historical con
text. In addition, Pal argued it w as even m ore difïïcult to assess blam e for initiating
wars against individual political leaders operating in an international and national sys
tem that lacked universally accepted international laws and judicial m echanism s for de
term ining breaches o f the peace.^’
Still, the criticism s o f Pal, Roling and other scholars o f the Tokyo trials, however
valid, have done little to detract from the core principles o f international law developed
at N urem berg or the precedent o f crim inalizing state authorized aggressive war.^®
M oreover, scholars have been quick to isolate the flaws in the Tokyo trials from the
m ore respected judgm ents m ade at Nuremberg.^^
In general, the post-W orld W ar II trials brought to fruition m any o f ideas and pro
posals that had first appeared after W orld W ar I, Additionally, while few fundam en
tally new concepts cam e out o f the W orld W ar II w ar crim es trials, the rem arkable feat
is that the N urem berg and Tokyo trials happened at all. U nlike W orld W ar I, the vic
tory o f W orld W ar II resulted in the total defeat and occupation o f Germany and Japan.

Ibid.
Pal, 177-701; Minear, 34-80; Piccagallo, 9-95,209-215.
Piccagallo, 209-215.
Taylor, 612-641; Henry T. King, Jr., “Conference Paper; The Nuremberg Con
text from the Eyes o f a Participant,” M ilitary Law Review 149 (Summer, 1995); 40-41.
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G erm any and Japan’s total defeat enabled the A llies to take com plete control o f both
countries and carry out all aspects o f the w ar crim es trials process virtually unop
posed.'®®
The A llies occupied Germ any w ith over one m illion troops, and therefore had
com plete access and control o f prisoners o f w ar, witnesses, and governm ent documents.
The process o f collecting evidence w as greatly enhanced by the “Teutonic penchant for
m eticulous record keeping,” as so aptly described by Telford Taylor.'®' In so doing, the
Allies achieved a result that was not possible after W orld W ar I. To a large degree the
success o f the w ar crim es trials after W orld W ar II was com pletely dependent on the
total victory and control over the territory o f the vanquished foes. As a result, fully im
plem enting w ar crim es follow ing W orld W ar I was in part prevented by the lack o f a
total victory over the Central Pow ers and the need to m aintain political stability in those
countries, particularly G erm any and Turkey. However, the significance o f the First
W orld W ar lies in the germ ination o f the ideas o f w ar crim es which were then allowed
to bear fruit and be given firm legal precedents as international law by the decisions o f
the w ar crim es tribunals at the end o f W orld W ar H.
The first and m ost im portant judgm ent at Nurem berg crystallized the fact that in
ternational law applied to all individuals w aging war, regardless if those individuals
were the highest governm ental leaders. The defense that as heads-of-state leaders were
im m une fi'om prosecution based on the principle o f sovereign imm unity was forever

'®®Ibid.
'®' Taylor, 57.
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repudiated.’®^ Violations o f international law were applicable to everyone follow ing the
judgm ent o f N urem berg, including heads-of-state.
The Nurem berg trials restricted the use o f defenses against w ar crim es prosecu
tion, including the defense o f superior orders, act o f state, and m ilitary necessity.’®^ It
created an entirely new categoiy o f international crim es - crim es against hum anity that was used to condem n H itler’s brutal policy o f exterm inating six m illion people o f
Jew ish ancestry and other people designated as racially inferior.'®^ M ost significantly,
it confirm ed that waging a w ar o f aggression (the N urem berg Tribunal used the term
“crim es against peace”) violated international law for which individual leaders could be
held crim inally responsible.
These precedents laid the foundation for a new international legal order in interna
tional affairs. The N urem berg principles “repudiated decisively the international anar
chy o f absolute sovereign states in w hich leaders and their followers could use force
according to the Taw o f the ju n g le’” .’®^ Hereafter, individuals engaged in the service o f
their countries during w ar w ould be subject to the dictates o f international law .’®®
However, despite the precedent setting nature o f post-W W U w ar crimes trials Al-

’®^ Taylor, 612-641; Henry T. King, Jr., “Conference Paper; The Nuremberg Con
text from the Eyes o f a Participant,” M ilitarv Law Review 149 (Summer 1995): 40-41.
’®^ W illis, 175.
’®^ Ibid.
’®®W illis, 175.
’®®Ibid.
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lied optim ism that the Nurem berg and Tokyo trials w ould act as a deterrent to future
w ars never reached fruition. In fact, as Eugene D avidson, the noted N urem berg histo
rian has suggested, “it m ay be argued that the uneasy peace that has endured betw een
the m ajor powers since W orld W ar II has been kept not because of, but despite, N urem 
berg.*®^ Certainly, it can be argued that in the C old W ar years, any serious attem pt to
enforce and apply the N urem berg principles to certain conflicts around the w orld m ight
have caused a world war.'®®
Additionally, controversy and historical/legal debate still surrounds the N urem 
berg and Tokyo tribunals as flawed judicial exam ples o f “victors’ justice.” '®^ The N ur
em berg trials proceeded from the w ills o f the victorious Allied superpowers."® Judicial
prosecutions following W orld W ar II ran only one way; the Allies never subjected their
conduct during the w ar to the sam e legal scrutiny applied to Germ any and Tokyo.
Thus, despite the fact that the fire bom bing o f Dresden, the bom bing o f Tokyo, and the
dropping o f atomic bom bs on civilian populations in Hiroshim a and Nagasaki arguably
fit the definition o f A llied w ar crim es - the “wanton destruction o f cities, towns, o r vil-

'®^ Eugene Davidson, The Nurem berg Fallacy: W ars and W ar Crimes since W orld
W ar n , (New York: Macmillan, 1973): 291.
'®®Ibid.
*®^ Philip R. Piccagallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied W ar Crimes Operations in
the East, 1945-1951, (Austin: U niversity o f Texas, 1979): 211.
' '® David Marcella, “Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to the Interna
tional Criminal Court and the Com m itm ent to International Law,” M ichigan Journal o f
International Law 20 (1999): 346.
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lages, or devastation not justified by m ilitary necessity,” - the Allies excluded their own
conduct in the w ar from the purview o f the post-W orld W ar II w ar crimes trials.’
The com plaint o f “victors justice” and selectivity in dispensing justice belie the
persistent criticism that international justice is not blind; international crim inal trials
produce “uneven justice, unequal justice, and politicized justice.”” ^ Furthermore, the
deterrent value o f the N urem berg trials has been m arginal i f not altogether non-existent.
Since the N urem berg principles were set forth and later affirm ed by the U.N. General
Assem bly, 250 arm ed conflicts are estim ated to have broken out, including genocidal
cam paigns o f violence in Tibet, Cam bodia, Guatem ala, Burundi, Indonesia, Paraguay,
and w ithin the Soviet Union.
W hile m any international scholars have denounced the lack o f political w ill in
allowing these atrocities to go unpunished, other equally persuasive scholars point out such as the aforem entioned Eugene D avidson - that sacrificing justice to preserve the
world from a potentially catastrophic nuclear w ar w orld w ar is a virtue not a v ice.” ''
Yet, for all the debate and scholarly exam inations regarding the trials perceived m oral
and legal flaws, Nurem berg and Tokyo also m arked a large step forward in developing
the new international order envisioned by W ilson and others follow ing W orld W ar 1.” ^
M any contem porary scholars and social com m entators lauded the trials as a tum -

Ibid., 349.
” ^Ibid.
' ” lbid.
114

Piccagallo, 213.

"^ W illis, 175.
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ing point in history. W alter Lippm an, the fam ous A m erican journalist, announced that
the judgm ent at N urem berg w ould be accorded by future generations as having the
sam e historical status as the M agna Charta, the right o f habeas corpus, and the Bill o f
R ights.” ® International law expert Richard Falk stated that w hile “deeply flawed as
m oral education, how ever there is m ore to N urem berg than its Judgm ent. Certainly the
Nurem berg trial contributed to an international learning experience on w orld order...” ' ”
A rthur Schlesinger Jr. stated the N urem berg principles constituted, “along w ith other
treaties, rudim ents o f an international consensus,” that m erited international enforce
ment. He added, “such docum ents, outlaw actions that the world has placed beyond the
limits o f perm issible behavior.” "*
In sum, the N urem berg trials created precedent-setting principles o f international
crim inal law that are crucial to the foundation o f a fully functioning ICC. Individuals
are crim inally liable for their conduct even if that conduct is com m itted under the pro
tection o f state granted authority under national law, and even if that conduct is ordered
as a result o f m ilitary or sovereign political commands: the defense o f superior orders
was no longer a justifiable defense in the eyes o f the international community. M ore
over, the norm s by w hich an individual is judged do not necessarily require the same

"® Ibid.
' Richard A. Falk, A Global Approach to National Policy (Cambridge, Mass.
Harvard University Press, 1975), 153.
' '* Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “The Necessary Amorality o f Foreign Affairs,”
Harper’s Magazine. August, 1971, 73; quoted in Piccagallo, 211.
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specificity o f a national penal statute so long as fundam ental principles o f justice are
respected."^

Post-W orld W ar II to the Present:
Developm ents Tow ard the Creation o f the ICC
Follow ing the epochal N urem berg and Tokyo trials, supporters anticipated that
further developm ents in international law w ould include the establishm ent o f an interna
tional crim inal court and an international code o f crim inal offenses.’^® Indeed, som e
progress in both these areas has been m ade. O ne o f the first m ajor acts o f the United
N ations General A ssem bly expressed approval for N urem berg’s legal principles and
sponsored a Convention on the Prevention and Punishm ent o f the Crime o f G enocide.'^'
The Genocide Convention adopted by the U nited N ations in 1948 m ade genocide a pun
ishable international o f f e n s e . ' I n 1949, the Geneva Conventions were revised, and
subsequently additional changes were m ade in other international conventions regarding

' However, there is considerable debate among legal scholars as to the limits o f
specificity that is required in international penal codes, the precise m anner in which rule
o f law principles are protected, and the m inim um guarantee o f procedural and substantive
principals o f law. See Bassiouni, International Criminal Law. 1:283-312.
Marquardt, 83-84.
By General Assembly Resolution 95/1 o f December 11,1946, the U.N. General
Assembly overwhelmingly affirmed “ [T]he principles o f international law recognized by
the Charter o f the Nuremberg Tribunal and die judgm ent o f the Tribunal.” See Bierzanek,
101-102, in Bassiouni, International Criminal Law. 3: 101-102.
M acPherson, 11.
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the laws o f w a r . ' S p e c i f i e d “grave breaches” o f the G eneva Conventions are consid
ered crim es for which individuals are deem ed personally responsible.
In the area o f international crimes, international law expert M. C herif Bassiouni
has identified twenty-two categories o f international offenses that rise to the status o f
international crim inal law.*^^ These offenses include terrorism , narcotics trafficking,
environm ental damage, stealing national treasures, and hum an rights violations.
Yet, these offenses rem ained uncodified w ithin a central code o f offenses. Instead, the
offenses o f international law are contained in separate m ultilateral treaties w ith separate
provisions and procedures for breaches and penalties. Tow ard the solution o f that prob
lem the United N ations General A ssem bly com m issioned the U .N .’s International Law
Com m ission (ILC) to form ulate a Draft Code o f Offenses A gainst the Peace and Secu
rity o f M ankind and a D raft Statute for an International Crim inal Court.
T w o sides crystallized in the debate over the creation o f a perm anent international
crim inal court. R icaldo Alfaro o f Panam a strongly advocated its creation. H e felt an
international crim inal court was the logical extension o f thirty years o f effort and devel
opm ent o f the rule o f law.

Em il Sandstrum o f Sweden objected to its creation just as

strongly. Sandstrum concluded that the problem s o f jurisdiction, state cooperation, and
enforcem ent w ould render successful establishm ent o f a court so rem ote that its “imme
diate creation w ould do m ore harm than good to the developm ent o f international

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
126

Marquardt, 85.
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law .'^’ A fter m uch spirited debate, the General A ssem bly authorized creating a com 
m ittee to draft the statute for an international crim inal court. The com m ittee developed
an initial Draft Statute in 1951, later revised in 1953.*^*
The com plete draft statute did little to ease the differing opinions over the pro
posed court. M oreover, in addition to the practical difficulties o f jurisdiction, crimes,
and enforcem ent, the C old W ar com plicated m atters considerably. The opposition o f
the Soviet bloc countries proved to be a m ajor obstacle to a court’s c r e a t i o n . W h e n
the Korean W ar broke out, Soviet opposition grew as concerns m ounted that such a
court w ould be used against them.
Am ong the plethora o f criticism s raised by these countries to the proposed court
were that any such court w ould violate national sovereignty, and interfere w ith the do
m estic affairs o f U nited N ations m em ber states in violation o f Article 2(7) o f the U.N,
Charter.*^® Such a court w ould also infringe upon the sphere o f jurisdiction o f the In
ternational Court o f Justice, and the Security Council’s responsibility under Chapter VII
o f the U.N . C harter regarding m atters related to the m aintenance o f international peace
and security.'^* N o r were the Soviet U nion and the Soviet bloc countries alone in their

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
U.N. Charter, Article 2(7) states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to in
tervene in m atters which are the essentially within the domestic jurisdiction o f any state or
shall require the M em bers to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter;
but this principle shall not prejudice the application o f enforcement measures under Chap
ter vn.
U.N. Charter, Chapter VH, Article 39 states:
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concerns. The United States was equally opposed to the creation o f the court for sim ilar
reasons, although they fram ed their opposition in term s o f procedural objections not on
p r i n c i p l e . I t was apparent that both the U.S. and the U .S.S.R did not w ish to be sub
ject to any judicial review for w hich they lacked veto pow er or an option not to accept
jurisdiction.’^^
As it becam e apparent that the political deadlock was insurm ountable at this ju n c 
ture in the C old W ar era, m ore states becam e convinced that the creation o f an interna
tional crim inal court w as prem ature, even i f state support existed in principle.’^'* If the
political reality precluded the establishm ent o f an international crim inal court, then pro
gress in drafting a court statute w ere essentially futile. The project o f codifying the
laws o f w ar and hum anitarian law protecting civilians suffered a sim ilar fate, although
the difficulty o f defining aggression was the m ain obstacle in this area.’^^ C onse
quently, until progress could be m ade in codifying international crimes, the ILC decided
to defer the m atter o f the creation o f an international crim inal court. The final blow
cam e in 1957 when the Sixth (Legal) Com m ittee, on the recom mendation o f the ILC,

The Security Council shall determine the existence o f any threat to the peace,
breach o f the peace, or act o f aggression and shall m ake recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore in
ternational peace and security.
Marquardt, 86.
Ibid.; Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 52.
Ibid..
Ibid.
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indefinitely postponed consideration o f both the court and the code o f c r i m e s / I t was
w idely regarded that the DLC’s recom m endation was m eant to lay to rest the issue.
Even though the U nited N ation’s efforts at establishing a perm anent international
crim inal court derailed in 1957, the issue did not go away. As in the interwar period
betw een the tw o w orld w ars, academ ic interest kept the issue a l i v e , I n the 1970s,
scholarly interest waxed, and w hile it generated no practical governm ental progress, the
propagation o f proposals prevented the issue from disappearing altogether. Am ong the
reasons for scholarly involvem ent in the early 1970’s were the suspected w ar crimes
violations in the V ietnam w ar and the Bengali w ar o f secession.

Two conferences,

one sponsored by the W orld Peace Through Law Center in 1971, and the other by the
Foundation for the Establishm ent o f an International Crim inal Court in 1972, produced
two draft statute proposals. Although a larger audience was lacking, expertise in the
field was not, and this m eant the issue could survive at least intellectually until the in
ternational com m unity o f nations was once m ore ready to take up the issue.
A t the same tim e, evidence suggested international interest in an international
crim inal code was on the rise. That interest resulted in a series o f conferences held be
tween 1975-1979 sponsored by the International Association o f Penal Law that pro
duced a draft code o f international offenses. Remarkably, in 1974, the General Assem -

Ibid.
Ibid.
M arquardt, 87.
’^’ ibid.

Ibid.
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bly finally m anaged to adopt a definition o f aggression.’'^’ The problem was w hat to do
w ith it. The General A ssem bly’s resolutions were non-binding, so the definition existed
w ithout legal m ooring.’'’^ Furtherm ore, w hen the Secretariat attem pted to persuade the
General A ssem bly to m ove to the next step o f w orking on the code o f international of
fenses, and a court to enforce them , the m em ber states b a l k e d . I t was not until 1981
when the General A ssem bly w ould again consider the issue o f the code."'’^
W hile it was im possible to produce a com prehensive draft code o f international
crim es, and an international crim inal court bogged down in political rancor and opposi
tion, the post-W orld W ar H decades w itnessed significant changes in substantive inter
national crim inal law. The m ultilateral approach to creating treaty law, w hich had de
veloped slowly in the late 19* and early 20* centuries, m ushroom ed rapidly in the post
war period.’'*^ The rapid grow th o f international law is brought about prim arily through
international crisis periods. Thus, after W orld W ar n, m axim um effort was turned to
ward internationalizing the m ost significant legal principles developed in the aftermath
o f that w ar in the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide C onvention.’'*^
However, circum stances and the passage o f tim e dictated concerns for sm allerscale crimes. As international drug trafficking grew and became a m ore serious prob
lem for countries, interest in crim inalizing this activity created a series o f international

Ibid.
U N Charter, Chapter TV, Articles 10, 11,12, 13 and 14.
Marquardt, 87.
Ibid.
Ibid., 88.
Ibid.
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conventions to deal with the problem.''*^ From these conventions international crim inal
laws targeting drug trafficking emerged.
A n even greater concern w as generated by the rise in terrorism in the 1960’s and
1970’s, as the international com m unity focused its efforts on containing the violence.
A lthough reaching agreem ent upon w hich groups were fi-eedom fighters, as opposed to
terrorists, proved im possible, certain proscribed acts were crim inalized through m ulti
lateral treaty law. Thus, while international conventions and m ultilateral treaties con
tinued to produce proscribed offenses, the effort w as piecem eal and lacked the com pre
hensiveness o f a code o f crim es necessary for the creation o f a perm anent international
crim inal court. The developm ent o f international crim es arose out o f crisis m anagem ent
rather than any deliberate United N ations forethought and planning.
These developm ents in international crim inal law in the 1960’s and 1970’s devel
oped w holly independent o f any consideration o f a centralized enforcement m echanism ,
international legislative or adjudicatory institutions o f international criminal law.'"*^
The m ultilateral instruments and institutions resulted fi-om political necessity o f control
ling international violence and crim e, and w ere w holly dependent on national processes
o f investigation, jurisdiction, and enforcem ent for im plem entation and prosecution.
However, the independent developm ent o f law in these areas stimulated general
international crim inal law in tw o very im portant ways. First the increase in m ultilateral
conventions broadened the content o f international crim inal law beyond the narrow con-

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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fines o f the m ost egregious violations o f crim es against hum anity. Second, the new
conventions created new areas o f international crim es that had significant ram ifications
for “high international politics.’’*^® States now regarded terrorism and narcotrafficking
to be m atters o f grave im portance involving issues o f national security.’^' U ltim ately
these threats to national security renewed calls for a perm anent crim inal court to enforce
these international crimes.
In 1989, the International Law Com m ission began anew to draft a statute for a
perm anent international crim inal c o u r t . T h e ILC ’s renew ed interest came about as a
result o f the international drug trade, A.N.R. Robinson, the Prim e M inister o f Trinidad
and Tobago, proposed the idea o f a perm anent international crim inal court as a way to
deal w ith the problem o f drug traffickers who were wreaking havoc upon sm aller coun
try’s judicial and law enforcem ent systems w ith intim idation, violence, and the threat o f
assassination. 153
In 1989 w ith the support o f a coalition o f Latin A m erican and Caribbean states,
the Trinidadian governm ent requested a General A ssem bly agenda item to consider the
creation o f an international crim inal court w ith jurisdiction over international drug of-
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Ibid.; Marquardt, 90; United Nations, Letter dated 21 August 1989 fi~om the
Perm anent Representative o f Trinidad and Tobago to the Secretarv-General. U N General
A ssem bly Official Records, 44* Sess., Annex 44, Agenda Item 152,1989, U N Doc.
A/44/195, as cited in M ahnoush H. Arsanjani, “Developm ents in International Criminal
Law: The Rom e Statute o f the International Criminal Court,” The American Journal o f
International Law 93 (January 1999) 22.
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fenses.'^"* The request included reference to the 1988 U.N. Narcotics Convention that
had m ade drug trafficking an international crim e, which “threatens to engulf small
States and afflicts even the super Pow ers,” and that an international crim inal jurisdiction
was needed “for prosecuting and punishing offenders who com m and the m eans to evade
the jurisdiction o f dom estic courts.” ’
The General A ssem bly responded by requesting that the ILC resum e its efforts on
the creation o f an international crim inal court.’

The request, w hich em phasized drug

crimes, was treated favorably by the ILC. The U nited States delegate to the ILC re
ported “broad agreem ent, in principle, on the desirability o f establishing a perm anent
international crim inal court” and general agreem ent that it was a “particularly favorable
tim e” to create such a court.
A t the same tim e, turm oil engulfed the form er Y ugoslavian Republic as it disinte
grated following the breakup o f the form er Soviet U nion and the easing o f the Cold
W ar. In the form er Y ugoslavia a wave o f violence and terror sw ept over that part o f
Europe triggering reports o f atrocities that the continent had not w itnessed since W orld
W ar

n.

These reports o f w ar crim es created renewed interest and calls for the creation

o f a criminal court.

Ibid.
M arquardt, 91.
United Nations, General Assem bly Resolution 44/39. UN GAOR, 44* Sess.,
Supp. No. 4 8,1989, U N Doc.A/44/195, 311.
M arquardt, 91.
Ibid., 93-94; Marcella, 351-353; M acPherson, 14; Ball, 121-154.
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Thus, the political clim ate and the obviating circum stances o f Yugoslavia - later
in Rw anda - factored heavily in the Security C ouncil’s decisions to create ad hoc tribu
nals for the prosecution o f w ar crim es in these tw o areas o f conflict. Reports o f war
crim es com m itted in Rwanda and the Balkans spurred renewed calls for the creation o f
a perm anent international crim inal court. The U N ’s International Law Com mission
produced a draft statute in 1993, which led to the eventual creation by the General A s
sem bly in 1995 o f the Prepatory C om m ittee on the Establishm ent o f an International
Crim inal Court (“Prepatory C om m ittee”).
The purpose o f the Prepatory Com m ittee was to produce a draft statute that w ould
serve as the basis for a convention to be adopted at an international diplom atic confer
ence. Approval for an international conference w as secured, and following the com ple
tion o f the eighth session o f the Prepatory Com m ittee in April 1998, the date was set for
a five-week conference to consider the draft statute. The five-week diplom atic confer
ence was held in Rom e in June and July o f 1998, and ultim ately produced a Rom e Stat
ute o f the International Crim inal Court to create the w orld’s first international crim inal
court. M any nations have since ratified the treaty. Yet, the U.S. has stated it w ill not be
one o f them.'®® A s the ICC edges closer to'the sixty ratifications it needs to becom e
international law, the U.S. rem ains convinced o f the Statute’s defects, and thus rem ains

United Nations, Revised Report o f the W orking Group on the Draft Statute for
an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 1993, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/L.490;
United Nations, Revised Report o f the W orking Group on the Draft Statute for an Interna
tional Criminal Court: Addendum, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 1993, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/L.
490/Add. 1.
'®® Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relation, Is A U N International
Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?. 105^ Cong,
sess., 23 July 1998.
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opposed to the creation o f the ICC. W hat are the U .S. objections to the ICC, and do
they have any m erit? A description o f the U.S. objections to the ICC and an assessment
o f those objections is the topic o f the next chapter.
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C H A PT ER 4
ASSESSING A M ERICA N OBJECTION S TO THE
IN TERN A TIO N A L CRIM INAL COURT

The follow ing chapter assesses specific U nited States objections to the ICC Stat
ute (see copy o f ICC Statute in appendix). The chapter begins with an overview and
background o f the official U.S. position prior to the Rom e Conference in 1998 regarding
the type o f court sought by the U.S. In this first section the key U.S. positions are listed.
The chapter then describes the general institutional features o f the ICC Statute as final
ized at the Rome Conference. In this section the specific ICC mechanisms and articles
are identified that the U.S. has criticized and predicted w ill lead to a flawed Court. Fi
nally, the chapter assesses those particular ICC m echanism s and supporting articles.
The assessm ent is done by carefully analyzing the language o f those articles to ascertain
whether o r not they will lead to the IC C ’s flaw ed results that the U.S. has predicted.

United States Positions Prior to the 1998 Rom e Conference
The United Nations G eneral A ssem bly voted to hold Prepatory Com m ittee m eet
ings (PrepCom ) beginning in 1996 for the purposes o f prelim inary drafting and negotiat
ing o f the substantive and procedural issues underlying the establishment o f the IC C .’

’ Howard Ball, Prosecuting W ar Crimes and Genocide (Kansas: University Press o f
Kansas, 1999), 195.
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The U.S. State D epartm ent under President C linton’s direction em phatically argued
from the beginning o f PrepCom m eetings in 1996 the key positions that the U.S. stated
w ere non-negotiable. The largest concern for the U.S. w ere the issues involving how
the jurisdiction o f the ICC could be triggered, w hether the authority to refer cases to the
Court w ould be vested in states parties, the degree o f independence and authority exer
cised by the ICC Prosecutor, and w hether the Security Council could control what cases
cam e before the ICC.^ These issues can be sim plified as pertaining to three interrelated
areas:
1)

The ICC ’s jurisdiction;

2)

The role and function o f the Office o f the Prosecutor;

3) The relationship between the ICC and the U nited N ations Security Council.
In term s o f the overall goal sought by U.S. negotiators o f the ICC treaty, D avid Scheffer,
Am bassador-at-large for W ar Crime Issues, stated the U.S. position that actions o f U.S.
citizens, particularly the m ilitary, “w ill always rem ain beyond the conceivable reach o f
such an [international crim inal] court.”^
U .S. am bassador to the U.N. Bill Richardson also reaffirm ed the overall U.S. po
sition in a speech before the General Assem bly on O ctober 3 1 ,1 9 9 6 . In that speech,
Richardson, w hile em phasizing the long-standing U.S. com m itm ent to the establishm ent

^ Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relation, Subcommittee on International
Operations. Is A U N International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?. lOS***
Cong, 2"*^ sess., 23 July 1998 (hereafter cited as ICC Senate Hearing ).
^ Joe Stork, “The ICC in Focus.” International Criminal Court 3. no. 4 (1998): 1.
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o f the ICC in principle cautioned other nations that his country had serious concerns
with the proposed ICC:
There are som e w ho argue that the Security Council w ill politicize the work
o f the Court, that it w ill underm ine the C ourt’s independence. [Regarding the per
ception] that the Security Council is a political body, and its actions are therefore
w holly suspect... w hile individual governm ents and individual Tribunal staff are
objective, non political, and reliable,...T he Security C ouncil transcends the indi
vidual political view s and agendas o f each specific m em ber. It is an institution
with checks and balances and an essential objective m ission to fu lfill.. There is
also a need for checks and balances w ith respect to the decisions o f a single Prose
cutor, who in theory could be influenced by personal and political considerations.
I f the Prosecutor had sole discretion to initiate investigations and file com plaints—
as som e delegations have sought under the rubric o f “inherent jurisdiction”— the
results could be m ore idiosyncratic, possiblv even m ore political, than the deci
sions o f the Security C ouncil [em phasis added] ."*
Two years later, on the eve o f the commencement o f the Rom e Conference on June
17, 1998, Am bassador Bill Richardson repeated U.S. policy toward the ICC. Richard
son’s statement contained basic principles o f American policy, in addition to emphasizing
the categorically firm stance o f the U.S. by use o f the word “must” sixteen times in the
following excerpt o f that speech:
The world m ust not underestimate the importance o f our collective efforts here to
day. The creation o f a perm anent International Criminal Court m ust represent a sin
gular statement o f consensus; genocide, crimes against humanity, and the m ost seri
ous war crim es are never acceptable.. ;But it must be the world community that cre
ates the C o u rt... .The Court m ust be built on the firm ground on international con
sensus, and enjoy international support.... [W]e m ust also recognize the reality o f the
international system today.. .As we craft a Court that reflects our ideals, we must
rem em ber that it will not operate in a political vacuum. Experience teaches us that
w e must carefully distinguish between w hat looks good on paper and what works in
the real w o rld .... It [the ICC] m ust be a part o f the international order, and supported
by the international community. .. .[T]he U.S. believes that the Security Council
m ust play an important role in the work o f a permanent court, including the Court’s

Bill Richardson, Speech on 31 October 1996 before the United Nations General
Assembly, as quoted in Ball, 203.
98

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

trigger mechanism. The [Security] Council m ust be able to pursue the aims o f
peace. The Council m ust be able to refer critical situations to the Court for investi
gation and m ust be able to instruct countries to cooperate with the Court if necessary
and appropriate within its pow ers... .[Tjhe Court must operate in coordination— not
in conflict— with the Security C ouncil... [T]he ICC m ust work in coordination, not
in conflict, with states. The Court m ust complement national jurisdiction and en
courage national state action wherever possible.. .[W ]e m ust not turn an Interna
tional Criminal Court— or its Prosecutor— into a human rights ombudsman, open to,
and responsible for responding to, any and all complaints from any source.. ..An In
ternational Criminal Court will succeed only if governments draft a treaty that melds
effectively the proper role o f individual states, their national judicial systems, the
Security Council, and the U N itself. The U.S., which has been so instrumental in es
tablishing international tribunals from Nuremberg to Arusha [Rwanda], will con
tinue to seek actively the achievement o f this important objective.^
Scheffer reiterated the U .S. position regarding a Security Council controlled ICC when
he announced that the “ Security Council needs to be a very significant player in the op
eration o f this court.
D etailing specifics o f the U.S. policy on the jurisdiction o f the ICC, David Schef
fer officially stated “Official actions o f a non-party state should not be subject to the
C ourt’s jurisdiction if that country does not jo in the treaty, except by m eans o f a Secu
rity C ouncil action under the U.N. Charter.”^ The U.S. sought a jurisdictional schem e
that w ould only allow cases to come before the ICC if the state o f the nationality o f the
prospective defendant consented to the IC C ’s participation.®

^Ibid.
®T.R. Goldman, “A W orld Apart? U.S. Stance on a New ICC Concerns Rights
Groups.” Legal Times. June 18,1998,16.
^ ICC Senate Hearing, 14.
®M. C herif Bassioni, “Negotiating the Treaty o f Rom e on the Establishment o f an
International Criminal Court.” The Cornell International Law Journal. 32 (1999): 458.
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On the subject o f the ICC Prosecutor, the U.S. officially announced their position
in the U.S. State D epartm ent release entitled, “Statem ent o f the U nited States D elega
tion E xpressing Concerns R egarding the Proposal for a Proprio M otu Prosecutor,”’
subm itted to the Rom e Conference on June 22, 1998. In that statem ent the U.S. stipu
lated:
The United States is strongly o f the view that the principles o f prosecutorial
independence and effectiveness...w ill be best served by, the structure proposed by
the ICC under w hich the Prosecutor’s authority to em bark on an investigation is
triggered by a referral by a State or the Securitv Council (em phasis added).
Yet, the proposal favored by a m ajority o f other countries in Rom e was an ICC
Statute w hereby cases could be initiated by referrals from one o f four sources; either a
State, the Security Council, the Prosecutor, or any other interested party, including vic
tim s, non-govem m ental organizations or any other reliable source, all o f w hom could
refer cases to the ICC Prosecutor.' ' A referral is a request to the prosecutor to investi
gate the situation to determ ine if one or m ore persons should be charged for a crime.
H um an rights groups were particularly strong advocates o f an independent prosecutor,
believing that the U.N. Security C ouncil w ould be averse to referring situations to the

’ Proprio M otu literally means on his or her own motion.
“The Concerns o f the United States Regarding the Proposal for a Proprio Motu
Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 147-150 (hereafter cited as U.S. Concerns o f Proprio
M otu Prosecutor).
' ' Peggy E. Rancillio, “From Nurem berg to Rome: Establishing An International
Criminal Court and the N eed for U.S. Participation,” University o f Detroit M ercv Law
Review 77 (Fall 1999): 183.
Ibid.
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Court. It w as also felt that an independent prosecutor w ould allow victim s o f crim es to
com e forth and initiate investigations against the perpetrators.'^
H ow ever, the U nited States rejected the proposals for an independent Prosecutor.
The U.S. also rejected the idea that other entities and individuals should be allowed to
initiate an investigation by the P r o s e c u to r .S e n a to r R od G ram s articulated U.S. con
cerns in a hearing before the U.S. Senate: "The [ICC] prosecutor w ill have the pow er to
initiate prosecutions w ithout a referral from the Security Council or state parties. There
w ill be no effective screen against politically m otivated prosecutions from being
brought forward."'^ A m bassador Scheffer suggested that there existed a legitim ate rea
son for referrals to com e from m em ber states or the Security Council. He said:
The value o f having a governm ent refer it or the Security Council refer it is they
are accountable to somebody. They are accountable either to their people, their
populace, for doing so, or the Security Council is accountable to the U nited N a
tions system. W e believe that that fundam ental principle o f accountability should
be at the core o f referrals to this court.
The U.S. outlined five m ain reasons for rejecting the creation o f a “proprio motu. "
in an official statem ent on the proposal o f a proprio m otu prosecutor.'^ First, the U.S.
rejected as “entirely cynical the notion that the com m unity o f States is so lacking in
m oral and political courage that w hen faced with an atrocity m eriting the attention o f the

Ball, 192.
‘TJ.S. Concerns o f Proprio M otu Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 147.
“Opening Statement o f Senator Rod Grams,” ICC Senate Hearing. 3.
ICC Senate Hearing, 23.
“U.S. Concerns o f Proprio M otu Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 147.
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Court, not one State w ill respond.” '* Instead, the U.S. cited the ad hoc tribunals created
to investigate atrocities in Rwanda and the form er Y ugoslavia republic as evidence o f
the willingness o f the United States and other States to address serious crim es o f inter
national concern.
Second, the U.S. rejected as sim plistic the attitude that a system o f State and Se
curity Council referrals can only politicize the office o f the Prosecutor, while the proprio
m otu w ill be inherently apolitical and impartial.^® The U.S. stated that the debate sur
rounding the subject cast the U nited States and other States as acting on purely “politi
cal” grounds. Advocates for an independent prosecutor defined “political” in a pejora
tive sense denoting partisanship and self-interest, while m aintaining that individuals and
non-govem m ental organizations are beyond m otivations o f self-interest and partiality.^'
Third, the U.S. argued that state involvem ent is critical to the functioning o f the
ICC.^^ In supporting their contention for an active state role, the U.S. argued that pro
ponents for an independent prosecutor neglect the fact that State and Security Council
referrals will have a positive “political” impact.^^ State and Security Council referrals
dem onstrate political w ill and political support that are vital to the prosecutor’s work.
The U.S. sum m arized its position on the efficacy o f active state involvem ent as follows;

'* Ibid., 148.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
ICC Senate Hearing, 14.
“U.S. Concerns o f Proprio M otu Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 149.
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U nder the proprio m otu m odel, we fear it w ill becom e too easy for the States Par
ties to abdicate their responsibilities and sim ply leave it to individuals, organiza
tions and the Prosecutor him self to initiate cases w ithout the starting foundation o f
political will and com m itm ent that only States can provide.^"*
Fourth, the U .S. found unpersuasive the argum ents that an independent prosecutor
w ill m ake decisions to pursue investigations solely on legal criteria, and thus avoid any
questioning o f the Prosecutor’s m otives, impartiality, or independence,^^ The U.S. ra
tionalized that granting the Prosecutor the authority— and responsibility— to investigate
all credible allegations w ould overw helm the resources o f the Prosecutor. Inevitably
w ith such an overw helm ing volum e o f allegations to review, the Prosecutor w ould be
forced to reject m any o f those com plaints, including those that are unsuitable for prose
cution. A m ong the com plaints found unsuitable w ill be referrals that are directed to
ward an individual, have their basis in political m otivations, and those being dealt with
by national judicial systems, which will invariably disappoint the organizations and in
dividuals w ho are the source o f the allegation?^
However, som e o f these com plaints will m eet the requirem ent o f legal m erit
contained in the draft Statute as possessing a “reasonable basis” on w hich to pursue an
investigation. Thus, the U.S. reasons, a sim ple legal checklist w ill be inadequate to de
cide betw een the large volum e o f legally m eritorious allegations, and consequently “the
Prosecutor w ill be required to m ake decisions o f policy in addition to those o f law.”^^

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
27

Ibid.
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The effect o f increasing the am ount o f sources from which the Prosecutor receives alle
gations w ill substantially increase the instances where the Prosecutor m ust reject appar
ently suitable referrals, resulting in charges o f im partiality and criticism from groups
unhappy w ith the Prosecutor’s choices. The U.S. position concludes, “In sum, the pro
prio m otu proposal risks routinely draw ing the Prosecutor into m aking difficult public
policy decisions w hich the Prosecutor is neither well-equipped nor inclined to m ake.”^^
Fifth, the U.S. also opposed the role o f judges in review ing decisions o f the prose
cutor, adding that granting review authority to judges allows them to substitute their
policy preferences for those o f the prosecutors. Finally the U .S. opined that allowing
the prosecutor’s office to use inform ation from non-govem m ental and individual
sources w ould overw helm the office. The U.S. cited as evidence the nearly 30,000
complaints received by the U.N. Hum an Rights Com m ission in \ 991?^
To sum m arize, the U.S. pursued several non-negotiable points regarding the
establishm ent o f the ICC. The m ain U.S. objections as the R om e Conference got under
way in June 1998 were:
(1)

The Prosecutor m ust not have the authority to independently initiate an in

vestigation absent a referral to investigate from either a governm ent that is a state
party to the treaty or the Security Council. The Prosecutor w ould only be perm it
ted to initiate an investigation upon either a referral from a governm ent that is a
state party to the ICC treaty or the Security Council.

Ibid.
Ibid.
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(2)

A s a precondition to the exercise o f jurisdiction o f the Court over a crime,

both governm ents m ust be parties to the treaty.
(3)

U nder its Chapter VII responsibilities o f the U N C harter the Security C oun

cil m ust be able to review m atters that com e before the Court.

T h e R om e S ta tu te E m erges
A s the representatives arrived in Rom e for the start o f the Rom e Conference the
United States had three m ajor unresolved issues from the PrepCom meetings: (1) W hat
type o f relationship w ould be reserved for the U.N. Security Council and the ICC? (2)
W hat w ould be the functions, duties and scope o f authority o f the Prosecutor’s Office?
(3) W hat core crim es w ould com prise the jurisdictional subject m atter o f the Court?
The central debate before and during the Rom e Conference was the “scope o f the U .N .’s
Security Council involvem ent in deciding w hether or not the ICC takes up a particular
case.” W ould the perm anent m em bers o f the Security Council be perm itted to veto the
IC C ’s ability to investigate and to prosecute w ar criminals?^®
The U nited States arrived in Rom e with a PrepCom ICC draft that reflected the
U.S. position regarding the Security C ouncil’s role.^' Article 23(1) o f the PrepCom
draft stated reflected the U.S. position that only states that ratified the treaty and the Se-

Goldman, 1.
David J. Scheffer, “Developments in International Criminal Law: The United
States and the International Criminal Court,” The American Journal o f International Law
93 (January 1999): 13.
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curity Council could refer “situations” to the Prosecutors Office for initiation o f an in
vestigation.^^
How ever, a com peting option perm itted the Prosecutor’s Office independently to
initiate investigation proceedings on its ow n authority absent a state or Security Council
referral.^^ The U.S. delegation sought to prevent the inclusion o f a Prosecutor’s Office
w ith the authority to initiate ICC proceedings on its own. The U.S. by requiring a Secu
rity C ouncil referral w ould have preserved the veto o f the United States over possible
investigations. In the U .S .’s official view , “I f neither the Security Council nor any state
endorses action by the Court, the prosecutor w ould act without a critical and essential
base o f international consensus.”^^
The m ajority o f the other delegates at the Rome Conference disagreed with the
U.S. position. They supported an independent Prosecutor based on the rationale that
only a truly independent prosecutor w ould be able to investigate situations states w ould
rather avoid.^^ A pproaching m idnight on the final day o f the Conference, the U.S.

Ball, 198.
M ahnoush H, Arsanjani, “Developm ents in International Criminal Law: The
United States and the International Criminal Court,” The American Journal o f Interna
tional Law 93 (January 1999): 27.
“U.S. Concerns o f Proprio M otu Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 148-150.
The group o f nations opposing the U.S. position, called the Like-Minded Group,
was led by Great Britain, Canada, and A rgentina and ultimately included over eighty na
tions. The Like-M inded Group, working w ith the 264 Non-Govemmental Organizations
(N G O ’s) and human rights groups in Rom e to participate in the proceedings, advocated
for a strong and independent ICC that w ould create a tm ly independent Prosecutor, “fi*ee
o f Security Council (read U.S.) control.” See Ball, 199.
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sought to introduce a last m inute am endm ent regarding jurisd ictio n /^ The U.S.
am endm ent requested that ICC jurisdiction m ust be subject to the consent o f the state o f
the nationality o f the defendant, and that a non-state party’s nationals could only be in
vestigated upon a Security Council resolution to that affect.^^
Norw ay blocked a vote on the U .S. am endm ent with a no action motion.^® The
U .S. m otion for an am endm ent w ould only com e to a vote i f the no action m otion were
defeated. However, N orw ay’s no action m otion passed overwhelm ingly, and the U.S.
am endm ent was tabled permanently.^^
W hen the final vote was taken, the U.S. had failed in its attem pt to lim it ICC ju 
risdiction to the consent o f states. A bsent a Security Council referral, the ICC can pro
ceed w ith a case if a state party has subm itted a com plaint or the Prosecutor initiates a
case involving a state-Party to the treaty where either the crim e w as com m itted or the
accused is a national. A state that is not a party to the treaty can also accept ICC ju ris
diction on an ad hoc voluntary basis. T he U.S., unhappy w ith the final ICC Statute,
joined six other nations - Iraq, Libya, Qatar, Yem en, China and Israel - in voting
against the treaty on July 17, 1998."^®

36

Bassioni, “Negotiating the Treaty o f Rom e,” 458.
Ibid.

The no action motion, according to parliamentary rules, is a motion to take “no
action” on a motion on the table, which effectively removes the issue from further consid
eration at that time. Ibid., 459.
Ibid.
Thomas W. Lippman, “W orldwide W ar Crimes High Court Is Approved Dele
gates Overrule U.S. Objections.” W ashington Post. 18 July 1998, sec. A, p. 1.
107

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

O verview o f the ICC Statute: Structure and Functioning
o f the International Crim inal Court
The International Crim inal Court is an institution created by an international treaty
whose authority and pow ers are derived from the will o f the State-Parties to the tre a ty /'
The treaty contains the Statute o f the Court, which outlines the C ourt’s m ajor functions,
duties, rules, and procedures o f operation/^ The Statute will be binding only on StateParties and enters into force once sixty nations have ratified the treaty/^ The ICC ju ris
diction is intended to com plem ent that o f national crim inal justice systems, and can
prosecute only when national courts are unw illing or unable to prosecute for the crim es
contained w ithin the C ourt’s crim inal subject m atter/'* In addition, the Court can only
prosecute for crim es com m itted after the treaty enters into force/^ The ICC is depend
ent upon the cooperation o f nation-states for conducting its operations, including the
work o f investigations, prosecutions, extradition, and enforcement/*^
The Statute is com posed o f 128 A rticles organized into thirteen parts. A n opening
pream ble sets forth the purpose and historical context for the need o f a perm anent inter-

M. C herif Bassiouni, “Policy Perspectives Favoring the Establishment o f the In
ternational Criminal Court,” Journal o f International Affairs 52, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 797.
United Nations, “R om e Statute o f the International Criminal Court,” 17 July
1998, United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f
an International Criminal Court. U.N. GAOR, 53*^ sess., 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9
(hereafter cited as ICC Statute).
Ibid.
Ibid., Preamble.
Ibid.. Article 24.
Ibid., Part 9, Articles 85-102.
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national crim inal court.'^^ Part 1 contains four articles that establish the Court as a
“perm anent institution” headquartered at The H ague/^ In addition, the Statute creates a
Court having “international legal personality,” and provides that the “Court m ay exer
cise its functions and pow er...on the territory o f any State Party and, by special agree
ment, on the territory o f any other State.”^^ The Court w ill have jurisdiction “over per
sons for the m ost serious crim es o f international concern,” and operate as “com plem en
tary to national crim inal jurisdictions.”^®
The crim es contained w ithin the C ourt’s jurisdiction are broadly determ ined to be
the “m ost serious crim es o f international concern.” The Statute’s four categories o f
crime are genocide, crim es against hum anity, w ar crim es, and the crim e o f aggression.^*
The Statute provides definitions for g e n o c i d e , c r i m e s against humanity,^^ and war
crimes.^^ The crim e o f aggression, how ever, is w ithin the C ourt’s jurisdiction once the
crim e is defined.^^
Part 2, Jurisdiction, A dm issibility and A pplicable Law, com posed o f seventeen
articles (Articles 5-21), form the core o f the statute. This part categorizes and defines

Ibid., Preamble.
Ibid., Articles 1 and 3.
Ibid., Article 4.
Ibid., Preamble.
Ibid., Article 5.
Ibid., Article 6.
Ibid., Article 7.
Ibid., Article 8.
Ibid., Article 5(2). The crime o f aggression enters into effect seven years after the
treaty enters into force, if a definition can be agreed upon by the State-Parties.
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the crim es, establishes the process o f referring cases to the Court (the trigger m echa
nism ), defines criteria for adm issibility, and lists the applicable law /^
Part 3, General Principles o f Crim inal Law, com posed o f tw elve articles, sets forth
the statute’s substantive crim inal law, which forms the foundation o f the basis for individ
ual crim inal responsibility and grounds for excluding crim inal responsibility/^ This part
states clearly that the court has jurisdiction over "natural persons.”

However, the Court

will n o t have jurisdiction over any over any person under the age o f eighteen at the time
the crim e was committed.^^ Articles 22 and 23 contain the principles o f nullum crimen
sine lege and nulla ooena sine leee.^^
Part 4, Com position and A dm inistration o f the Court, com prises nineteen arti
cles.^’ The Court establishes four elements o f the ICC: a Presidency with three
ju d g e s/^ a section creating an Appeals d i v i s i o n , a Pre-Trial and a Trial D iv isio n /'’ a
Prosecutor’s O ffice/^ and the Registry to perform adm inistrative duties.^^ The court is

Ibid., Part 2, Articles 5-21.
Ibid., Part 3, Articles 22-33.
Ibid., Article 25(1).
Ibid., Article 26.
Ibid., Articles 22-23.
Ibid., Part 4, Articles 34-52.
Ibid., Article 38.
Ibid., Article 39.
^ I b id .
Ibid., Articles 15,42.
Ibid., Article 34.
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to have eighteen judges, nom inated and elected by states parties.^^ The judges are
elected as full-tim e personnel and shall perform their functions on that basis.®* H ow 
ever, the Statute anticipates and supports the likelihood that some judges m ay serve on a
part-tim e basis depending on the C ourt’s caseload.®^
The specific U.S. objections are contained in Part 2 on Jurisdiction, A dm issibility
and Applicable Law. Exam ining article 124, the opt-out clause, and what exactly that
m eans, along with A rticles 12 and 13 regarding jurisdiction, are necessary to assess the
question o f w hether U.S. claim s about the nature o f the IC C ’s exceptional authority are
accurate. In assessing objections to the Office o f the Prosecutor, Articles 14 and 15 are
analyzed. Finally, A rticle 16, w hich defines the role o f the Security Council, is analyzed
at the conclusion o f the chapter.

A ssessing The U.S. O bjections to the IC C Statute
Jurisdictional Objections
Article 12 and 13 contain the relevant provisions that determ ine the necessary
requirem ents that the Court m ust have in order to initiate an investigation. In
conjunction, these articles perm it the Court to exercise a form o f lim ited jurisdiction
over the nationals o f non-state parties w ith regard to the core crim es as set forth in
Article 5. The jurisdictional regim e created a two-track system. The first track perm its
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over all states involved in the conflict regardless o f
whether any o f the states involved are parties to the treaty. Article 13(b) states;

®^ Ibid., Article 36.
®* Ibid., Article 35.
Ill
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The Court m ay exercise its jurisdiction w ith respect to a crime referred to in
article 5 in accordance w ith the provisions o f this Statute if:
(b) A situation in which one or m ore o f such crim es appears to have been com 
m itted is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter
V n o f the Charter o f the U nited Nations;^®
The second track perm its the Court to exercise jurisdiction over states, even i f they are
non-state parties to the treaty, providing that one o f tw o requirem ents is met. The first
requirem ent necessitates either the state where the alleged crime occurred is a party to
the ICC treaty, or the accused is a national o f a state that is a party to the Statute. The
second requirem ent is the acceptance o f ICC jurisdiction for non-state parties providing
either the accused is a national or the alleged crim e w as com m itted on their soil.
A ppearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Com m ittee in W ashington, DC,
July 23, 1998, A m bassador-at-Large for W ar Crim es Issues and head o f the U.S. D ele
gation in Rom e, D avid Scheffer, w hile acknowledging that certain U.S. objectives were
achieved, stated that, “serious risks rem ain because o f the docum ent's provisions on ju 
risdiction.”^* The U.S. w anted a court that w ould have required both countries to be
parties to the ICC treaty, “or at a m inim um , w ould have required that only the consent
o f the state o f nationality o f the perpetrator be obtained before the court could exercise
jurisdiction.”^^ Scheffer stated that, because the ICC created a jurisdictional regim e in
the m anner it did, the ICC as currently structured does not “serve the cause o f intem a-

Ibid.
Ibid.
ICC Senate Hearing, 14.
Ibid.
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tional justice.”’^ Specifically, the U.S. objection to the jurisdictional structure o f the
court is stated as such:
Since m ost atrocities are com m itted internally and m ost internal conflicts are
betw een warring parties o f the sam e nationality, the w orst offenders o f interna
tional hum anitarian law can choose never to join the treaty and be fully insulated
firom its reach absent a Security Council referral. Y et m ultinational peacekeeping
forces operating in a country that has joined the treaty can be exposed to the
court's jurisdiction even if the country o f the individual peacekeeper has not joined
the treaty. Thus, the treaty purports to establish an arrangem ent whereby U.S.
arm ed forces operating overseas could be conceivably prosecuted by the interna
tional court even i f the U nited States has not agreed to be bound by the treaty.
There are two parts to the U .S. objection surrounding the jurisdictional regim e o f
the ICC. The first part is a factual claim. The factual claim states that internal atrocities
com m itted by states against their ow n nationals are exem pted from ICC jurisdiction ab
sent a Security Council resolution. A s a result, the U.S. asserts that the worst forms o f
international crim es - those com m itted by dictators such as Pol Pot, and Saddam H us
sein against their own nationals —w ill escape prosecution barring Security Council ac
tions.
The second part o f the U.S. objection concerns the IC C ’s jurisdiction. The U.S.
claim s that the IC C ’s jurisdiction perm its states to join the treaty and by exercising the
opt-out clause o f Article 124 exem pt their forces from ICC prosecution while subjecting
the nationals o f states that do not jo in the treaty to the Court’s jurisdiction.^^ The pri
m ary objection o f the U nited States is that the ICC jurisdiction, in conjunction with A r
ticle 124 containing the opt-out clause, the Prosecutor’s power, and the Security Coun-

Ibid.
Ibid.
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c il’s role com bine to create an ICC that w ill fail to “serve the cause o f international justice.”’^
A fictitious scenario involving country X is used to analyze the first part o f the
U .S. objection regarding jurisdiction. C ountry X, w hich is not a party to the ICC treaty,
is alleged to have com m itted crim es as set forth in Article 5 o f the Statute against its
ow n civilians on its territory. In such a circum stance, several factors m ust be present in
order to initiate an ICC investigation. First, the crimes that country X is alleged to have
com m itted m ust fall w ithin the crim es set forth in A rticle 5 o f the ICC Statute. A rticle 5
defines the crim es falling under the IC C ’s jurisdiction as:
Article 5
Crim es w ithin the jurisdiction o f the Court
1.
The jurisdiction o f the C ourt shall be lim ited to the m ost serious crim es o f
concern to die international com m unity as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in
accordance with this Statute w ith respect to the follow ing crimes:
(a) The crime o f genocide;
(b) Crim es against hum anity;
(c) W ar crimes;
(d) The crime o f aggression.’^
Assum ing that evidence exists that the above crim es have been com m itted after
the date the ICC enters into force, the next step is to determ ine w hether or not the ICC
can obtain jurisdiction over the crim es. The next factor to consider is country X ’s nonparty status to the ICC treaty. Since country X is not a party to the ICC treaty. Article

Ibid.
Ibid., 12.
” However, the crime o f aggression rem ains outside the Court’s jurisdiction for a
minim um o f seven years after the treaty enters into force, and a satisfactory definition is
agreed upon by two-thirds o f the state parties to the treaty. See “ICC Statute,” Article 5.
114

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1 2 (1 ) does not apply as it refers to state acceptance o f jurisdiction with respect to states
that becom e a party to the ICC Statute:
A State which becom es a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction o f
the C ourt with respect to the crim es referred to in article 5. ®
An ICC investigation still could be triggered if country X voluntary accepted the IC C ’s
jurisdiction as stated in Article 12(2):
In the case o f article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court m ay exercise its jurisdic
tion if one or m ore o f the follow ing States are Parties to this Statute or have ac
cepted the jurisdiction o f the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory o f w hich the conduct in question occurred or, if the
crim e w as com m itted on board a vessel or aircraft, the State o f registration o f that
vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State o f w hich the person accused o f the crime is a n ational/^
Country X ’s voluntary acceptance o f ICC jurisdiction could happen i f country X ’s gov
ernment, the alleged perpetrator o f the crim es, were ousted and replaced by a govern
m ent that accepted ICC jurisdiction to investigate the form er regim es alleged atrocities.
However, Scheffer uses the scenario wherein the atrocity is comm itted by a state
against its ow n nationals, and the state refuses to accept ICC jurisdiction. Thus, Article
12(2)(a) and (b) does not apply since, as in the fictional scenario o f country X, the ac
cused state, and the “state on the territory o f w hich the conduct in question occurred,”
are one in the same.*® Country X ’s alleged atrocities are exactly the type o f scenario
that is criticized by Scheffer and the U nited States. In these types o f situations Article

Ibid., Article 12(1).
Ibid., Article 12(2).
80

Ibid., Article 12(2)(a)(b).
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12 does not apply since a state is com m itting atrocities against its own citizens, and is
not a party to the treaty.
M oving from the fictitious to the concrete, the exam ples o f Pol Pot’s exterm ina
tion o f Cam bodian citizens in the late 1970’s and Saddam H ussein’s alleged gassing o f
the Kurds in Iraq in 1988 are real w orld exam ples that w ould fall within the fictitious
scenario o f county X ju st described.*’ In these tw o exam ples —Iraq and Cam bodia states have com m itted crim es against hum anity, and, or, genocide, against their ow n na
tionals on its own territory.
Thus, in the exam ples o f Cam bodia and Iraq the ICC could not exercise jurisdic
tion over the alleged crim es com m itted by these governm ents. The only way a nonparty state can be prosecuted for crim es com m itted against its own nationals w ithin its
territory is by a referral fi*om the Security Council as set forth in Article 13(b), which
states:
The Court m ay exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crim e referred to in article
5 in accordance w ith the provisions o f this Statute if:
(b) A situation in w hich one or m ore o f such crim es appears to have been com 
m itted is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter
v n o f the Charter o f the U nited Nations;*^
Therefore, the criticism leveled at the IC C ’s jurisdictional regim e by the United States

*' Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use o f Force
(New York: Routledge, 1993), 98, 112,121-123; R oy Gutman and David Rieff, ed..
Crimes o f W ar: W hat the Public Should Know. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999),
155-156.
“ICC Statute,” Article 13(b).
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through its A m bassador-of-W ar Crimes, D avid Scheffer, is accurate. U nder the Statute
there is no authority for the ICC to prosecute a nation that is not a party to the Statute
for violations o f international hum anitarian laws against its own civilians on its terri
tory, unless, and only if the situation were referred to the ICC prosecutor by a Security
Council referral.®^
However, there exists a second part o f the U nited S tate’s critique o f the Statute’s
jurisdictional regime. Scheffer alleges that “because o f the extraordinary way the
C ourt’s jurisdiction was fram ed. . .a country willing to com m it w ar crim es could jo in the
treaty and opt-out o f w ar crim es jurisdiction for 7 years, while a non-party state could
deploy its soldiers abroad and be vulnerable to assertions o f [ICC] jurisdiction.”
Scheffer’s objection reflects U .S. policy w hich m aintains that states should have
the opportunity to assess the effectiveness and im partiality o f the Court before subject
ing its nationals to its jurisdiction.®^ This position w as balanced with the U.S. recogni
tion o f the advantages o f a broad ICC jurisdiction to prosecute international w ar crimes.

As a result some scholars have suggested the ICC’s jurisdiction is both too broad
and too narrow resulting in the worst o f both worlds. The jurisdiction is broadly defined
to allow the possibility o f exposing peacekeepers participating in humanitarian missions in
internal armed conflicts to ICC prosecution. At the same time the jurisdiction is too nar
row as to allow non-states parties to the treaty to perpetrate the worst forms o f crimes
against its own citizens and yet be im m une from prosecution absent a Security Council
referral. See Ruti Teitel and others, “Panel: The International Criminal Court: Contem po
rary Perspectives and Prospects for Ratification,” N ew York Law School Journal o f H u
m an Rights 16, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 519.
ICC Senate Hearing, 14.
Ibid.
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To balance the tension betw een the principles o f broad jurisdiction against the principle
that a state m ust have an opportunity to assess the C ourt’s effectiveness, the U.S. ac
cepted the idea o f autom atic jurisdiction o f the Court over the crim e o f genocide, but not
for the category o f crim es against hum anity and w ar crimes.
For the category o f w ar crim es and crim es against hum anity the U.S. favored a
proposal that w ould allow a country to exem pt its nationals firom ICC prosecution for a
period o f up to ten years during w hich tim e the C ourt’s effectiveness could be ascer
tained.*^ A t the end o f the ten-year period the state could choose one o f three options:
(1) to accept the C ourt’s jurisdiction over all the Statute’s core crim es, (2) to extend the
opt-out provision, or (3) to w ithdraw firom the treaty altogether. The U.S. proposal was
defeated, and instead a proposal was accepted that allows countries to exempt its na
tionals from being prosecuted for w ar crim es for a seven-year period. According to
Scheffer, in the worst case scenario. A rticle 124’s seven-year opt-out clause allows state
parties to charge other nations who have not joined the ICC w ith w ar crimes while ex
em pting its own nationals fi'om w ar crim es prosecution.
Is Scheffer’s assertion accurate? Can a country jo in the treaty, exercise the opt-out
clause and charge other nations for w ar crim es com m itted on their soil? Could Saddam
Hussein charge U.S. soldiers for alleged crim es w ithin Iraq, while choosing to exem pt
its own conduct from the ICC jurisdiction by joining the treaty and exercising the opt-

Ibid.
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out clause? In order to answ er that question it is necessary to exam ine the language o f
the opt-out clause in Article 124. Article 124 states:
N otw ithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becom ing a party
to this Statute, m ay declare that, for a period o f seven years after the entry into
force o f this Statute for the State concerned, it does n o t accept the jurisdiction o f
the Court w ith respect to the category o f crim es referred to in article 8 w hen a
crim e is alleged to have been com m itted by its nationals or on its territory. A dec
laration under this article m ay be w ithdraw n at any time. The provisions o f this
article shall be review ed at the Review Conference convened in accordance with
article 123, paragraph 1.*^
Therefore, it is possible for a nation such as Iraq to jo in the treaty and exercise the optout clause.
Furtherm ore, since the opt-out clause is only available to countries that jo in the
treaty, the U.S. by failing to jo in w ould not enjoy the right to exem pt its nationals from
war crim es prosecution in the ICC. Therefore, in theory a country such as Iraq, could
violate w ar crim es and exem pt its nationals from ICC prosecution under Article 124,
while subjecting U.S. nationals to possible prosecution before the ICC for acts com m it
ted by U.S. troops in that nation’s territory. Thus, it is entirely possible for Iraq to join
the ICC and charge the U.S. w ith w ar crim es violations for potential acts com m itted as
part o f the ongoing U.S. m ilitary operations in Iraq w hile exem pting its own troops from
war crim es violations for at least seven years.
In summary. Article 124, the opt-out clause, in concert with Article 12 authorizes
state-parties to the ICC treaty to refer situations o f the arm ed forces o f a non-state party
to the ICC for prosecution w hile exem pting its ow n nationals from prosecution for w ar

“ICC Statute,” Article 124.
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crim es. Therefore, the U.S. objection that the ICC Statute perm its states to jo in the
treaty and enjoy tem porary prosecution from w ar crim es while subjecting states that fail
to ratify the Statute to the IC C ’s jurisdiction, is an accurate assessment.

The R ole and Function o f the O ffice o f the Prosecutor
The U nited States consistently opposed the creation o f an independent prosecutor
with authority to initiate investigations on his or her own.®* jSpeaking before the U.S.
Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, D avid Scheffer explained the U.S. position on
the role o f the prosecutor:

,

The treaty also creates a proprio m otu —or self-initiating prosecutor — who,
on his or her own authority with the consent o f two judges, can initiate investiga
tions and prosecutions w ithout referral to the court o f a situation either by a gov
ernm ent that is party to the treaty or by the Security Council. W e opposed this
proposal, as we are concerned that it will encourage overwhelm ing the court with
complaints and risk diversion o f its resources, as well as embroil the court in con
troversy, political decision-m aking, and confusion.®^ {
The U.S. was opposed by other countries that believed an independent prosecutor was
necessary to act in cases where investigations o f alleged crim es ran contrary to a state’s
interest.^® The theory behind the creation o f the independent Prosecutor was to "prevent
favoritism and ensure that suspected crim inals from all sides o f the conflict are treated
fairly."^* Advocates argued an independent Prosecutor w ould ensure impartiality by

®®“U.S. Concerns o f Proprio M otu Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 147.
®^ ICC Senate Hearing, 14.
Ball, 199.
Bryan F. M acPherson, “Building An International Criminal Court for the 21®‘
Century.” Connecticut Journal o f International Law 13 (W inter 1998): 57.
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possessing the authority to refer cases to the Court acting on their own initiative, absent
any State or Security Council referral.
In the end, the U.S. opposition to the independent prosecutor m et with defeat.
Instead, the ICC created an independent prosecutor that the U.S. criticized as having far
too m uch pow er and too little accountability. A rticles 15 and 54 create the institution o f
the independent Prosecutor. The Prosecutor’s duties and responsibilities include
evaluation o f evidence, initiation o f investigations o f alleged crim es, and the prosecu
tion o f defendants.^^ Thus, in addition to allow ing referrals to the Court to com e from
states and Security Council referrals, the independent prosecutor can investigate allega
tions o f applicable crim es upon inform ation from victim s, non-govem m ental agencies,
or other reliable sources.^^
All referrals regardless if originating from a State, the Security Council, or any
other source, m ust be subm itted to the Prosecutor, w ho has sole authority to reject or
continue with an investigation. The authority for referring situations to the Court is con
tained in Article 13. Article 13 creates a jurisdictional schem e that allows cases to come
before the Court for investigation by three different routes, either by a State, the Security
Council, or by the Prosecutor:
Article 13: Exercise o f jurisdiction
The Court m ay exercise its jurisdiction w ith respect to a crime referred to in
article 5 in accordance with the provisions o f this Statute if:

“ICC Statute,” Articles 15 and 54.
Ibid., Articles 13 and 15.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

A situation in which one or more o f such crim es appears to have been com 
m itted is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance w ith article
14;
A situation in which one or m ore o f such crim es appears to have been com 
m itted is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security C ouncil acting under
C hapter VB o f the C harter o f the U nited Nations; or
The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect o f such a crim e in ac
cordance w ith article 15.®'*

A rticle 13, regardless o f the source o f the referral, grants the Prosecutor the func
tion o f receiving applications for investigations.®^ Thus, the Prosecutor has the respon
sibility for receiving all referrals m ade to the Court. The responsibility and pow er o f the
Prosecutor appears to be broad as he or she is the sole recipient o f all referrals to the
ICC.
Article 13 stipulates who can m ake referrals, while Article 14 goes further by de
scribing the process o f w hat happens after a referral is received. Article 14 affirm s that
States “m ay refer to the Prosecutor a situation.. .requesting the Prosecutor to investi
gate.”®^ By use o f the w ord “requesting” the Prosecutor has the initial authority to de
cide w hether a request for an investigation is accepted or denied. Furthermore, Article
14 grants the Prosecutor the authority o f “investigating a situation for the purpose o f de
term ining w hether one or m ore specific persons should be charged w ith the com m ission
o f such crim es.”®’ A rticle 14 states:
1.
A State Party m ay refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or m ore
crim es w ithin the jurisdiction o f the Court appear to have been com m itted request-

®^*Ibid., Article 13.
®^ Ibid.
96

Ibid., Article 14.

®’ Ibid.
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ing the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose o f determ ining
w hether one or m ore specific persons should be charged with the com m ission o f
such crimes.
2.
A s far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant circum stances and be
accom panied by such supporting docum entation as is available to the State refer
ring the situation.’*
The w ord “situation” as used in A rticle 14 o f the ICC Statute refers to two things.
First, it is designed to prevent referrals that target individuals alleged to have com m itted
violations o f the Statute’s crim es.” Tw o, the word “situation” refers to the authority o f
the Prosecutor to investigate a conflict in it entirety, and thereby prevents lim iting the
Prosecutor to investigating the alleged crim inal activities o f only one party, one individ
ual, o r one incident.’”
Thus, if country X refers a case to the Court involving country Y, the Prosecutor,
acting under Article 14, is not lim ited to solely investigating country X ’s allegation, but
can broaden the investigation to include any possible violations that m ay have been
com m itted by both sides. The rationale behind giving the Prosecutor the pow er to in
vestigate the entire situation rather than one incident, individual, or group, is that neither
State in a conflict should be able to shield its nationals from investigations for alleged
com m ission o f crim es falling w ithin the jurisdiction o f the Court. In other w ords, the
Prosecutor can, should, and, in theory, m ust have the authority to investigate all parties

” Ibid.
” Bassiouni, “Policy Perspectives Favoring the Establishment o f the International
Criminal Court,” 759,
Ibid.
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involved in an armed conflict in order to avoid any hint o f bias toward any o f the par
ties.’®’
The idea o f authorizing the Prosecutor to investigate all parties to a conflict and
thus determ ine the direction o f the investigation has long been supported by the U.S.:
[W ]e reiterate the longstanding position o f the U nited States that no one, not the
Security Council, not States, nor any entity nor individual should be able to con
trol the direction o f the Prosecutor’s investigation by referring a particular case
against a particular person.’®^
However, .the Statute, w hile attem pting to avoid charges o f biased prosecutions, will
nevertheless be unable to escape these charges for the follow ing reasons.
Since, as noted earlier, m any o f the referrals to the Court will originate from an
internal arm ed conflict, there is a high probability that all the warring sides in the con
flict w ill charge the other with the ICC Statute’s core crim es.’®^ As referrals are subm it
ted to the Prosecutor’s office from the warring parties, the pressure w ill likely be tre
m endous for the Prosecutor to investigate all parties’ allegations against each other in
order to avoid criticism s o f partiality or bias. Therefore, in an attem pt to avoid criti
cism s o f bias, investigations w ill likely result for the entire situation, that is o f all parties
to a conflict.
In addition, the Prosecutor has sole authority to perform investigations and decides
w hat crimes, i f any, have been com m itted and by whom . As the Prosecutor alone bears
the burden o f investigation, determ ination o f charges, and nam ing the defendants, there

’®’ Ibid
102 4

‘U.S. Concerns over the Proprio M otu Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing, 148.

’®^ Ibid., 50-56.
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is likely to be considerable pressure placed on the Prosecutor in the initial investigation
stages. Indeed, a great deal o f “lobbying” w ill be going on, not ju st toward the Prosecu
tor, but tow ard the p u b lic .'^ Public opinion cam paigns are likely to be directed by all
parties in an attem pt to portray them selves as blam eless, w hile portraying the other side
as blameworthy.'®^ Thus, i f the U nited States w ere involved in a conflict that generated
referrals to the Prosecutor, it is anticipated that considerable pressure will be brought to
bear upon the Prosecutor to investigate claim s against the U.S. as to avoid charges o f
favoritism and bias on the part o f the Prosecutor.'®^
W hile the U.S. supports the idea that no entity o r individual should be able to steer
the direction o f a Prosecutor’s investigation, the U.S. adam antly opposes giving the
pow er o f the Prosecutor to initiate cases on his or her own. However, Article 15 o f the
ICC Statute gives to the Prosecutor, proprio m otu status, that is, the pow er to initiate
investigations acting on his or her own authority. Article 15(1) states:
The Prosecutor m ay initiate investigations proprio m otu on the basis o f inform a
tion on crim es w ithin the jurisdiction o f the Court.'®^
A rticle 15(1) raises the question o f w hat does “on the basis o f information on
crim es w ithin the jurisdiction o f the C ourt’’ mean?'®® W ho or w hat is the source o f that
inform ation? Article 15(2) answ ers this question. Article 15(2) gives the Prosecutor the
authority to analyze the “seriousness o f the inform ation received,” from sources that in-

'®^ Ibid, 8-16.
'®^ Ibid.
'®®Teitel, 519.
'®’ Ibid., Article 15(1).
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elude states, the subsidiary organs o f the U .N ., intergovernm ental, non-govem m ental,
and other reliable sources, in written or oral form. Article 15(2) says:
The Prosecutor shall analyze the seriousness o f the information received.
For this purpose, he or she m ay seek additional inform ation from States, organs o f
the U nited Nations, intergovernm ental or non-govem m ental organizations, or
other reliable sources that he or she deem s appropriate, and m ay receive w ritten or
oral testim ony at the seat o f the Court.
Article 15(2) also gives pow er to the Prosecutor to seek out “additional information”
from entities and individuals, and “other reliable sources that he or she deem s appropri
ate.” ’’® The Statute does not define “reliable” nor “appropriate,” instead leaving their
interpretations to the Prosecutor’s discretion.” ’ Thus, authority rests with the Prosecu
tor to determ ine w hat “other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate.” ” ^ The
words “reliable” and “appropriate” w ithout definition are vague, and thus open to sub
jective determ inations o f the Prosecutor. The accountability rests with the Prosecutor’s
discretion.
Article 15(3) authorizes the Prosecutor to determ ine w hether or not a referral for
investigation m erits a, “reasonable basis to proceed” subject to review by the three judge
Pre-Trial Chamber. Article 15(3) states:
I f the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed w ith an in
vestigation, he or she shall subm it to the Pre-Trial Cham ber a request for authori
zation o f an investigation, together w ith any supporting m aterial collected. Vic
tim s m ay m ake representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with the

Ibid.
Ibid., 15(2).
” ®Ibid.
” ’ lbid.
” ^Ibid.
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R ules o f Procedure and Evidence.’’^ (em phasis added)
Once the Prosecutor has determ ined that a com plaint shall go forward, the Pre-Trial
C ham ber m ust also agree “that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investiga
tion, and that the case appears to fall w ithin the jurisdiction o f the Court,” in which case,
“it shall authorize the com m encem ent o f the investigation.” ’

A rticle 15(4) states:

I f the Pre-Trial Cham ber, upon exam ination o f the request and the supporting m a
terial, considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed w ith an investigation,
and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction o f the Court, it shall author
ize the com m encem ent o f the investigation, w ithout prejudice to subsequent de
term inations by the Court w ith regard to the jurisdiction and adm issibility o f a
case.” ^
Therefore, the requirem ent o f a Pre-Trial C ham ber review o f a Prosecutor’s re
quest to investigate acts as a check on Prosecutorial p o w e r.^ o w e v e r, David Scheffer
argues this check is inadequate since the Prosecutor need only convince two o f three
judges for the investigation to continue, as set forth in Article 57.” ^ M oreover, even if
the Pre-Trial Cham ber rules to deny the com m encem ent o f an investigation. Article
15(5) still enables the Prosecutor to subm it new evidence to the Pre-Trial Cham ber that
could reopen the case:
“The refusal o f the Pre-Trial Cham ber to authorize the investigation shall not pre
clude the presentation o f a subsequent request bv the Prosecutor based on new
facts or evidence regarding the sam e situation.” *”

Ibid., Article 15(3).
**"* Ibid., Article 15(4).
” ^Ibid., Article 15(4).
” ®Ibid., Article 57(1).
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Thus, article 15(5) clearly contains the possibility o f a case continuing even after
the Pre-Trial Cham ber rejects a petition for an investigation. The language o f Articles
15(5) and 15(6) grant authority to the Prosecutor to review new facts and evidence. A r
ticle 15(5) and 15(6) also allow the Prosecutor to subm it those new facts and evidence
to the Pre-Trial Cham ber for the purposes o f having them reverse their previous deci
sion to allow an investigation to continue. Specifically, Article 15(6) states:
If, after the prelim inary exam ination referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Prose
cutor concludes that the inform ation provided does not constitute a reasonable b a
sis for an investigation, he or she shall inform those w ho provided the information.
This shall not preclude the Prosecutor from considering further information sub
m itted to him or her regarding the same situation in the light o f new facts or evi
dence.***
The only thing it is reasonable to conclude the Prosecutor cannot do when his or
her request for further investigation has been denied is to collect new information.
However, delegates and scholars at the Rom e Conference have represented Article 15 as
preventing a Prosecutor from investigating a situation if the Pre-Trial Cham ber rules to
deny the Prosecutor’s request. In fact, the language used by Professor M ichael Scharf
suggests that the Prosecutor cannot even launch an investigation unless given approval
by the Pre-Trial Chamber. A ppearing before the Senate Subcom m ittee on International
Operations on June 23, 1998, Professor Scharf, stated:
The safeguard against an independent prosecutor...is in article 15 which requires
the approval o f a three-judge pretrial panel before the independent prosecutor can
launch an in vestigation...” *'^

"* Ib id ., Article 15(6).
**’ “Statement o f Professor M ichael P. Scharf before the Senate Subcommittee on
International Operations,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 61.
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A careful exam ination o f article 15 reveals that S c h a rf s statement is not entirely
accurate. Article 15(1) and 15(2) clearly grants the Prosecutor the authority to launch an
investigation into any situation around the globe regardless o f issues involving jurisd ic
tion, admissibility, or Pre-Trial C ham ber review. In fact, the Prosecutor has a consider
able degree o f latitude in investigating any m atter involving potential violations o f the
IC C ’s crim inal subject m atter. A ll procedural checks upon the Prosecutor com e after an
investigation has already com m enced. A fter inform ation has been gathered in an inves
tigation, then the Prosecutor review s the inform ation and determines, on his or her own
judgm ent w hether or not to proceed w ith the investigation by requesting perm ission
from the Pre-Trial Chamber. Since a Prosecutor has the authority to initiate investiga
tions on his or her own, and can request inform ation for any reliable source that the
Prosecutor deem s appropriate, a request to the Pre-Trial Cham ber to investigate seem s
to be a m ere formality.'^®
A num ber o f international scholars are fairly consistent in their opinion that A rti
cle 15(4) indicates that a negative ruling by the Pre-Trial Cham ber would prevent the
Prosecutor from further investigation.^^’ A rticle 15(2) gives the pow er o f the Prosecu
tor to “analyze the seriousness o f the inform ation received (emphasis m ine).” ’^^ By

W hile the language o f the ICC m ay not refer to evidence collection, including
witness preparation as an “investigation.” it would appear a de facto investigation is occur
ring when any prosecutor in any legal system is gathering and examining evidence, and
interviewing witnesses.
Bassiouni, “Policy Perspectives Favoring the Establishment o f the International
Criminal Court,” 798; Arsanjani, 26-29; Ball, 212; ICC Senate Hearing. 61.
“ICC Statute,” Article 15(2).
129

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

w riting into Article 15(2) the w ord received and not collected o r gathered, it is reason
able to conclude that the authors o f the Statute intended for the Prosecutor’s investiga
tion to cease once the Pre-Trial Cham bers has denied his or her request for com m encing
an investigation.
How ever, by allow ing the Prosecutor to review new facts and evidence subm itted
to him o r her, the Statute’s Articles 15(5) and 15(6) clearly authorizes the Prosecutor to
accept new evidence. Perm itting the Prosecutor to accept new evidence tacitly ac
know ledges the right o f parties to subm it new inform ation to the Prosecutor. W hat is
the source o f this new inform ation? Referring back to Article 15(2), the source is “in
form ation from States, organs o f the U nited N ations, intergovernm ental or nongovem m ental organizations, or any other reliable sources that he or she [Prosecutor]
deem s appropriate..

Additionally, the Prosecutor is given the pow er to review new

facts and evidence, and thus w hile technically the Prosecutor is no longer investigating
and gathering new facts and evidence, the Statute clearly assum es that someone is still
gathering and collecting new evidence.
Some scholars have noted that Article 18 acts as a prosecutorial check. Article 18,
w hich was proposed by the U.S., requires the Prosecutor to notify all states regarding a
m atter under review. I f the state o f the accused decided to investigate, the Prosecutor
w ould have to defer to the state’s investigation unless the Pre-Trial Cham ber decided
otherwise.*^'* However, the language o f A rticle 18 is unclear regarding at what point the

123

Ibid., Article 15(2).
Ibid., Article 18.
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Prosecutor has to notify states o f an on-going investigation. For exam ple, i f a Prosecu
tor receives inform ation on a crim e in a particular country from one credible source is
the Prosecutor bound to notify the parties identified in the crim e at that juncture, o r can
the prosecutor attem pt to verify the facts first before notifying parties? The Statute is
unclear and vague on this question.

T he R ole o f the Security Council
Leading up to start o f the Rom e Conference the central question still to be decided
was the role o f the Security Council. J ^ e U.S. sought a crim inal court that w ould have
required a Security Council referral in addition to consent o f the states to initiate ICC
jurisdiction. The U.S. position w as seen as too restrictive by m any delegations and
N G O ’s who feared Security Council m em bers w ould not refer situations involving their
a l l i e s . M a n y participants at the R om e Conference believed that the real m otivation
behind the U.S. policy for a Security Council controlled Court is the view “that it m ust
be able to veto any effort [by the Prosecutor] to investigate and prosecute.” ’

The U.S.,

Ibid., Article 18(1): “W hen a situation has been referred to the Court pursuant to
article 13 (a) and the Prosecutor has determined that there would be a reasonable basis to
commence an investigation, or the Prosecution initiates an investigation pursuant to arti
cles 13 (c) and 15, the Prosecutor shall notify all States Parties and those States, which,
taking into account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over
the crimes concerned.” See “ICC Statute,” Article 18(1).
Elisa M assimino, a m em ber o f the NGO, Lawyers Committee for Hum an Rights,
commented that the U.S. position, which advocated a veto pow er for the Security Council,
“would eviscerate the court’s effectiveness,” as cited in Ball, 199.
Norman Dorsen and M orton H. Halperin, “Justice After Genocide,” W ashington
Post. 13 M ay 1998, sec. A, p. 1.
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and the rest o f the w orld realized that by requiring a Security Council referral to initiate
investigations the U.S. could effectively block any investigation by the Prosecutor.
As the Rom e Conference got under w ay in late June o f 1998, the delegates worked
from an International Law Com m ission draft statute that preserved the Security Coun
cil’s control over the activation o f the Court.

W ithout the consent o f the all states

w ith an interest in the case, the ICC needed a Security Council resolution to investigate.
A rticle 23(1) o f the PrepCom draft stated that only states that ratified the treaty and the
Security Council could refer “situations” to the Prosecutors Office for investigation.'^^
Before the Rom e Conference Singapore offered a com prom ise proposal that was
ultim ately accepted and written into the ICC Statute. Included in the Statute as Article
16, it proposed giving the Security Council the authority to forestall ICC investigations
and prosecutions for one year. Article 16 states:^

A rticle 16
D eferral o f investigation or prosecution
N o investigation or prosecution m ay be com m enced or proceeded w ith under
this Statute for a period o f 12 m onths after the Security Council, in a resolution
adopted under Chapter VII o f the C harter o f the U nited Nations, has requested the
Court to that effect; that request m ay be renewed by the Council under the same
conditions.'^®
|~Thus, unanim ous consent is needed by all the perm anent m em bers plus a m ajority o f the
entire Security Council to pass a resolution to delay an investigation. In doing so, the

David J. Scheffer, “Developm ents in International Criminal Law: The United
States and the International Criminal Court,” The American Journal o f International Law
93, (January 1999): 13.
Ball, 198.
“ICC Statute,” Article 16.
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balance o f pow er shifts aw ay from any one m em ber’s ability to block an investigation.
Instead, all perm anent m em bers m ust be in agreem ent to block an investigation, which
is a considerably higher bar to achieve. Fifty-three nations supported the Singapore
proposal’s one-year deferral; the U nited States and four other nations w anted a deferral
tim e o f an “unspecified num ber o f y e a r s ." '^ ^
I The Security Council retains the right under Article 13 to refer situations to the
Prosecutor. W hile the Prosecutor is obligated to investigate, he or she is not bound to
subm it the m atter to the Pre-Trial Cham ber to continue with Court proceedings. How 
ever, w hen the Security Council does refer a m atter there is no requirem ent that the
states be parties to the treaty. Furtherm ore, states are bound by the term s o f the U.N.
C harter under the Security C ouncil’s Chapter VU authority to com ply with the dictates
o f the C o u n c i l . T h u s , w ith a Security Council referral state cooperation can be en
forced w ith embargoes, the freezing o f assets o f heads-of-state and their supporters,
and/or by authorizing the use o f f o r c e . /

Ball,

213.

UNCharter, Chapter Vn, A rticle 39states:
The Security Council shall determine the existence o f any threat to the peace, breach
o f the peace, or act o f aggression and shall m ake recommendations, or decide what m eas
ures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore interna
tional peace and security.
Ibid.
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CH A PTER 5
A SSESSIN G U.S. O BJECTION S FROM A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter focuses on problem s o f the IC C ’s crim inal definitions with respect to
the principle o f legality. In particular, this chapter will exam ine the problem o f the
ICC ’s crim es from a theoretical perspective using legal theorist Lon Fuller’s analysis o f
the rule o f law. Prospects for the IC C ’s success are m ade m ore difficult by definitional
problem s w ithin the crim inal subject m atter o f the Court. M ajor W illiam K. Lietzau, the
Deputy Legal Counsel to the Chairm an o f the U .S. Joint Chiefs o f Staff, has raised con
cerns that the lack o f clarity and preciseness in the IC C ’s definition o f crim es w ill cast
doubt that the ICC is operating under the R ule o f Law .' Consequently, M ajor Lietzau
argues that greater effort and attention should be paid to defining precisely the crimes
contained within the Statute.^

' W illiam K. Lietzau, “Checks and Balances and Elements o f Proof: Structural Pil
lars for the International Crim inal Court.” Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999):
478.
^ Ibid., 480.
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T h e P ro b le m : D efining C rim es W ith in th e IC C S tatu te
In the early stages o f the PrepCom negotiations, the U.S. delegates articulated the
view that the long-term success o f the Court w ould depend upon judicial integrity.^ Par
ticipants m ust view the C ourt’s judicial procedures and m echanism s as producing im par
tial and fair outcomes. The U .S. believes that i f the Court fails to be perceived as im par
tial, institutional credibility will be insufficient to secure state cooperation.
State cooperation w ith the C ourt is crucial to its institutional survival.'* U nder the
principle o f com plem entarity national courts retain the right o f first jurisdiction with re
spect to the alleged com m ission o f crim es contained w ithin the ICC.^ Com plem entarity
is consistent w ith existing crim inal law systems, w hich grants national courts primary
jurisdiction over any crim e com m itted w ithin their borders.^ The ICC takes over ju ris
diction when national courts cannot or will not prosecute, or have voluntarily given ju 
risdiction to the ICC.^
In the event the ICC obtains jurisdiction, all Court requests, including investiga
tions, ensuring evidence collection procedures, witness participation, the issuance o f ar

^ Congress, Senate, Com m ittee on Foreign Relation, Subcommittee on International
Operations, “Testimony o f David Scheffer Before the Committee on Foreign Relations,”
Is A UN International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?. 105* Cong, 2"^* sess.,
23 July 1998, 13 (hereafter cited as ICC Senate Hearing).
'* Ruti Teitel, et al, “Panel: The International Criminal Court; Contemporary Per
spectives and Prospects for Ratification,” N ew York Law School Journal o f Human Rights
16 (Spring 2000), 548-549.
^ United Nations, “Rom e Statute o f the International Criminal Court,” 17 July 1998,
United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f an In
ternational Criminal Court. U.N. GA OR, 53"^ sess., 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9
(hereafter cited as ICC Statute); Article 17(l)(a)(b).
^ Teitel, 505.
^ “ICC Statute,” Article 17(1)(2).
135

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

rest w arrants, and the apprehension o f suspected crim inals, require nation-state coopera
tion to be carried out effectively.® O n its own, the ICC has no authority or enforcem ent
pow ers to com pel state cooperation. Only the Security Council, using its Chapter V n
enforcem ent pow ers o f the U N Charter, can coerce states to participate in Court proceed
ings. A s it is likely that situations w ill arise that justify ICC investigation but not Secu
rity Council participation, the need for state cooperation is even m ore important if the
Court is to carry out effectively its m andate. Thus, the U.S. stressed the need for an im 
partial and fair Court w ith w hich states w ould be w illing to cooperate.
In order to achieve the requisite judicial integrity, the U.S. m ade certain that the
C ourt included in the IC C ’s final draft an article that w ould m ore precisely define
crimes, procedures, and rules for the use o f evidence.^ Article 9 o f the ICC Statute in
serts into the Statute “Elem ents o f Crim e,” which are equivalent to the U.S. legal sys
tem ’s “Elem ents o f P ro o f’ that stipulate the necessary requirem ents necessary to obtain
a conviction, including rules governing evidence, witnesses, and burden o f proof stan
dards.
The inclusion o f the Elem ents o f C rim e and the Rules and Procedures for Evidence
reflected the tension in creating the ICC Statute betw een the com m on law judicial sys
tem s o f the U.S. and Great Britain, and the civil law judicial systems, as used throughout
Europe and m any parts o f the w o r l d . T h e tension between these two systems is m ost

®Ibid., Article s 86-102.
^ Ibid., Article 9.
M. C herif Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty o f Rome on the Establishment o f an
International Criminal Court.” Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999): 443-469.
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evident in the em phasis both system s place on balancing the need to secure convictions
versus the rights o f the accused.
A m inim um o f procedural rights was included in the Statute to satisfy effectively
the U.S. delegations as David Scheffer pointed out in his testim ony before Congress.' '
The inclusion o f the Elem ents and Procedures alleviates m uch o f the due process proce
dural concerns o f the U.S. How ever, it does not satisfy the U.S. objections over the
definition o f crim es in the Statute. The problem for the U.S. is the definitions are too
vague and im precise and thus violate core legal principles that comprise the western le
gal traditions o f the “rule o f law .”
The U.S. contends that in failing to define sufficiently and adequately the C ourt’s
crim es the ICC will deliver verdicts that are neither impartial, fair, nor follow interna
tionally recognized m inim um rule o f law guarantees.*^ W ithout judicial integrity, states
w ill be unwilling to cooperate w ith the ICC, resulting in a weak and ineffectual Court.
To avoid this, the U.S. argues that the ICC crim es need m ore sufficient definitions to
satisfy the principle o f the rule o f law.

The Inner M orality o f Law
Lon Fuller m akes the case that any legal system follows certain moral principles.'^
He refers to these legal principles as the “inner m orality o f law.” He m aintains that
while a governm ent can regulate and control behavior using any num ber o f various

" ICC Senate Hearing. 14.
Lietzau, 478.
*^ Lon L. Fuller, The M orality o f Law. 4* ed. (New Haven, CT; Yale University
Press, 1969.)
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m ethods, it does not necessarily make that system a system o f law. In interpreting how
crim es are defined and applied, courts in the U.S. em ploy a clear-statem ent principle o f
the “rule o f law ,”
As articulated by L. Fuller in The M orality o f Law, the rule o f law principle is pre
sent in a legal system “in w hich legal rules exist, are clear rather than vague, do not ap
ply retroactively, operate in the w orld as they do in the books, and do not contradict each
o t h e r . A c c o r d i n g to Fuller a legal system that lacks the “rule o f law” violates the the
ory o f the inner m orality o f law, and is therefore a flawed, partial and unfair legal sys
tem.
Fuller bases his theory on the idea that law is a system o f general rules designed to
regulate and control conduct by hum ans endow ed w ith the capacity for deliberation and
choice. Fuller lists eight ways that a legal system can fail, and correspondingly, eight
principles o f the “inner m orality o f law, ” that cause a legal system to succeed.'^ The
eight ways in which a legal system can fail are: (1) having no rules at all so that every
thing relies on ad hoc decisions; (2) failure to m ake the laws public; (3) applying laws
retroactively, which therefore offers no guidance regarding w hat is lawful and unlawful;
(4) a failure to m ake rules understandable; ,(5) enacting rules that are contradictory; (6)
issuing rules that are beyond people’s pow er to follow; (7) changing the rules so fre-

Cass R. Sunstein, “Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State.” Harvard Law
Review 103 (December 1989): 471.
Fuller, 33-94.
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quently people cannot ascertain w hat conduct is expected o f them; and, finally (8) in
congruity betw een the rules as publicized and their adm inistration.’^
Conversely, the eight dem ands o f the inner m orality o f law are: (1) the generality
o f law, m eaning the use o f rules to govern hum an conduct; (2) rules m ust be publicly
prom ulgated; (3) rules m ust be prospective and not retro-active; (4) rules m ust be de
fined w ith clarity; (5) rule cannot contradict one another; (6) laws m ust be able to be fol
lowed, m eaning that they cannot require the impossible; (7) legislative inconstancy, that
is changing laws too frequently m ust be avoided; and (8) congruency should exist be
tween official action and the declared rule.’^ If there is a total failure to provide any o f
the eight demands. Fuller writes that it “does not simply result in a bad system o f law; it
results in som ething that is not properly called a legal system at all, except perhaps in a
Pickwickian sense in w hich a void contract can still be said to be one kind o f contract.” '®
Fuller’s theory flatly rejects the legal positivism o f John A ustin, which m aintains
that laws are laws because they are com m ands issued by a sovereign backed by the
threat o f sanction.'^ Austin m ade a central distinction betw een the question o f w hether a
law form ed part o f the positive law and w hether or not it was a good or ju st law. Thus,
“W hat is the law ?” is quite distinct fi'om “W hat ought the law be?”

On this subject

Austin writes, “The existence o f law is one thing; its m erit or dem erit another. W hether

Ibid., 39.
Ibid., 45-91.
Ibid., 39.
Andrew Altman, Arguing A bout Law. 2"** ed. (London: W adsworth Publishing
Company, 2001), 68.
Ibid.
139

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

it be or be not is one inquiry; w hether it be or not be conform able to an assum ed stan
dard, is a different inquiry.”
However, Fuller rejects the general characteristic o f legal positivism that equates
law “as a one-way projection o f authority, originating with govem m ent.”^^ Instead,
Fuller notes that the law, i f it is to function as a regulatory system, m ust take into ac
count the relationship betw een citizens and governments. For exam ple. Fuller raises the
question o f w hat constitutes legitim acy “to a written constitution for a country just
emerging from a period o f violence and disorder in which any thread o f legal continuity
with previous governm ents has broken.”^^ The answer is found in the acceptance o f the
citizens o f the constitution.
Similarly, Ronald D w orkin speaks o f "law beyond law,"^"* a social consensus that
inspires us continually to discern the "best route to a better future"^^ by defining "the
people we want to be and the com m unity w e aim to have."^*^ It is within the bounds o f
this kind o f negotiated social consensus that transitional societies, which are frequently
devoid o f obvious shared norm ative values, m ust establish the legal legitimacy o f their

J.W. Brown, ed., The Austinian Theory o f Law. (Littleton, CO; Rothman, 1983),
71, cited in Altman, 68.
Fuller, 204.
Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply To Professor Hart,”
Harvard Law Review 91 (1958), 630.
Ronald Dworkin, Laws Em pire (1986), 409; quoted in Charles Villa-Vicencio,
“W hy Perpetrators Should N ot Always Be Prosecuted: W here the International Criminal
Court and Truth Com missions M eet.” E m ory Law Journal 49 (Winter 2000): 207.
Ibid., 413.
Ibid.
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new governm ents. An analogous circum stance is drawn in regard to the creation o f the
ICC, w hich attem pts to establish a w holly new international crim inal justice system.
The ICC contains m any o f the elem ents necessary for m eeting the principle o f the
rule o f law. A rticle 24 states that laws will not be applied retroactively and that the rule
o f lenity, w hich requires Courts to resolve am biguities in favor o f defendants, will apply.^’ Article 22, contains the principle o f nullum crim en sine lege (no crim e w ithout a
punishm ent), w hich states that laws w ill not be applied retroactively.^® Article 20, con
tains the principle o f no bis in idem, or double jeopardy, which prevents trying a person
tw ice for the sam e offense.^^
However, the m ain contention that is exam ined in this chapter is that inadequately
defined crim es violate legal principles that require laws to be clear rather than vague.
W hile not explicitly stated by the U.S., the im plication o f Fuller’s theoiy o f the inner
m orality o f law m ay lead to the conclusion that the ICC is a theoretically flawed Court.
Therefore, if the ICC contains crim es that are ill-defined and lack specificity, this
strengthens the claim that the inner m orality o f law is violated by the ICC Statute, result
ing in a theoretically flawed Court.

C rim inal L iability for Ill-D efined Crimes
The U nited States C onstitution states that vague or ill-defined criminal statutes vio
late due process, and are therefore considered unconstitutional. In Lanzetta v. New Jer-

27.

‘ICC Statute,” Article 24.

Ibid., Article 22.
Ibid., Article 20.
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sev. the Suprem e Court noted that the “Court has repeatedly stated that crim inal statutes
w hich fail to give due notice that an act has been m ade crim inal before it is done are un
constitutional deprivations o f due process o f law .”^®
In another case. Screw s v. U nited States, the Suprem e Court declared that due
process requires statutory specificity “to give due notice that an act has been made
crim inal before it is done and to inform [the] accused o f the nature o f the offense
charged, so that he m ay adequately prepare and m ake his defense.”^* Constitutional
concerns over potential due process violations related to the IC C ’s core crimes raise sev
eral issues. Each separate issue is listed and then given m ore consideration in ensuing
paragraphs.
Constitutional guarantees provided to accused persons by the United States Consti
tution are not necessarily afforded to persons accused in other nations.^^ The Supreme
C ourt ruled that A m erican constitutional rights do not apply to crim es com m itted outside
the United States, or to violations o f laws o f foreign nations.^^ In addition, the U.S. fed
eral courts have also held that the Sixth A m endm ent is non-applicable to extradition
hearings. In M arten v. W arden, the 11* Circuit federal court held that there is no due
process right to a “speedy, extradition.”^"* The 9* Circuit also held in P e n Yin-Chov v.

Lanzetta v. N ew Jersey, 306 U.S. 452 (1939).
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 9 1 ,1 2 8 (1954).
Kenneth J. Harris and Robert Kushen, “Prosecuting International Crime: Surren
der o f Fugitives to the W ar Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Squaring Inter
national Legal Obligations with the U.S. Constitution,” Criminal Law Forum 7, no. 3
(1996): 561,597.
” Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
^"* M arten v. W arden, 993 F. 2d 824, 825 (1993).
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R obinson that the right to confront adverse witnesses does not apply to extradition/^
Therefore, the claim is advanced that there is no m erit to the argum ent that the U.S. can
not becom e a party to the ICC i f U.S. constitutional protections are not included in the
ICC Statute,
However, a second issue is the fact that any treaty which violates the Constitution
cannot bind the U nited States. The Suprem e Court held in Reid v. Covert that “no pro
vision o f an [international] agreem ent m ay contravene any o f the prohibitions or lim ita
tions o f the Constitution applicable to any exercise o f authority by the U nited States.”^^
The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Com m ittee explained that it had no doubt w hatsoever
that “no treaty can override or conflict with the Constitution. The Constitution is para
mount. [See] Reid v. Covert. 354, U.S. 1 (1957).”^^ The Com mittee had m ade the above
statement to explain the reservation attached to the ratification o f the Genocide Conven
tion.^* The Com m ittee fully anticipated that at some future tim e the International Court
o f Justice would interpret the G enocide Convention in a m anner that would require the
U.S. to adopt m easures that w ould be unconstitutional.^^
In m aking a forceful statem ent restating the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid v.
Covert, the Senate Foreign R elations Com m ittee was m aking it crystal clear that the U.S.

Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F. 2d 1400, 1406 (9* Circuit 1988).
Reid V. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); quoted in Congress, Senate, Report o f the Sen
ate Foreign Relations on the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
o f the Crime o f Genocide. Exec.O., 81®* Congress, 1®* sess.. Exec. Rep. 99-2,99**^ Cong.,
1®' sess., 1985; 20.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 20-21,
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Senate w ould never give its advice and consent to a treaty that could be perceived to vio
late constitutional protections. The Senate’s stand has great significance for assessing
U.S. objections to the ICC Statute. If it can be affirm ed that the IC C ’s Statute would, in
all likelihood violate constitutional due process, then the prospects o f the U.S. ratifying
the treaty are seriously diminished.
O ne solution to the problem o f the conflict betw een ICC provisions and the U.S.
C onstitution is to sidestep the issue altogether by describing the ICC as a non-Article HI
court, w hich is not bound by U.S. law."*® The U.S. Constitution states:
[T]he judicial pow er o f the U nited States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress m ay from tim e to time ordain and estab
lish. The Judges, both o f the suprem e and inferior courts, shall hold their offices
during good Behavior, and shall ..receive...a Com pensation, which shall not be di
m inished during their Continuance in Office.'*'
As the ICC is not a creation o f the

U.S. Congress, nor does the President nom inate its

judges, the ICC is arguably a non-Article IH court.**^ Legal scholar Paul M arquardt, in
advocating for non-Article IQ status, claim ed that since the ICC will exercise authority
derived firom the international com m unity o f nation-states, the ICC would not m erit A r
ticle

in court consideration.'*^

M arquardt also asserts that even if the

U.S. investigated

and detained alleged w ar priminals for the ICC, it w ould still not warrant Article HI

'*" Paul D. Marquardt, “Law W ithout Borders: The Constitutionality o f an Interna
tional Criminal Court.” Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 33, no. 1 (1999): 104-106.
'*' U.S. Constitution, art. 3, sec. 1.
Daniel J. Brown, “The International Criminal Court and Trial in Abstentia.”
Brooklvn Journal o f International Law 24, no. 3 (1999): 789.
^*^ Marquardt, 106.
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status. In short, states M arquardt, “International courts are sim ply separate from the sys
tem o f U nited States courts governed by Article HI.”
M oreover, the Suprem e Court ruling in H irota v. M acA ithur bolsters precedence
for the ICC as a non-A rticle HI c o u r t I n that case, the Suprem e Court held that be
cause the Tokyo Tribunal w as created under the authority o f U.S. Supreme Allied Com 
m ander G eneral Douglas C. M acArthur, it “is not a tribunal o f the United States.”
However, there are flaws in the above argument. The ICC is based on the principle
o f com plem entarity, which grants prim ary jurisdiction to national courts. A s such, any
proceedings o f the ICC in the U.S. national courts w ould be operating not as interna
tional courts but rather as U.S. courts. For exam ple, w hile extradition proceedings in
U.S. courts m ay not have to provide full constitutional guarantees, such as the right to a
speedy trial, these courts are still Article HI courts operating as part o f the U.S. judicial
system. Thus, the question o f w hether or not the ICC proceedings in U.S. courts m ust
provide all constitutional protections to defendants is a different question than whether
the court is acting as an Article HI court. Any ICC proceedings in U.S. courts would
arguably m erit full constitutional protections o f any crim inal defendants, since any court
operating in the U.S. w ould be national in character, and thus w ould have to be an A rti
cle HI Court.
Theoretically, the tension betw een U.S. constitutional guarantees and the ICC Stat
ute raises a larger issue. W ithin the fram ework o f Fuller’s “inner morality o f law” there

"^Ibid.

H irota v. M acArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
Ibid.
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exists the possibility o f the theoretical incom patibility betw een the theories o f the rule o f
law as applied in accordance w ith the U.S. Constitution versus the rule o f law ’s applica
tion in countries w ith a civil law tradition.

Problem s o f D efinition
T he ICC Statute lists four crim es as the subject m atter jurisdiction o f the Court,"*^
They are listed in A rticle 5, then given fuller consideration in Articles 6, 7, and 8. A rti
cle 5 reads;
C rim es w ithin the jurisdiction o f the Court
1. The jurisdiction o f the Court shall be lim ited to the m ost serious crimes
o f concern to the international com m unity as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction
in accordance w ith this Statute w ith respect to the following crimes:
(a) The crim e o f genocide;
0?) Crimes against humanity;
(c) W ar crimes;
(d) The crim e o f aggression.
Article 6 o f the Statute defines genocide, w hich is taken from the original genocide con
vention in 1949.'** How ever, Article 6 only contains a portion o f that original conven
tion. Article 6 states:
For the purpose o f this Statute, "genocide" m eans any o f the following acts
com m itted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing m em bers o f the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or m ental harm to m em bers o f the group;
(c) D eliberately inflicting on the group conditions o f life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in w hole or in part;

“ICC Statute,” Article 5.
'** “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide,” 9 De
cem ber 1948, Treaties and International Agreements Registered or Filed or Reported with
the Secretariat o f the U nited Nations 78, no. 277.
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(d)
(e)

Im posing m easures intended to prevent births w ithin the group;
Forcibly transferring children o f the group to another group.**’

The crim e contained w ithin the Statute, including genocide, are restatem ents o f
custom ary international hum anitarian offenses, excepting som e m inor changes.^® The
problem , how ever, is that sim ply restating the custom ary norm s as set forth in the geno
cide convention is insufficient for the dem ands o f crim inal specificity.^’ Custom ary
norm s as contained w ithin the Geneva and Hague Conventions, as well as other relevant
treaties w ere created as general norm s whose im plem entation, and subsequent precise
ness was left for states to create with dom estic legislation.^^
Leaving im plem entation o f Geneva and Hague Convention norms to dom estic leg
islation causes tw o problem s for the ICC. The ICC is based on the principle o f com ple
m entarity, which m eans national courts will obtain prim ary jurisdiction and the ICC will
prosecute cases only w hen countries are unw illing or unable to prosecute. W hile defer
ring to national courts preserves their sovereign autonomy, the judicial results will vary
fi-om country to country. Each country w ill have different judicial systems, rules, and
procedures, as w ell as varying interpretations o f the crim es contained within the ICC
Statute. In one sense this preserves the original intent o f the creators o f the Geneva and
Hague Conventions, w ho envisioned the im plem entation o f the treaties’ provisions as
being uniquely tailored to each nation. H ow ever, with the ICC designed to provide uni-

Ibid.
United Nations, Report o f the Prepatorv Com mission on the Establishment o f an
International Criminal Court. U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, 1996, U.N. Doc.
A /5 1 /2 2 ,16.
Lietzau, 482.
Ibid.
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fonnity and universality in interpreting the laws o f w ar and peace it leaves the question
unansw ered o f how the ICC w ill accept the national judicial decisions.

In effect the

Statute places the ICC in the role o f a “suprem e court” o f the w orld for war crimes.
U nder the term s o f Rom e Statute, the ICC w ill have the pow er o f judicial review
over national crim inal justice systems, since the ICC determ ines when a nation is “un
able or unw illing” to prosecute for w ar crimes.^'* Article 17(2) states:
2,
In order to determ ine unw illingness in a particular case, the Court shall
consider, having regard to the principles o f due process recognized by international
law, w hether one or m ore o f the follow ing exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was
m ade for the purpose o f shielding the person concerned from crim inal re
sponsibility for crim es w ithin the jurisdiction o f the Court referred to in arti
cle 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circum 
stances is inconsistent w ith an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or im 
partially, and they w ere or are being conducted in a m anner which, in the cir
cum stances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice.
3.
In order to determ ine inability in a particular case, the Court shall con
sider w hether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability o f its national
judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence
and testim ony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
But under the principle o f com plem entarity the ICC leaves the responsibility o f creating
more precise definitions o f the custom ary qorm s and treaties, which comprise the IC C ’s
crim inal subject m atter, up to individual nations within the international community.
Specifically, in order to m eet R ule o f Law standards for criminal law specificity, these
custom ary norm s m ust find expression as crim inal provisions that transform the general

Paul Dubinsky, “Panel: The International Criminal Court: Contemporary Perspec
tives and Prospects for Ratification,” N ew Y ork Law School Journal o f Human Rights 16
(Spring 2000): 535.
“ICC Statute,” Article 17(2).
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proscriptions into crim es w ith specificity accom panied by elements o f p ro o f N ext, laws
created at the m acrolevel o f states m ust be converted to the m icrolevel o f individuals to
determ ine individual crim inal culpability. Presum ably the ICC will then bring these
law s into a consistent international fram ework. These steps constitute the set o f general
tasks associated w ith the application o f international crim inal law from the level o f the
ory to practice.^^
The specific m ethod required to perform this task is to review a m ultiplicity o f fac
tual scenarios to attach guilt only w hen the accused is crim inally liable in both deed and
intent.^® The goal, from a m ilitary standpoint is to balance the prosecution o f genuine
w ar crim es against preventing the prosecution for justifiably defensible m ilitary acts.
The difficulty o f “enhancing certainty and predictability...[isjno easy task, especially in
warfare scenarios where violence and aggression necessarily lie at the root o f state ac
tion.”

H ow the ICC can accom plish that task w ithout infringing upon the sovereignty

o f national judicial systems rem ains to be seen.
In relation to the definition o f genocide. Article (6)(a) is reasonably straightfor
ward; the reference to “killing” is the least vague part o f the article.^* However, Article
(6)(b) states, “Causing serious bodily or m ental harm to m em bers o f the group.”
There is no definition as to what constitutes “serious. ” or “m ental harm .” The elements
o f crim e which w ere created under the authority o f A rticle 9 contain no useful guideline.

Lietzau, 483.
Ibid.
” Ibid.
58

ICC Statute,” Article 6(a).
Ibid., Article 6(b).
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Precedent is generally lacking, as the G enocide Convention was only applied for the first
tim e in the R w anda and Yugoslavia w ar tribunals. The criteria for commission o f geno
cide is defined as “acts com m itted with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such.” ^
In the Elem ents o f Crime, “whole or in part,” is clarified as “serious bodily or m en
tal harm to one or m ore persons.”

Strictly construed, genocide under the ICC Statute

could occur if only one person was subject to “serious m ental or physical harm ” with a
view tow ard causing the death o f that person. The Elem ents further define “killing” as
stated in A rticle 6(a) as being interchangeable with the term “caused death.”

Using

the term “caused death” appears to create further difficulties. I f an auto accident causes
the death o f a person o f a protected group under the definition o f genocide, technically
that conduct, i f proven to be intentional, w ould constitute genocide.
Sim ilarly, m any other hypothetical scenarios could be drawn where “death” is
caused, particular during an arm ed conflict. The qualifying statement that limits broad
ness in the definition o f genocide is the “intent” requirem ent “to destroy, in whole o r in
part.”

Presum ably, the qualifying statem ent was intended to prevent solitary deaths,

but one individual technically is still a “part” o f a protected group.

Ibid., 6U nited Nations, “Finalized Draft T ext o f the Elements o f Crimes,” June 2000,
Report o f the Prepatorv Com mission for the International Criminal Court. PCNICC/2000/
1/Add. 2; Article 6(b) (hereafter cited as Elements o f Crimes).
Ibid., Article 6(a)(1), footnote 2.
“ICC Statute,” Article 6.
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A rticle 6 part (c) equates genocide with “deliberating inflicting on the group condi
tions o f life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” ^
Once again the Elem ents o f Crimes stipulate that technically one need only cause the
death o f one person to m eet the definition o f genocide.^^ Conceivably, Article (6)(c)
could apply to a sanctions situation, such as in Iraq. How ever, ju st w hat constitutes the
m eaning o f “deliberating inflicting on the group conditions o f life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in w hole or in part” is unknown. There is no guidance,
and presum ably ICC judges will decide on a case-by-case basis, w hich causes great con
cern fo r the U.S.
Parts (d) and (e) o f the definition o f genocide are equally vague in m eaning. Part
(d) states that genocide exists when there is a cam paign to reduce the rate o f pregnancy
in order to lim it population growth.^^ A t least one international lawyer has questioned
the forethought behind part (d), and believes that w hile the Statute’s drafters had some
“paradigm o f evil” in m ind, they w ere not forthcom ing in their meaning.®^ The vague
ness o f this definition leaves open the possibility o f a variety o f interpretations, ranging
from N azi-like forced sterilization to U.N. sponsored birth control programs. M oreover,
discussion papers w ere not very helpful for clarifying the definition.^* One PrepCom

Ibid., Article 6(c).
“Elements o f Crimes,” Article 6(a)(1).
“ICC Statute,” Article 6(d).
George Fletcher, “The International Criminal Court: Contemporary Perspectives
and Prospects for Ratification,” in Ruti Teitel, N ew York Law School Journal o f Human
Rights 16 (Spring 2000), 525.
“U N Prepatory Com m ission for International Criminal Court concludes first ses
sion at HQ,” M 2 Presswire. 2 M arch 1999, 1999 W est Law, 12607695, reprinted in David
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paper circulated in M arch o f 1999 stated “G enocide by preventing births would occur if
the accused im posed m easures that w ere intended to prevent births within a group.”
It w ould appear that the crime bears a relationship to the m anner o f how measures
to prevent pregnancies are im posed on a population. Thus, conceivably Planned Parent
hood could be construed as im posing m easures designed to prevent births by counseling
all clients on form s o f birth control. H ow ever, Planned Parenthood’s operation surely
cannot be the type o f activity the IC C ’s drafters had in m ind when considering conduct
that rises to the level o f genocide.
Part(e) o f the definition o f genocide is equally problem atic. Article 6(e) states,
“forcibly transferring children o f the group to another group.” A s the definition now
stands, the practice o f finding hom es for children o f one group and placing them with
another w ould be consistent with the above definition. Professor George Fletcher states
that drafters surely did not intend for this to be so, how ever they left the definition vague
enough to allow for this form o f strict reading. Professor Fletcher suggests that what the
drafters had in m ind was an act sim ilar to the taking o f Aborigine children in Australia
and forcing them to be raised in W hite hom es in order to assim ilate them into another
culture.^®
A rticle 25, section 3, in conjunction w ith the definition o f genocide raises specific
U.S. constitutional questions. A rticle 25, section 3, provides for various forms o f par-

Nill, “National Sovereignty; M ust It B e Sacrificed to the International Criminal Court?’
BYU Journal o f Public Law 14, no. 1 (1999): 119-150.
^^Ibid.
Fletcher, 526.
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ticipation in a crim inal offense which render the person liable for crim inal prosecution.’ ’
A rticle 25(3)(e) w ould appear to violate constitutionally protected free speech. Article
25(3)(e) states:
e) In respect o f the crim e o f genocide, directly and publicly incites
others to com m it genocide.’^
In effect, w riting or speaking o f population transfers m ay violate this provision and
render the person liable for the crim e o f genocide. The above article would invariably
constitute a challenge to constitutionally protected free speech.’^ O nly in the circum 
stance where the speech or w riting was likely to cause an im m inent likelihood o f inciting
others to com m it genocide w ould the above provision o f the ICC Statute be perm itted in
U.S. law.
The definition o f genocide in Article 6 is fairly representative o f the im precise na
ture o f the definition o f crim es contained in the ICC Statute. Although the crimes
against hum anity in Article 7 are better defined than the Article 8 w ar crimes. Article 7
still contains sim ilar definitional problem s. A ccording to international law scholar
M .C herif Bassiouni, the language o f A rticle 7 is clear, and yet he acknowledges “some
o f the prohibited acts are m ere labels whose elements w ill need to be established in the
future.”

The lack o f specificity and elem ents clarifying crim es against hum anity raises

” “ICC Statute,” Article 25(3)
Ibid., Article 25(3)(e).
73

U.S. Constitution, Am endm ent 1.
Bassiouni, 461.
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“questions about their conform ity to the requirem ents o f the principles o f legality con
tained in Article 22,” which requires that laws be “strictly construed.”
A rticle 8 is m ore problem atic ow ing to the fact that custom ary laws o f w ar often
reflect negotiated law o f w ar treaties w here consensus w as m ore valued than clear, pre
cise terminology.^^ M ilitaries are typically loath to bind their forces through restrictive
precise language, and therefore the practice o f the law s o f w ar has been one o f general
proscriptions rather than narrow ly tailored ones.^^
Som e exam ples illustrate this point. In Article 8, one o f the first w ar crimes listed
is that o f “w illfully causing great suffering, o r serious injury to body or health.”’®
Agreem ent upon w hat exactly that m eans is com pletely lacking.’^ The problem . M ajor
Lietzau notes, is that “great suffering” is a com m on result o f war, even among “pro
tected” civilian persons.®® O ther exam ples o f ambiguous wording are “wounding
treacherously,”®’ “attacking...buildings w hich are undefended,”®^ and “persecution,” de
fined as “intentional and severe deprivation o f fundam ental rights contrary to interna
tional law by reason o f the identity o f the group or collectivity.” ®^

75

Ibid. ; “ICC Statute,” A rticle 22.
Lietzau, 483.

” Ibid.
’®“ICC Statute,” Article 8(2)(a)(iii).
Lietzau, 487.
®®Ibid., 488.
®’ “ICC Statute,” Article 8(2)(b)(xi).
®^ Ibid., Article 8(2)(b)(v).
®^ Ibid., Article 7 (l)(h ) and (2)(g).
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A s this chapter concludes it is clear that the crim es exam ined here represent only a
fraction o f the definitional difficulties that w ill need to be worked out to attain the level
o f specificity required by crim inal justice system s operating under Fuller’s R ule o f Law
requisites. However, the uniqueness o f the ICC is that there is no supra-legislator that
can m ore adequately define the crim es. One scholar has stated that one o f the things that
the ICC m ay do very w ell is “provide clarity and uniform interpretation to international
hum an rights and hum anitarian law .”®^ It is precisely because international hum anitarian
law is so lacking in clear and specific definitions that the U nited States is troubled by the
IC C ’s treatm ent o f the crim inal subject m atter.
If the ICC is establishing precedents as to uniform interpretations o f com m and re
sponsibility, genocide, and war crim es, it w ill be doing so as a treaty organization that
not all states will join. A dvocates o f the ICC w ould like to believe the precedents set in
international law by the Court m ay ultim ately bind all states. Indeed as m entioned above,
m any scholars believe that the function o f interpreting law is one o f the advantages to
w ard creating the ICC.
However, the precedential value w ill occur w ithout m any states’ - including the
U .S .’s - consent. That is deeply troubling^to the U.S. w hich feels such important matters
should not be left up to judges operating w ithout proper and effective oversight in a
treaty based organization that not all states w ill join.*^ Although the ICC tries to steer
away from m aking the claim that it w ill be creating binding law,^^ nevertheless, the deci-

Dubinsky, 535.
Leitzau, 512-529.
“ICC Statute,” A rticle 10 states:
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sions m ade b y the ICC will com e to occupy a space in international law as part o f the
evidence for the existence o f custom ary international law, which is binding on all
states.*^

Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as lim iting or prejudicing in any way existing or
developing rules o f international law for purposes other than this Statute.
Article 38 o f the Statute o f the International Court o f Justice identifies the sources
o f international law as deriving from four categories; (1) treaties, (2) international customs,
(3) general principles o f law com m on to all legal systems, and (4) judicial precedents
along with the teachings o f international law experts. See J.L. Brierly, The Law o f Na
tions. 5* ed. (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1955), 57-66.
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CH A PTER 6
CON CLU SION

On July 18, 1998 the Convention creating the ICC was opened for signature at II
C am pidoglio in Rom e. W ithin two hours o f the opening for signatures twenty-six coun
tries had signed the T reaty.’ A little over a year later, by O ctober 1999, eighty-nine
states had signed and four states had ratified the Treaty.^ The rapidity with w hich na
tion-states have jo in ed the Treaty dem onstrates the wide support the ICC enjoys among
the w orld com m unity. Perhaps w ith that in mind form er President Clinton decided to
sign the treaty on the last day it was open for signatures.^
However, the Senate has m ade it clear they will not ratify the treaty.'* C linton’s
signing o f the ICC treaty does not bind the U.S. to the treaty until the Senate gives their
advice and consent and ratifies the treaty. However, under the Vienna Law o f Treaties,

’ M. C herif Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty o f Rom e on the Establishment o f an
International Criminal Court.” Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999): 467.
^ United Nations, “Rom e Statute o f the International Criminal Court, Ratification
Status,” United Nations Official W ebsite, [ratification status on-line]; available jfrom
http://www.un.org/ law /icc/statute/status.htm; Internet; accessed 16 M ay 2001.
^ On Decem ber 31,2000, on the last day the treaty was open for signature. Presi
dent Clinton signed the ICC Statute.
Congress, Senate, Com m ittee on Foreign Relation, Subcommittee on International
Operations, Is A U N International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest? Sub
comm ittee on International Operations. 105**’ Cong, 2"'* sess., 23 July 1998 (hereafter
cited as ICC Senate Hearing).
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a state’s signature does bind it to refrain fr-om defeating the purpose o f that tre a ty / The
U.S. w aited alm ost forty years to ratify the G enocide Convention, and given the w ide
spread support for the ICC, m any scholars have predicted that the ICC w ill be opera
tional long before the U.S. ever becom es a state-party to the treaty.^
The reality that the U.S. w ill not be a party to the ICC Statute raises an im por
tant question. Since the U .S. w ill not participate in the ICC w hy is it im portant to assess
U.S. objections? A t the outset, it is difficult to envision the efficient functioning o f the
ICC w ithout U.S. participation. International legal scholars point out the exam ple o f the
U.S. failure to participate in the League o f Nations as one possibility that represents the
worst-case scenario.^ A t worst, the ICC w ill not only be ineffective, but also acerbate
international tensions, potentially fueling conflicts and prolonging wars.
N evertheless, advocates rem ain cautiously optim istic, seeing in the creation o f the
ICC a m om entous step forward in institutionalizing international criminal justice
m echanism s. Yet, they also realize the ICC is no panacea for all the ills o f mankind.
T he tendency among ICC advocates is to view the U .S. as refusing to hold their own
conduct accountable to the sam e rule o f law they impose on others. The ICC advocate’s
viewS on U.S. opposition m akes it easier for proponents o f the ICC to dism iss U.S. ob
jections w ithout really analyzing their content. However, dism issing U.S. objections

^ United N ations, “Vienna C onvention on the Law o f Treaties,” 23 May 1969,
United Nations Treatv Series. 1115, Article 8 ,3 3 1 , 336.
^ Christopher Blakesley and others, “Panel: Association o f the American Law
Schools Panel on the International Criminal Court,” American Criminal Law Review 36,
no. 2 (Spring 1999): 223-254.
^ W illiam S. Shepard, “Restraining Gulliver: Am erican Exceptionalism and the In
ternational Criminal Court,” M editerranean Quarterly 11, no. 1 (2000), 69.
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w ithout fully considering their m erits fails to appreciate the validity o f those criticism s.
A ssessing U.S. objections to the ICC becom es im portant because their validity could act
as a predictor o f future ICC results, allow ing policy m akers and leaders to anticipate the
effect o f those results and respond accordingly. For exam ple, i f it can be determ ined
that in a particular instance the aggressive pursuit by the ICC o f a suspected w ar crim i
nal could lead to the destabilization o f a region, the U .S. can use its pow er to prevent
that particular ICC prosecution.
The paradox o f the tw entieth century is that although m ore international coopera
tion and international treaties have been used to m itigate and prevent the violence o f
war, it has also produced m ore death and destruction than any other century in history.®
The treaties represented the w orld’s attem pt through the use o f the international law to
reduce the horrors o f war, the instability they produce, and the lives they destroy. Yet,
repeatedly the attem pts to reduce the sheer brutality o f m en toward other m en have
failed. The post-W orld W ar H w ar crim es trials at N urem berg and Tokyo reflect hu
m anity’s desire to right wrongs and punish international transgressors who comm it hei
nous acts that “shock the conscious o f m ankind.” ^

®Professor Rudi Rum m el docum ents that as m any as 170 million persons have
been murdered by their own governments. See Rudolph J. Pummel, Death Bv Govern
m ent 9 ,1 9 94, as cited in M ichael P. Scharf, “The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An A p
praisal o f the First International W ar Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg,” Albanv Law Re
view 60 (Spring 1997): 861.
®The Pream ble to the ICC states:
M indful that during this century m illions o f children, women and men have been
victims o f unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience o f humanity.
See United Nations, “Rom e Statute o f the International Criminal Court,” 17 July
1998, United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f
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W ill the passage and successful establishm ent o f a perm anent international crim i
nal court com plete the m issing link in an international crim inal justice system that be
gan w ith the International M ilitary Tribunal (IM T) trials at N urem berg? The U.S. has
responded w ith a definite answ er o f no. It is the position o f the U.S. that the ICC
adopted at Rom e, and destined to becom e a fully functioning institution before long,
suffers from institutional flaws that hinder, not support the application o f international
justice. This study exam ined the thesis posited by the U nited States that deficiencies in
the institutional structures o f the ICC w ould render the crim inal court inadequate to ac
com plish its stated objectives o f punishing and deterring the w orst forms o f interna
tional crim inal atrocities.'®
The thesis analyzed particular institutional features o f the ICC to assess the claim s
o f the U.S. against the actual language o f the Statute to determ ine if the U.S. claims
m erited consideration. In testing the U.S. hypothesis this thesis confined the scope o f
its inquiry to four features o f the ICC Statute:
(1)

The jurisdiction o f the ICC;

(2)

The authority and pow ers o f the Office o f the Prosecutor;

(3)

The role o f the U nited N ations Security Council; and,

(4)

The crim es that the ICC w ill be enforcing.

an International Criminal Court. U.N. GAOR, 53^ sess., 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (hereafter cited as ICC Statute).
'® The Preamble to the ICC Statute articulates its objectives:
A ffirm ing that the m ost serious crimes o f concern to the international community
as a whole m ust not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured
by taking m easures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.
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The m ethod used to assess the specific U.S. objections was a careful analysis o f
the language o f the disputed articles o f the ICC Statute to ascertain w hether or not U.S.
claim s are accurate. The m aterials that have been used in this study are derived from
both prim ary and secondary sources. The prim ary source m aterial is official govern
m ent docum ents pertaining to the ICC, including the treaty Statute that legally creates
the Court, and U .S. and U N documents. The secondary source m aterials come from
books and academ ic journals.
To provide the context for the impetus behind the ICC creation, the thesis exam 
ined the history o f tw entieth century attem pts at establishing international judicial
m echanism s to prosecute the crim es o f war, genocide, and crim es against humanity.
The historical chapters focused on the failed WWI w ar crim es trials, and the successful

WWn trials in N urem berg and Tokyo. The N urem berg and Tokyo trials are not only
the inspiration but also the source o f the international law upon which the ICC is
founded.
Before the tw entieth century international law had nothing to say regarding in
dividuals; it provided legal personality only to nations. Individuals were recognized in
international law only in the context o f their being a citizen o f a country, such that when
an individual w as w ronged it was really the citizen’s country that had rights to redress
o f grievances. A n individual w ithout a country possessed no rights recognized by inter
national law. Consequently, citizens had no rights outside the context o f their national
ity. Prior to, and throughout m uch o f the tw entieth century, if a citizen were wronged
by their governm ent, international law w as silent.
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Then in 1899 the first Hague Conference was held. N ations assem bled in recogni
tion o f their m utual benefit to regulate their conduct both to prevent wars and to m iti
gate the horrors that stem m ed from wars. Credit falls to the Russian Czar N icholas H
for calling the first Hague Conference, as credit falls to the Hague Conference for pro
ducing the first international codification o f the laws o f w ar.’ * A t the second Hague
Conference, another Russian, international ju rist Feodor de M artens gets credit for writ
ing into international law a w hole new category o f crim es that sets the revolutionary
tone in international law in the tw entieth century.’^
The M artens Clause, contained in the Pream ble o f the 1907 Hague Convention,
m oved onto the stage o f international law the recognition and protection o f the lives and
rights o f individuals. The M artens C lause gave recognition to the category o f crim es
against hum anity, w hich brings protection to civilians in war.
The first test at im plem enting the laws o f w ar erected at the Hague Conferences
ended in failure as the “Guns o f A ugust” erupted in the sum m er o f 1914 with the out
break o f W W I. The H ague represented the first international efforts to hum anize the
conduct o f the participants in war. Y et, the First W orld W ar was anything but hum an
ized; it was the m ost brutal w ar ever fought up to that time. It was a w ar o f m etal and

*’ James F. W illis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy o f Punish
ing W ar Criminals o f the First W orld W ar (London: Greenwood Press, 1982), xi
The M artens’ Clause contained in the Preamble o f the 1907 Hague Convention
reads:
Until a more complete code o f the laws o f w ar has been issued, the High Contract
ing Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the
m le o f the principles o f the law o f nations, as they result from the usages established
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m achines that delivered m en up to their deaths, not in the hundreds, but in the thou
sands. W orld W ar I has becom e an iconographie sym bol for the horrors o f w ar evoking
im ages o f trenches and barbed w ire strewn battlefields littered with pockets o f poison
gas and the bodies o f dead soldiers cut dow n by m achine guns, their faces covered w ith
gas m asks.’^
A t last w hen the “Guns o f A ugust” were silent, the victorious Allies were in no
m ood to be conciliatory. They charged K aiser W ilhelm II for violations o f the laws o f
nations and pursued his punishm ent before an international tribunal. Although the ef
forts at w ar crim es w ere unsuccessful, the trials becam e the legal genesis behind the
N urem berg and Tokyo trials. In 1943 the Allies created the U nited Nations W ar Crimes
Com m ission (UNW CC) to investigate form ally w ar crim es violations and explore pro
posals for creating a w ar crim es c o u r t . U N W C C exam ined the work o f the 1919
Com m ission on the Responsibility o f the A uthors o f the W ar and on Enforcem ent o f
Penalties to determine the direction that the post-W W H trials should take.’^ The
U N W CC wanted to m ake sure the m istakes o f W W I were not repeated.

among civilized peoples, fi-om the laws o f humanity, and the dictates o f the public con
science.
Howard Ball, Prosecuting W ar Crimes and Genocide (Kansas: University Press
o f Kansas, 1999), 9-25.
C herif M. Bassiouni, “From Versailles To Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The
Need to Establish a Perm anent International Criminal Court,” Harvard Human Rights
Journal 10 (Spring 1997): 21-23.
“Commission on the Responsibility o f the Authors o f the W ar and on Enforce
ment o f Penalties,” 29 M arch 1919, R eport Presented to the Preliminary Peace Confer
ence, American Journal o f International Law 14, no. 1 (1920): 95-96 (hereafter cited as
1919 Commission Report).
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The 1919 Com m ission recom m ended charging the K aiser for initiating the war.
The effort failed in the politically-charged atm osphere o f post-W W I Europe, but it
served as the basis for the idea behind charging the G erm ans and Japanese after W W n
for w aging an aggressive war.'® W orld W ar I also sought to punish Turkey for m ass
execution o f A rm enians in 1915, turning back centuries o f tradition and international
law that gave states the right to treat its own nationals as they willed. The effort failed,
but it is significant for establishing the precedence for the idea that citizens are entitled
to international protections even from their ow n governm ents. In bringing their charges
against the K aiser and Turkey, the Allies relied on the w ork o f The Hague Conferences
and the M artens Clause. W W I gave legal life to the ideas o f The Hague; the task that
lay before the world w as m aking them binding international law.'^
N urem berg served as the m idw ay point betw een the failed application o f the ideas
o f w ar crim es after W W I and the successful finalization in 1998 o f a treaty to create the
w orld’s first perm anent international crim inal court. N urem berg is instmm ental for the
developm ents in international law that m ake the ICC possible. The idea o f a perm anent
crim inal court was broached by the 1919 Com m ission but never really considered.'®
The idea was broached again after W W II but stalled in the post-W ar political stalemate
o f the Cold W ar.'^ Finally the idea w as brought to life in the 1990’s. Nurem berg cre

'® W illis, xi.
'^ Ib id., 3-6.
'® Ibid., 166.
How ard Ball, Prosecuting W ar Crimes and Genocide (Kansas: University Press
o f Kansas, 1999), 86-93; Paul D Marquardt, “Law W ithout Borders: The Constitutionality
o f an International Criminal Court,” Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 33, no. 1
(1995): 83-92.
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ated the international legal precedents upon w hich the ICC is based. “The lasting con
tribution o f N urem berg w as to m ake individuals responsible for their actions,” said Jutta
Lim back, president o f G erm any’s Suprem e Court.^° In 1945 the victorious A llies cre
ated the London Charter. A rticle 6 o f that C harter created three categories o f interna
tional w ar crim es for w hich individuals, including heads-of-states and m ilitary leaders,
could be held crim inally liable, and therefore tried before a court o f law. In 1946, the
General A ssem bly o f the newly-created U nited N ations affirm ed and codified the gen
eral principles behind the N urem berg trials into international law. Article 6 o f the N ur
em berg’s C harter m ade three crim es punishable by the N urem berg judges:
(a)
C R IM E S A G A IN S T P E A C E : namely, planning, prepara
tion, initiation or waging a w ar o f aggression, or a w ar in violation o f international
treaties, agreem ents or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspir
acy or the accom plishm ent o f any o f the foregoing.
(b)
W A R C R IM E S : namely, violations o f the laws or customs
o f war. Such violations shall include, but not be lim ited to, murder, ill-treatm ent
o r deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose o f civilian population o f or
in occupied territory, m urder or ill-treatm ent o f prisoners o f w ar or persons on the
seas, killing o f hostages, plunder o f public or private property, wanton destruction
o f cities, towns, o r villages, or devastation not justified by m ilitary necessity.
(c)
C R IM E S A G A IN S T H U M A N IT Y : namely, m urder, ex
term ination, enslavem ent, deportation, and other inhum ane acts com m itted against
any civilian populations, before or during the war; or persecution on political, ra
cial, or religious grounds in execution o f or in connection with any crim e w ithin
the jurisdiction o f the tribunal, w hether or not in violation o f the dom estic law o f
the country w here perpetrated.^'

Ball, 92.
United Nations, “Prosecution and Punishm ent o f M ajor W ar Criminals o f the
European A xis,” 8 August 1945, United Nations Treatv Series 279, 59,1946, Stat. 1544:
82 (hereafter cited as London Charter); Article 6.
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The General A ssem bly codified these principles into international law in 1946 as well
as the other legal precedents set at N urem berg. The others principles codified by the
General A ssem bly were:
Principle I:

There is individual responsibility for w ar crimes.

Principle H;

Individual responsibility lies in international law, regardless o f
w hether dom estic law has no such provisions.

Principle lU. “H ead o f State” is no longer an im m unizing defense against w ar
crim es charges.
Principle IV. “Superior Orders” is no longer a defense against w ar crimes
charges, “provided a m oral choice was in fact im possible.”
Principle V:

A person charged with w ar crim es has “the right to a fair trial on
the facts and the law .”

Principle VII: Com plicity in the com m ission o f the above w ar crimes is a crim e in
international law.
R evolutionary ideas in international law that began with the first attem pts to cod
ify crim es at The Hague, and continued with the legal precedence o f efforts to punish a
head-of-state, K aiser W ilhelm n after W W I, finally took international legal existence at
the N urem berg trials. W ith the N urem berg Principles cam e the ushering in o f a new era
in international law. N o longer was international law silent on how a nation treated its
own citizens. Follow ing in the line o f logic contained in the 1907 M arten’s Clause, in
ternational law now said that even in wartim e there are lim its “to w hat governments
m ay use as a m eans o f killing and w hat they m ay do even to their ow n citizens; such
issues m ay appropriately be judged b y an international tribunal and, m ost important,
those w ho gave the orders and those w ho carried them out both bear full responsibil-

Ball, 87.
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The Hague Conferences had begun a revolution in international law that at
tem pted to bring w ar under the rule o f law/'*
The ICC brings together the unfinished legacy o f the W orld W ar H tribunals, cre
ating a perm anent international crim inal court to hear cases involving the m ost serious
violations o f the laws and custom s o f w ar that for whatever reason are not prosecuted
by national crim inal justice systems. The ICC however, is not a perfect institution. The
specific objections addressed by the U nited States point out difficulties in the IC C ’s
ability to deliver on the prom ise o f finishing the legacy o f N urem berg. The largest con
cern for the U.S. w ere the issues involving how the jurisdiction o f the ICC could be
triggered, w hether the authority to refer cases to the Court w ould be vested in states par
ties, the degree o f independence and authority exercised by the ICC Prosecutor, and
w hether the Security Council could control what cases cam e before the ICC.^^
In regard to the IC C ’s jurisdiction the thesis addressed the following problem
identified by the U.S. The w ay the ICC jurisdiction is framed, the worst forms o f vio
lence com m itted by a nation against its own citizens will go unpunished unless the Se
curity C ouncil refers that case to the ICC. Does the ICC perm it the w orst forms o f in
ternational atrocities occurring w ithin nations to go unpunished absent Security Council
involvem ent, while exposing a nations peacekeepers operating in a hum anitarian m is
sion to the potential risk o f prosecution by the ICC?

" W illis, xi.
Ibid., 5.
ICC Senate H earin g . 1-32.
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The answer is yes. Article 12 only grants the ICC jurisdiction if one o f the parties,
either the nation o f the accused, or the nation w here the crim e was comm itted has either
ratified the treaty or consented to the ICC having jurisdiction to try the case.^^ Since in
all likelihood the leaders o f nations m ost likely to com m it atrocities against their own
citizens - the H itlers o f the w orld - will not jo in the treaty, the only way the ICC can
prosecute such crim es is i f the Security Council, acting under A rticle 13(b), refers the
situation to the Court.^^
The U.S. also cited concerns that a nation could jo in the treaty, exercise the optout clause for war crim es and thereby exem pt its forces from prosecution for that crime.
Therefore, the U.S. claim ed, a nation’s forces could com m it w ar crim es with impunity
while at the same tim e refer cases involving other nations to the ICC to stand trial. The
analysis o f the relevant ICC A rticles 12 and 24 confirm s that the U.S. claim is true. Ar
ticle 124, the opt-out clause, in concert w ith Article 12 authorizes state-parties to the
ICC treaty to refer situations o f the armed forces o f a non-state party to the ICC for
prosecution while exem pting its own nationals from prosecution for w ar crimes. There
fore, the U.S. objection that the ICC Statute perm its states to jo in the treaty and enjoy

“ICC Statute,” Article 12.
The only w ay a non-party state can be prosecuted for crimes committed against
its own nationals within its territory is by a referral from the Security Council as set forth
in Article 13(b) o f the ICC Statute which states:
The C ourt m ay exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in arti
cle 5 in accordance w ith the provisions o f this Statute if:
A situation in w hich one or m ore o f such crim es appears to have been committed
is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security C ouncil acting under Chapter VII o f
the Charter o f the United N ations;
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tem porary prosecution from w ar crim es w hile subjecting states that fail to ratify the
Statute to the IC C ’s jurisdiction is an accurate assessment.
There is also a practical problem w ith the w ay the ICC jurisdiction is framed.
M any chroniclers o f the Nurem berg trials have pointed out that one o f the keys to suc
cess was the fact that the A llies had occupied G erm any with over a m illion troops and
thus had access to all w itnesses and evidence.^® In the situation involving an atrocity
such as the m assacres in Cam bodia, territorial occupation by a victorious arm y will not
be the case. Cam bodia w ould have not only to give up the accused for trial but also co
operate to provide evidence. A nother alternative w ould be if the nation, in this exam 
ple, Cam bodia, were to prosecute the suspected w ar crim inals themselves.
How ever, when these atrocities occur, the governm ent that com m itted the crim es
is typically still in pow er as was the case w ith Cam bodia. In those cases the Security
Council w ould have first to m ake a determ ination if the situation was a threat to interna
tional peace and security and then decide w hether to pursue m ilitary options either to
apprehend and/or overthrow the leaders and others responsible. W hile it m ay seem cal
lous, arguably few situations w ould be so severe as to m uster Security Council support
for m ilitary options. Even in 1991, when the Security Council, led by U.S. troops, re
pelled the Iraqi army from K uw ait, a ground offensive to occupy Baghdad and over
throw Saddam H ussein w as politically unfeasible. Similarly, the NATO operation in
K osovo could not generate support for a ground offensive to protect ethnic Albanians
from Serbian forces.

Telford Tavlor. The Anatom y o f the Nurem berg Trials (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1992), 57.
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The problem is an old one. It is one thing to declare that international law per
m its prosecution o f individuals for universally condem ned crimes. It is quite another to
have that person in custody and have access to all evidence. Once more it w ould appear
that force alone can deliver the Saddam H ussein’s and Pol P ot’s to the world to stand
trial. M oreover, w ithout support from the w orld’s largest superpower, the U.S., it is
hard to fathom how the ICC w ill solve this age-old problem.
The thesis also assessed the U.S. claim that the ICC Prosecutor’s authority is
overly broad and contains too few checks and balances. Furtherm ore, the thesis as
sessed the U.S. contention that too little authority is given to the Security Council in
determ ining what cases com e before the Court. Finally, the thesis exam ined theoretical
problem s associated with the lack o f clarity and preciseness in the IC C ’s definition o f
crimes that w ould underm ine the IC C ’s ability to operate under the Rule o f Law.^^
Professor Bryan M acPherson acknowledges the broad authority granted to the Prosecu
tor:
Rather than rigid rules that w ould underm ine the international court, how 
ever, decisions on w hether to proceed should be left to the prosecutor’s discretion,
after considering the totality o f the circumstances. W hen a state is actively inves
tigating a m atter, the prosecutor could consider, inter alia, the quality o f the state
investigation, the likelihood o f a fair and successful prosecution, and w hether the
state or the international court w ill be better able to obtain relevant evidence and
custody o f the accused. The prosecutor might consider w hy the national court ac
quitted the suspect or w hy national authorities declined to prosecute. If, for ex
ample, the international court has obtained additional evidence that was not con
sidered by the national authorities, an international trial m ight well be reasonable.

W illiam K. Lietzau, “Checks and Balances and Elements o f Proof: Structural Pil
lars for the International Criminal Court, ’’ Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999):
478.
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I f the consequence o f not taking jurisdiction w ould be trial by a possibly biased
state, international court jurisdiction should be strongly favored. ®
This thesis, after review ing the Office o f the Prosecutor, concludes that the U.S. claim
regarding the overly broad scope o f authority given to the Prosecutor is accurate, as
Professor M acPherson affirm s. Article 15 highlights the confirm ation o f the U.S. claim
on the Prosecutor’s expansive powers.
A rticle 15(1) gives the Prosecutor the pow er to initiate investigations on his or her
own.^‘ A fter initiating an investigation. A rticle 15(2) grants the Prosecutor the author
ity to decide i f the case warrants further investigation or should be dismissed.^^ If the
Prosecutor agrees that the case should go forward, then Article 15(3) states the Prosecu
tor m ust subm it a request to the Pre-Trial Cham ber, “together w ith any m aterial col
lected.”^^ Article 15(3) allow s victim s to also testify before the Pre-Trial Chamber.
A fter the Prosecutor has subm itted a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber, Article 15(4)
authorizes the Pre-Trial Cham ber judges to review the evidence, and determine whether
“there is a reasonable basis to proceed w ith an investigation.”^'* The judges acting un
der A rticle 15(4) m ust also decide if the “case appears to fall w ithin the jurisdiction o f
the Court,” and if the answ er to both o f these determ inations is in the affirmative, then
the judges, “shall authorize the com m encem ent o f an investigation.”^^

M acPherson, 4 1 -4 2 .
“ICC Statute,” Article 15(1).
Ibid., Article 15(2).
Ibid., Article 15(3).
Ibid., Article 15(4).
Ibid.
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How ever, A rticle 15(5) states that the ju d g es’ refusal to allow an investigation to
proceed does not prevent the Prosecutor from m aking a “subsequent request., .based on
new facts or evidence regarding the sam e situation.”^^ A rticle 15(6) says that if the
Prosecutor, after a review o f the evidence, concludes that there is no reasonable basis
for an investigation, that decision m ust be com m unicated to those w ho provided the in
formation.^^ The Prosecutor, pursuant to Article 15(6), reserves the right to consider
additional inform ation “subm itted to him or her.”^® Additionally, the Prosecutor is
given the pow er to review new facts and evidence, and thus while technically the Prose
cutor is no longer investigating and gathering new facts and evidence, the Statute
clearly perm its the collection o f further evidence.
B ased on these Articles it is difficult to determ ine how the lack o f a Pre-Trial
C ham ber authorization for an investigation effectively prevents the Prosecutor from
proceeding with gathering m ore evidence. I f there is no reasonable basis to continue
with an investigation, then w hy is the Prosecutor perm itted to receive and submit new
evidence and facts? In fact, it appears that the check on the Prosecutor’s ability to con
tinue with an investigation by having obtained authorization o f the Pre-Trial Cham ber is
largely illusory. This is because non-govem m ental organizations and individuals are
free to perform the Prosecutor’s “leg w ork” in finding new facts and evidence, and the
Statute essentially allow s the unlim ited opportunity to continue to present and submit
any new facts or evidence found. Thus, for defendants, a Pre-Trial Cham ber’s findings

Ibid., Article 15(5)
Ibid., Article 15(6).
Ibid.
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that the evidence does not support further investigation, does not prevent anyone from
unlim ited investigations and inquiries in attem pting to find the “sm oking gun” that will
convince the Pre-Trial judges finally to deliver an indictment.
In addition, this thesis finds that the U.S. claim regarding the inadequate role o f
Security Council is the least problem atic o f U.S. claim s exam ined. The Security C oun
cil still has the authority to refer cases to the ICC for investigation, and is the only insti
tution that can com pel non-state parties to the treaties to cooperate with the Court under
its Chapter VII powers.^^ In fact, it can be argued that the ICC grants to the Security
Council a powerful instrum ent to use to influence recalcitrant nations. H O w ev er, one
m ajor weakness w ith the role designed by the ICC for the Security Council is what to
do when one the perm anent m em bers o f the Security Council is the nation that is being
investigated. If that scenario, if the investigation depends on a Security Council resolu
tion to m ake it happen, the veto pow er w ill protect the nation from the IC C ’s judicial
scrutiny, thus potentially subverting justice.
However, in other cases involving other nations, the Security Council can w ield
the pow er o f an ICC prosecution and trial. For exam ple, i f Saddam Hussein commits
atrocities against his ow n,citizens once the^ICC has gone into effect, the Security C oun
cil could refer Saddam H ussein for investigation even if Iraq failed to jo in the treaty. If
Iraq refused to com ply w ith an investigation, or if after a period the ICC ruled that a
parallel Iraqi investigation was inadequate, the Security Council could use any o f the
enforcem ent m easures, including m ilitary force, contained in Chapter VH o f the U N

“ICC Statute,” Article 13(b).
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C harter to force Iraq to comply. A failure by Iraq to com ply w ould also create interna
tional public opinion against them such that they w ould be branded an outlaw and rogue
nation.
To illustrate another exam ple, if another m assacre occurred sim ilar to the Khm er
R ouge’s m assacres in C am bodia in the late 1970’s, the Security Council could refer the
killings to the ICC. Conceivably, any recalcitrance by the K hm er Rouge in cooperating
w ith the ICC w ould incur Security C ouncil enforcem ent m easures, which m ay be
enough to prevent further violence. Furtherm ore the gravest crim es would be less likely
to m erit a veto from one o f the five perm anent m em bers especially with the end o f the
C old W ar superpow er stalem ate betw een the U.S. and the U S S R.
The U.S. w ould have required either the consent o f the state o f the accused or Se
curity Council approval before a case could be heard before the ICC, and as such, the
ICC, w ithout U.S. consent, could never have investigated U.S. nationals. However, a
case can go forward if the state where the alleged crim e occurred consents to ICC ju ris
diction. In such a case even if the U.S. refused to agree with an ICC investigation, ac
cording to the ICC treaty, the case could still go forward if the country where the crime
occurred agreed. The U.S. could shield it&nationals by getting the Security Council to
defer the investigation for up to a year as provided for in Article 16 o f the Statute. That
Article provides;
N o investigation or prosecution m ay be com m enced or proceeded w ith under this
Statute for a period o f 12 m onths after the Security Council, in a resolution
adopted under Chapter VII o f the C harter o f the U nited N ations, has requested the
Court to that effect; that request m ay be renew ed by the Council under the same
conditions.'*®
'*®“ICC Statute,” Article 16.
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There are several problem s with using that A rticle as a shield, however. First, the Secu
rity C ouncil m ust act under C hapter VII. C hapter VO only applies if the Security
C ouncil determ ines that there is “a threat to the peace, breach o f the peace or act o f ag
gression.”^* Second, a m ajority o f the Security Council, including all perm anent m em 
bers, m ust be in favor o f the tw elve-m onth postponem ent.
Finally, this thesis exam ined possible theoretical difficulties contained within the
Statute crim inal subject m atter that m ay ultim ately determine w hether the Court
succeeds o r fails. To appreciate fully the m agnitude o f the attem pt to hold individuals,
accountable on an international scale for the m ost serious crim es against hum anity is
difficult to assess from such a close historical vantage point. However, the U.S. has ap
parently pointed out a central problem o f the Court. The Court w ill never function as
envisioned w ithout acceptance o f the legitim acy o f its decisions. Legitimacy requires
follow ing w hat Lon Fuller describes as the “inner m orality o f law.” Two theoretical
problem s in particular are especially relevant to the ICC and Fuller’s theory o f law. The
(a) issue o f clarity and (b) the congruency betw een the crim es as stated and the crimes
as enforced will challenge the Court in its functioning.
For the first time, the w orld w ill attem pt consistently to apply and enforce cus
tom ary norm s and treaties outlaw ing w ar crim es, genocide, and crim es against hum an
ity. W ithout concise and clear definitions, ju st and equitable outcom es will depend on
judges. Judicial interpretation has been generally one o f the areas m any observers have
expected that the Court w ill do well. It is im portant to rem em ber quantity is not quality.

41

U N Charter, Chapter VQ.
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Once the treaty goes into force, presum ably the ICC judges will be quite active inter
preting and setting precedents. The quantity o f decisions will not be a concern; yet,
how w ell the law evolves, and w hether it reflects the high-m inded principles the treaty
was founded on, depends upon a great deal m ore than enlightened intention. Textual
am biguities and defining the elem ents necessary for the requirem ents o f crim inal prose
cution, w hile not as controversial as the functions o f the Prosecutor, invariably m ay
prove to be the m ost im portant w ork that determines the C ourt’s success.
The ICC represents a w orthy attem pt to bring enforcem ent to international hu
m anitarian law. U nfortunately, the attem pt to m ove the w orld toward international ju s
tice m ay not yield the progress advocates envision. The Court, in order to be successful
m ust earn its reputation for ju stice and equity; it m ust find its moral compass, its own
inner m orality o f law. It is overly sim plistic to believe that because the Court is built,
justice will follow. As Lon Fuller points out, any functioning legal system requires the
presence o f certain elem ents in order to regulate and control hum an conduct success
fully. Equally im portant is the degree o f acceptance and willingness o f participants to
engage actively in the ongoing project o f governing conduct between peoples. The ex
tent to which com m unication and cooperation can occur betw een nation-states and the
Court w ill, in the final analysis, determ ine if the ICC m atches its lofty goals w ith practi
cal application.
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APPEN D IX

R O M E S T A T U T E O F T H E IN T E R N A T IO N A L C R IM IN A L COU RT*
Adopted by the U nited N ations Diplom atic Conference o f Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishm ent o f an International Crim inal Court on 17 July 1998
[* as corrected bv the procés-verbaux of 10 November 1998 and 12 July 1999]

PREAMBLE
The States Parties to this Statute.
Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared
heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time.
Mindful that during this century millions o f children, women and men have been victims of
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being o f the world,
Affirming that the most serious crimes o f concern to the international community as a whole must
not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national
level and by enhancing international cooperation.
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to
the prevention of such crimes.
Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible
for international crimes.
Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles o f the Charter o f the United Nations, and in particular that
all States shall refrain from the threat or use o f force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes o f the United Nations,
Emphasizing in this connection that nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any State
Party to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs o f any State,
Determined to these ends and for the sake o f present and future generations, to establish an
independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United Nations system, with
jurisdiction over the most serious crimes o f concern to the international community as a whole,
Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions,
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Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice,
Have agreed as follows
PART 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COURT
Article 1
The Court
An International Criminal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It shall be a permanent
institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to natioml criminal
jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning o f the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this
Statute.
Article 2
Relationship o f the Court with the United Nations
The Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations through an agreement to be
approved by the Assembly o f States Parties to this Statute and thereafter concluded by the President o f the
Court on its behalf.
Article 3
Seat of the Court
1.

The seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague in the Netherlands ("the host State").

2.
The Court shall enter into a headquarters agreement with the host State, to be approved by the
Assembly o f States Parties and thereafter concluded by the President of the Court on its behalf.
3.

The Court may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable, as provided in this Statute.
Article 4
Legal status and powers o f the Court

1.
The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall also have such legal capacity as may
be necessary for the exercise o f its functions and the fulfilment o f its purposes.
2.
The Court may exercise its functions and powers, as provided in this Statute, on the territory of
any State Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other State.
PART 2. JURISDICTION, ADMISSIBILITY AND APPLICABLE LAW
Article 5
Crimes within the iurisdiction of the Court
1.
The jurisdiction o f the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes o f concern to the
international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with
respect to the following crimes:
(a)

The crime of genocide;
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(b)

Crimes against humanity:

(c)

War crimes;

(d)

The crime o f aggression.

2.
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime o f aggression once a provision is adopted in
accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the
relevant provisions o f the Charter o f the United Nations.
Article 6
Genocide
For the purpose o f this Statute, "genocide" means any o f the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a)

Killing members of the group;

(b)

Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members o f the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
(d)

Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e)

Forcibly transferring children o f the group to another group.
Article 7
Crimes against humanitv

1.
For the purpose o f this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts when
committed as part o f a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack:
(a)

Murder;

(b)

Extermination;

(c)

Enslavement;

(d)

Deportation or'forcible transfer o f population;

(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental
rules of international law;
(f)

Torture;

(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any
other form o f sexual violence o f comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in
this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction o f the Court;
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(i)

Enforced disappearance o f persons;

(j)

The crime o f apartheid;

(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health.
2.

For the purpose of paragraph 1:
(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct involving the
multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant
to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack;
(b) "Extermination" includes the intentional infliction o f conditions o f life, inter alia the
deprivation o f access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part o f a
population;
(c) "Enslavement" means the exercise o f any or all o f the powers attaching to the right o f
ownership over a person and includes the exercise o f such power in the course o f trafficking in
persons, in particular women and children;
(d) "Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced displacement o f the persons
concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present,
without grounds permitted under international law;
(e) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;
(f) "Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant,
with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave
violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting
national laws relating to pregnancy;
(g) "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation o f fundamental rights contrary
to international law by reason o f the identity o f the group or collectivity;
(h) "The crime o f apartheid" means inhumane acts o f a character similar to those referred to in
paragraph 1, committed in the context o f an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and
domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the
intention of maintaining that regime;
(i) "Enforced disappearance o f persons" means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons
by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation o f freedom or to give information on the
fate or whereabouts o f those persons, with the intention o f removing them from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.

3.
For the purpose of this Statute, it is tmderstood that the term "gender" refers to the two sexes, male
and female, within the context of society. The term "gender" does not indicate any meaning different from
the above.
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Article 8
War crimes
1.
The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect o f war crimes in particular when committed as part of
a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission o f such crimes.
2.

For the purpose o f this Statute, "war crimes'* means:
(a) Grave breaches o f the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions o f the relevant Geneva
Convention:
(i) Wilful killing;
(ii)

Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;

(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation o f property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(v) Compelling a prisoner o f war or other protected person to serve in the forces o f a
hostile Power;
(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner o f war or other protected person o f the rights of fair
and regular trial;
(vii)
(viii)

Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;
Taking o f hostages.

(b) Other serious violations o f the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict,
within the established framework o f international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are
not military objectives;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against persormel, installations, material, units or
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection
given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law o f armed conflict;
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated;
(v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives;
(vi) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no
longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;
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(vii) Making improper use o f a flag o f truce, of the flag or of the military insignia and
uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as o f the distinctive emblems of
the Geneva Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injuiy;
(viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power o f parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or
parts o f the population o f the occupied territory within or outside this territory;
(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education,
art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the
sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;
(x) Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical
mutilation or to medical or scientiflc experiments of any kind which are neither justified
by the medical, dental or hospital treatment o f the person concerned nor carried out in
his or her interest, and wdiich cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such
person or persons;
(xi) Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or
army;
(xii)

Declaring that no quarter will be given;

(xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the necessities o f war;
(xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and
actions o f the nationals of the hostile party;
(xv) Compelling the nationals o f the hostile party to take part in the operations o f war
directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before
the commencement o f the war;
(xvi)
(xvii)

Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
Employing poison or poisoned weapons;

(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids,
materials or devices;
(xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as
bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with
incisions;
(xx) Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods o f warfare which are
o f a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently
indiscriminate in violation o f the international law o f armed conflict, provided that such
weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are the subject of a
comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute, by an
amendment in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in articles 121 and 123;
(xxi) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
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(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as
defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual
violence also constituting a grave breach o f the Geneva Conventions;
(xxiii) Utilizing the presence o f a civilian or other protected person to render certain
points, areas or military forces immune from military operations;
(xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and
transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in
conformity with international law;
(xxv) Intentionally using starvation o f civilians as a method o f warfare by depriving
them of objects indispensable to their simvival, including wilfully impeding relief
supplies as provided for imder the Geneva Conventions;
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the
national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.
(c)In the case o f an armed conflict not o f an international character, serious violations o f
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down dieir arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause;
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(ii) Conunitting outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(iii)

Taking o f hostages;

(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees
which are generally recognized as indispensable.
(d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does
not apply to situations o f internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic
acts o f violence or other acts o f a similar nature.
(e) Other serious violations o f the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an
international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the
following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and
transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems o f the Geneva Conventions in
conformity tvidi international law;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance
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with the Charter o f the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection
given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law o f armed conflict;
(iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education,
art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the
sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;
(v)

Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;

(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as
defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual
violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions;
(vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age o f fifteen years into armed
forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities;
(viii) Ordering the displacement o f the civilian population for reasons related to the
conflict, unless the security o f the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so
demand;
(ix)
(x)

Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;
Declaring that no quarter will be given;

(xi) Subjecting persons who are in the power o f another party to the conflict to
physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments o f any kind which are neither
justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment o f the person concerned nor carried
out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of
such person or persons;
(xii) Destroying or seizing the property o f an adversary unless such destruction or
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities o f the conflict;
(f)
Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not o f an international character and thus does
not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic
acts o f violence or other acts o f a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in
the territory o f a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities
and organized armed groups or between spch groups.
3.
Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e) shall affect the responsibility of a Government to maintain or
re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the unity and territorial integrity of the State, by all
legitimate means.

Article 9
Elements o f Crimes
1.
Elements o f Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and
8. They shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members o f the Assembly of States Parties.
2.

Amendments to the Elements of Crimes may be proposed by:
(a)

Any State Party;

184

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(b)

The judges acting by an absolute majority;

(c)

The Prosecutor.

Such amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority o f the members of the Assembly o f States
Parties.
3.

The Elements o f Crimes and amendments thereto shall be consistent with this Statute.

Article 10
Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or
developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.

Article 11
Jurisdiction ratione temnoris
1.
The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force o f this
Statute.
2.
If a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that State,
unless that State has made a declaration under article 12, paragraph 3.

Article 12
Preconditions to the exercise o f iurisdiction
1.
A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with
respect to the crimes referred to in article S.
2.
In the case o f article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more
of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in
accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was
committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State o f registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b)

The State o f which the person accused o f the crime is a national.

3.
If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that
State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise o f jurisdiction by the Court with
respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or
exception in accordance with Part 9.
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Article 13
Exercise of iurisdiction
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in
accordance with the provisions o f tiiis Statute if;
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is
referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14;
(b) A situation in which one or more o f such crimes appears to have been committed is
referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter o f the
United Nations; or
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect o f such a crime in accordance with
article 15.
Article 14
Referral o f a situation bv a State Party
1.
A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the
jurisdiction o f the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the
situation for the purpose o f determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the
commission o f such crimes.
2.
As far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant circumstances and be accompanied by such
supporting documentation as is available to the State referring the situation.
Article 15
Prosecutor
1.
The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis o f information on crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court.
2.
The Prosecutor shall analyse the seriousness of the information received. For this purpose, he or
she may seek additional information from States, organs o f the United Nations, intergovernmental or nongovemmental organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate, and may receive
written or oral testimony at the seat o f the Court.
3.
If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he or
she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization o f an investigation, together with any
supporting material collected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance
with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
4.
If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination o f the request and the supporting material, considers
that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commencement of the investigation, without prejudice to
subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of a case.
5.
The refusal of the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize the investigation shall not preclude the
presentation o f a subsequent request by the Prosecutor based on new facts or evidence regarding the same
situation.
6.

If, after the preliminary examination referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Prosecutor concludes
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that the information provided does not constitute a reasonable basis for an investigation, he or she shall
inform those who provided the information. This shall not preclude the Prosecutor from considering
further information submitted to him or her regarding the same situation in the light of new facts or
evidence.

Article 16
Deferral o f investigation or prosecution
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a
period o f 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter
o f the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council
under the same conditions.
Article 17
Issues of admissibility
1.
Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case
is inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it,
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the
unwillingness or inability o f the State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject o f the
complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3;
(d)

The case is not o f sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.

2.
In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to
the principles o f due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist,
as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the
purpose o f shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the
jurisdiction o f the Court referred to in article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and
they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
3.
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total
or substantial collapse or unavailability o f its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or odierwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
Article 18
Preliminarv rulings regarding admissibilitv
1.
When a situation has been referred to the Court pursuant to article 13 (a) and the Prosecutor has
determined that there would be a reasonable basis to commence an investigation, or the Prosecutor
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initiates an investigation pursuant to articles 13 (c) and 15, the Prosecutor shall notify all States Parties
and those States which, taking into account the information available, would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crimes concerned. The Prosecutor may notify such States on a confidential basis and,
where the Prosecutor believes it necessary to protect persons, prevent destruction of evidence or prevent
the absconding o f persons, may limit the scope o f the information provided to States.
2.
Within one month of receipt o f that notification, a State may inform the Court that it is
investigating or has investigated its nationals or others within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts
which may constitute crimes referred to in article 5 and which relate to the information provided in the
notification to States. At the request o f that State, the Prosecutor shall defer to the State's investigation of
those persons unless the Pre-Trial Chamber, on the application o f the Prosecutor, decides to authorize the
investigation.
3.
The Prosecutor's deferral to a State's investigation shall be open to review by the Prosecutor six
months after the date o f deferral or at any time when there has been a significant change o f circumstances
based on the State's unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation.
4.
The State concerned or the Prosecutor may appeal to the Appeals Chamber against a ruling o f the
Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with article 82. The appeal may be heard on an expedited basis.
5.
When the Prosecutor has deferred an investigation in accordance with paragraph 2, the Prosecutor
may request that the State concerned periodically inform the Prosecutor of the progress o f its
investigations and any subsequent prosecutions. States Parties shall respond to such requests without
undue delay.
6.
Pending a ruling by the Pre-Trial Chamber, or at any time when the Prosecutor has deferred an
investigation under this article, the Prosecutor may, on an exceptional basis, seek authority from the PreTrial Chamber to pursue necessary investigative steps for the purpose of preserving evidence where there
is a unique opportunity to obtain important evidence or there is a significant risk that such evidence may
not be subsequently available.
7.
A State which has challenged a ruling o f the Pre-Trial Chamber under this article may challenge
the admissibility of a case under article 19 on the grounds of additional significant facts or significant
change of circumstances.

Article 19
Challenges to the iurisdiction of the Court
or the admissibilitv of a case
1.
The Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it. The Court may,
on its own motion, determine the admissibility o f a case in accordance with article 17.
2.
Challenges to the admissibility of a case on the grounds referred to in article 17 or challenges to
the jurisdiction o f the Court may be made by:
(a) An accused or a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear has been
issued under article 58;
(b) A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or
prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted; or
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(c)

A State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under article 12.

3.
The Prosecutor may seek a ruling from the Cotirt regarding a question o f jurisdiction or
admissibility. In proceedings with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility, those who have referred tie
situation under article 13, as well as victims, may also submit observations to the Court.
4.
The admissibility of a case or the jurisdiction o f the Court may be challenged only once by any
person or State referred to in paragraph 2. The challenge shall take place prior to or at the commencement
of the trial. In exceptional circumstances, the Court may grant leave for a challenge to be brought more
than once or at a time later than the commencement o f the trial. Challenges to the admissibili^ o f a case,
at the commencement of a trial, or subsequently with the leave o f the Court, may be based only on article
17, paragraph 1 (c).
5.

A State referred to in paragraph 2 (b) and (c) shall make a challenge at the earliest opportunity.

6.
Prior to the confirmation o f the charges, challenges to the admissibility of a case or challenges to
the jurisdiction of the Court shall be referred to the Pre-Trial Chamber. After confirmation of the charges,
they shall be referred to the Trial Chamber. Decisions with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility may be
appealed to the Appeals Chamber in accordance with article 82.
7.
If a challenge is made by a State referred to in paragraph 2 (b) or (c), the Prosecutor shall suspend
the investigation until such time as the Court makes a determination in accordance with article 17.
8.

Pending a ruling by the Court, the Prosecutor may seek authority from the Court:
(a) To pursue necessary investigative steps o f the kind referred to in article 18, paragraph 6;
(b) To take a statement or testimony from a witness or complete the collection and
examination o f evidence which had begun prior to the making o f the challenge; and
(c) In cooperation with the relevant States, to prevent the absconding of persons in respect of
whom the Prosecutor has already requested a warrant of arrest under article 58.

9.
The making o f a challenge shall not affect the validity o f any act performed by the Prosecutor or
any order or warrant issued by the Court prior to the making of the challenge.
10.
If the Court has decided that a case is inadmissible under article 17, the Prosecutor may submit a
request for a review of the decision when he or she is fully satisfied that new facts have arisen which
negate the basis on which the case had previously been found inadmissible under article 17.
11.
If the Prosecutor, having regard to the matters referred to in article 17, defers an investigation,
the Prosecutor may request that the relevant State make available to the Prosecutor information on the
proceedings. That information shall, at the request o f the State concerned, be confidential. If the
Prosecutor thereafter decides to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall notify the State to which
deferral o f the proceedings has taken place.
Article 20
Ne bis in idem
1.
Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court with respect to
conduct which formed the basis o f crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the
Court.
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2.
No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article 5 for which that person
has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
3.
No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8
shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for
crimes within the jurisdiction o f the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms
o f due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the
circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
Article 21
Applicable law
1.

The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements o f Crimes and its Rules o f Procedure and
Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of
international law, including the established principles of the international law o f armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles o f law derived by the Court from national laws o f legal
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally
exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this
Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.

2.

The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.

3.
The application and interpretation o f law pursuant to this article must be consistent with
internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such
as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.
PART 3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
Article 22
Nullum crimen sine lege
1.
A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction o f the Court.
2.
The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case
of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour o f the person being investigated, prosecuted or
convicted.
3.
This article shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under international law
independently of this Statute.
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Article 23
Nulla Doena sine lege
A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute.
Article 24
Non-retroactivitv ratione personae
1.
No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into
force o f the Statute.
2.
In the event o f a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final judgement, the law
more favourable to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply.
Article 25
Individual criminal responsibility
1.

The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.

2.
A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction o f the Court shall be individually
responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.
3.
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment
for a crime within the jurisdiction o f the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another
person, regardless o f whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is
attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission o f such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise
assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its
commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission o f such a crime
by a group of persons acting with a common puipose. Such contribution shall be intentional and
shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose o f the
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission o f a crime within the
jurisdiction o f the Court; or
(ii)

Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;

(e) In respect o f the crime o f genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit
genocide;
Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means
o f a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent o f the
person’s intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise
prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the
attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal
purpose.
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4.
No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the
responsibility o f States under international law.
Article 26
Exclusion o f iurisdiction over persons under eighteen
The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age o f 18 at the time o f
the alleged commission o f a crime.
Article 27
Irrelevance o f official caoacitv
1.
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In
particular, official capacity as a Head o f State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament,
an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2.
Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person,
whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over
such a person.
Article 28
Responsibilitv o f commanders and other superiors
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction o f the Court committed by forces under
his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be,
as a result o f his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at
the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such
crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), a
superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction o f the Court committed
by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result o f his or her failure to
exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly
indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and
control o f the superior; and
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(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or
her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
Article 29
Non-apolicability o f statute o f limitations
The crimes within the jurisdiction o f the Court shall not be subject to any statute of limitations.
Article 30
Mental element
1.
Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for
a crime within the jurisdiction o f the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and
knowledge.
2.

For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a)

In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;

(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that
it will occur in the ordinary course o f events.
3.
For the purposes o f this article, "knowledge" means awareness that a circumstance exists or a
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events, "Know" and "knowingly" shall be construed
accordingly.
Article 31
Grounds for excluding criminal responsibilitv
1.
In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute, a
person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time o f that person's conduct;
(a) The person suffers from a mental disease or defect that destroys that person's capacity to
appreciate the unlawfulness or nature o f his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her
conduct to conform to the requirements o f law;
(b) The person is in a state o f intoxication that destroys that person's capacity to appreciate the
unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform
to the requirements of law, unless the person has become voluntarily intoxicated under such
circumstances that the person knew, or disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the intoxication,
he or she was likely fo engage in conduct'constituting a crime within the jurisdiction o f the
Court;
(c) The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person or, in the case of
war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the person or another person or
property which is essential for accomplishing a military mission, against an imminent and
unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree o f danger to the person or the other
person or property protected. The fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation
conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility
under this subparagraph;
(d) The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has
been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent
serious bodily harm against that person or another person, and the person acts necessarily and
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reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm
than the one sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be:
(i)

Made by other persons; or

(ii)

Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person's control.

2.
The Court shall determine the applicability o f the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility
provided for in this Statute to the case before it.
3.
At trial, the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility other than those
referred to in paragraph 1 where such a ground is derived from applicable law as set forth in article 21.
The procedures relating to the consideration o f such a ground shall be provided for in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence.
Article 32
Mistake o f fact or mistake o f law
1.
A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility only if it negates the
mental element required by the crime.
2.
A mistake of law as to whether a particular type o f conduct is a crime within the jurisdiction o f the
Court shall not be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. A mistake o f law may, however, be a
ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it negates the mental element required by such a crime, or
as provided for in article 33.
Article 33
Superior orders and prescription o f law
1.
The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction o f the Court has beencommitted by a person pursuant
to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of
criminal responsibility unless:
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders o f the Government or the superior
in question;
(b)

The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and

(c)

The order was not manifestly unlawful.

2.
For the purposes o f this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are
manifestly unlawful.
PART 4. COMPOSITION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE COURT
Article 34
Organs of the Court
The Court shall be composed o f the following organs:
(a)

The Presidency;

(b)

An Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division;

(c)

The Office o f the Prosecutor;

(d)

The Registry.
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Article 35
Service o f iudees
1.
Ail judges shall be elected as full-time members of the Court and shall be available to serve on
that basis from the commencement of their terms o f office.
2.

The judges composing the Presidency shall serve on a full-time basis as soon as they are elected.

3.
The Presidency may, on the basis o f the workload of the Court and in consultation with its
members, decide from time to time to what extent the remaining judges shall be required to serve on a
full-time basis. Any such arrangement shall be without prejudice to the provisions of article 40.
4.
The financial arrangements forjudges not required to serve on a full-time basis shall be made in
accordance with article 49.
Article 36
Qualifications, nomination and election o f judges
1.

Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, there shall be 18 judges o f the Court.

2.
(a) The Presidency, acting on behalf o f the Court, may propose an increase in the number of
judges specified in paragraph 1, indicating the reasons why this is considered necessary and appropriate.
The Registrar shall promptly circulate any such proposal to all States Parties.
(b) Any such proposal shall then be considered at a meeting o f the Assembly of States Parties to
be convened in accordance with article 112. The proposal shall be considered adopted if approved at the
meeting by a vote o f two thirds of the members o f the Assembly o f States Parties and shall enter into force
at such time as decided by the Assembly o f States Parties.
(c) (i) Once a proposal for an increase in the number of judges has been adopted under
subparagraph (b), the election of the additional judges shall take place at the next session of the Assembly
of States Parties in accordance with paragraphs 3 to 8, and article 37, paragraph 2;
(ii)
Once a proposal for an increase in the number o f judges has been adopted and brought
into effect under subparagraphs (b) and (c) (i), it shall be open to the Presidency at any time thereafter, if
the workload o f the Court justifies it, to propose a reduction in the number o f judges, provided that the
number o f judges shall not be reduced below that specified in paragraph 1. The proposal shall be dealt
with in accordance with the procedure laid down ip subparagraphs (a) and (b). In the event that the
proposal is adopted, the number o f judges shall be progressively decreased as the terms of office of
serving judges expire, until the necessary number has been reached.
3.
(a) The judges shall be chosen from among persons o f high moral character, impartiality and
integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the highest
judicial oflfices.
(b)

Every candidate for election to the Court shall:
(i) Have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the necessary
relevant experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity,
in criminal proceedings; or
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(ii) Have established competence in relevant areas of international law such as
international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive experience in
a professional legal capacity which is o f relevance to the judicial work of the Court;
(c)
Every candidate for election to the Court shall have an excellent knowledge o f and be fluent
in at least one of the working languages o f the Court.
4.
(a) Nominations o f candidates for election to the Court may be made by any State Party to this
Statute, and shall be made either:
(i) By the procedure for the nomination o f candidates for appointment to the highest
judicial offices in the State in question; or
(ii) By the procedure provided for the nomination of candidates for the International
Court o f Justice in the Statute o f that Court.
Nominations shall be accompanied by a statement in the necessary detail specifying how the
candidate fulfils the requirements o f paragraph 3.
(b) Each State Party may put forward one candidate for any given election who need not
necessarily be a national o f that State Party but shall in any case be a national o f a State Party.
(c) The Assembly of States Parties may decide to establish, if appropriate, an Advisory
Committee on nominations. In that event, the Committee's composition and mandate shall be established
by the Assembly o f States Parties.
5.

For the purposes o f the election, there shall be two lists o f candidates:
List A containing the names o f candidates with the qualifications specified in paragraph
3 (b) (i); and

List B containing the names of candidates with the qualifications specified in paragraph
3 (b)(ii).
A candidate with sufficient qualifications for both lists may choose on which list to appear. At the
first election to the Court, at least nine judges shall be elected from list A and at least five judges from list
B. Subsequent elections shall be so organized as to maintain the equivalent proportion on the Court of
judges qualified on the two lists.
6.
(a) The judges shall be elected by secret ballot at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties
convened for that purpose under article 112. Subject to paragraph 7, the persons elected to the Court shall
be the 18 candidates who obtqin the highest number o f votes and a two-thirds majority of the States
Parties present and voting.
(b)
In the event that a sufficient number o f judges is not elected on the first ballot, successive
ballots shall be held in accordance with the procedures laid down in subparagraph (a) until the remaining
places have been filled.
7.
No two judges may be nationals of the same State. A person who, for the purposes of membership
of the Court, could be regarded as a national o f more flian one State shall be deemed to be a national o f
the State in which that person ordinarily exercises civil and political rights.
8.
(a) The States Parties shall, in the selection o f judges, take into account the need, within the
membership of the Court, for:
(i) The representation o f the principal legal systems of the world;
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(ii)

Equitable geographical representation; and

(iii)

A fair representation o f female and male judges.

(b)
States Parties shall also take into account the need to include judges with legal expertise on
specific issues, including, but not limited to, violence against women or children.
9.
(a) Subject to subparagraph (b), judges shall hold office for a term of nine years and, subject to
subparagraph (c) and to article 37, paragraph 2, shall not be eligible for re-election.
(b) At the first election, one third o f the judges elected shall be selected by lot to serve for a
term of three years; one third of the judges elected shall be selected by lot to serve for a term of six years;
and the remainder shall serve for a term o f nine years.
(c) A judge who is selected to serve for a term of three years under subparagraph (b) shall be
eligible for re-election for a full term.
10.
Notwithstanding paragraph 9, a judge assigned to a Trial or Appeals Chamber in accordance with
article 39 shall continue in office to complete any trial or appeal the hearing o f which has already
commenced before that Chamber.
Article 37
Judicial vacancies
1.
In the event of a vacancy, an election shall be held in accordance with article 36 to fill the
vacancy.
2.
A judge elected to fill a vacancy shall serve for the remainder o f the predecessor's term and, if that
period is three years or less, shall be eligible for re-election for a full term under article 36.
Article 38
The Presidency
1.
The President and the First and Second Vice-Presidents shall be elected by an absolute majority of
the judges. They shall each serve for a term o f three years or until the end o f their respective terms o f
office as judges, whichever expires earlier. They shall be eligible for re-election once.
2.
The First Vice-President shall act in place o f the President in the event that the President is
unavailable or disqualified. The Second Vice-President shall act in place o f the President in the event that
both the President and the First Vice-President are unavailable or disqualified.
3.
The President, together with the First and Second Vice-Presidents, shall constitute the Presidency,
which shall be responsible for:
(a)

The proper administration o f the Court, with the exception o f the Office o f the Prosecutor;

and
(b) The other functions conferred upon it in accordance with this Statute.
In discharging its responsibility under paragraph 3 (a), the Presidency shall coordinate with and
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seek the concurrence o f the Prosecutor on all matters of mutual concern.
Article 39
Chambers
1.
As soon as possible after the election o f the judges, the Court shall organize itself into the
divisions specified in article 34, paragraph (b). The Appeals Division shall be composed of the President
and four other judges, the Trial Division o f not less than six judges and the Pre-Trial Division o f not less
than six judges. The assignment of judges to divisions shall be based on the nature o f the functions to be
performed by each division and the qualifications and experience of the judges elected to the Court, in
such a way that each division shall contain an appropriate combination o f expertise in criminal law and
procedure and in international law. The Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions shall be composed predominantly o f
judges with criminal trial experience.
2.

(a)
(b)

The judicial functions o f the Court shall be carried out in each division by Chambers.
(i)
(ii)

The Appeals Chamber shall be composed of all the judges o f the Appeals Division;
The functions o f the Trial Chamber shall be carried out by three judges o f the Trial

Division;
(iii) The functions o f the Pre-Trial Chamber shall be carried out either by three
judges of the Pre-Trial Division or by a single judge o f that division in accordance with
this Statute and the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence;
(c)
Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude the simultaneous constitution of more than one
Trial Chamber or Pre-Trial Chamber when the efficient management o f the Court's workload so
requires.
3.
(a) Judges assigned to the Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions shall serve in those divisions for a
period of three years, and thereafter until the completion o f any case the hearing o f which has already
commenced in the division concerned.
(b)

Judges assigned to the Appeals Division shall serve in that division for their entire term of

office.
4.
Judges assigned to the Appeals Division shall serve only in that division. Nothing in this article
shall, however, preclude the temporary attachment, of judges from the Trial Division to the Pre-Trial
Division or vice versa, if the Presidency considers that the efficient management o f the Court's workload
so requires, provided that under no circumstances shall a judge who has participated in the pre-trial phase
of a case be eligible to sit on the Trial Chamber hearing that case.
Article 40
Independence o f the iudees
1.

The judges shall be independent in the performance o f their functions.

2.
Judges shall not engage in any activity which is likely to interfere with their judicial functions or to
affect confidence in their independence.
3.
Judges required to serve on a full-time basis at the seat of the Court shall not engage in any other
occupation of a professional nature.
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4.
Any question regarding the application o f paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be decided by an absolute
majority o f the judges. Where any such question concerns an individual judge, that judge shall not take
part in the decision.
Article 41
Excusing and disqualification o f iudees
1.
The Presidency may, at the request o f a judge, excuse that judge from the exercise of a function
under this Statute, in accordance with the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
2.
(a) A judge shall not participate in any case in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be
doubted on any ground. A judge shall be disqualified from a case in accordance with this paragraph if,
inter alia, that judge has previously been involved in any capacity in that case before the Court or in a
related criminal case at the national level involving the person being investigated or prosecuted. A judge
shall also be disqualified on such other grounds as may be provided for in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.
(b) The Prosecutor or the person being investigated or prosecuted may request the
disqualification o f a judge under this paragraph.
(c) Any question as to the disqualification of a judge shall be decided by an absolute majority of
the judges. The challenged judge shall be entitled to present his or her comments on the matter, but shall
not take part in the decision.

Article 42
The Office o f the Prosecutor
1.
The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ o f the Court. It shall be
responsible for receiving referrals and any substantiated information on crimes wi4iin the jurisdiction of
the Court, for examining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions before the Court. A
member of the Office shall not seek or act on instructions from any external source.
2.
The Office shall be headed by the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor shall have full authority over the
management and administration of the Office, including the staff, facilities and other resources thereof.
The Prosecutor shall be assisted by one or more Deputy Prosecutors, who shall be entitled to carry out any
o f the acts required o f the Prosecutor under this Statute. The Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall
be o f different nationalities. They shall serve on a full-time basis.
3.
The Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall be persons o f high moral character, be highly
competent in and have extensive practical experience in the prosecution or trial o f criminal cases. They
shall have an excellent knowledge o f and be fluent in at least one o f the working languages o f the Court.
4.
The Prosecutor shall be elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the members o f the
Assembly of States Parties. The Deputy Prosecutors shall be elected in the same way from a list of
candidates provided by the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor shall nominate three candidates for each position
o f Deputy Prosecutor to be filled. Unless a shorter term is decided upon at the time o f their election, the
Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall hold office for a term o f nine years and shall not be eligible
for re-election.
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5.
Neither the Prosecutor nor a Deputy Prosecutor shall engage in any activity which is likely to
interfere with his or her prosecutorial functions or to affect confidence in his or her independence. They
shall not engage in any other occupation o f a professional nature.
6.
The Presidency may excuse the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor, at his or her request, from
acting in a particular case.

7.
Neither the Prosecutor nor a Deputy Prosecutor shall participate in any matter in which their
impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground. They shall be disqualified from a case in
accordance with this paragraph if, inter alia, they have previously been involved in any capacity in that
case before the Court or in a related criminal case at the national level involving the person being
investigated or prosecuted.
8.
Any question as to the disqualification o f the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor shall be decided
by the Appeals Chamber.
(a) The person being investigated or prosecuted may at any time request the disqualification of
the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor on the grounds set out in this article;
(b) The Prosecutor or the Deputy Prosecutor, as appropriate, shall be entitled to present his or
her comments on the matter;
9.
The Prosecutor shall appoint advisers with legal expertise on specific issues, including, but not
limited to, sexual and gender violence and violence against children.
Article 43
The Reeistrv
1.
The Registry shall be responsible for the non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing
of the Court, without prejudice to the functions and powers of the Prosecutor in accordance with article
42.
2.
The Registry shall be headed by the Registrar, who shall be the principal administrative officer of
the Court. The Registrar shall exercise his or her functions under the authority of the President o f the
Court.
3.
The Registrar and the Deputy Registrar shall be persons o f high moral character, be highly
competent and have an excellent knowledge o f and be fluent in at least one of the working languages of
the Court.
4.
The judges shall elect the Registrar by an absolute majority by secret ballot, taking into account
any recommendation by the Assembly o f States Parties. If the need arises and upon the recommendation
o f the Registrar, the judges shall elect, in the same manner, a Deputy Registrar.
5.
The Registrar shall hold office for a term o f five years, shall be eligible for re-election once and
shall serve on a full-time basis. The Deputy Registrar shall hold office for a term o f five years or such
shorter term as may be decided upon by an absolute majority of the judges, and may be elected on the
basis that the Deputy Registrar shall be called upon to serve as required.
6.
The Registrar shall set up a Victims and Wimesses Unit within the Registry. This Unit shall
provide, in consultation with the Office o f the Prosecutor, protective measures and security arrangements,
counselling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, and
others who are at risk on account o f testimony given by such witnesses. The Unit shall include staff with
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expertise in trauma, including trauma related to crimes of sexual violence.
Article 44
Staff
1.
The Prosecutor and the Registrar shall appoint such qualified staff as may be required to their
respective offices. In the case of the Prosecutor, this shall include the appointment of investigators.
2.
In the employment of staff, the Prosecutor and the Registrar shall ensure the highest standards o f
efficiency, competency and integrity, and shall have regard, mutatis mutandis, to the criteria set forth in
article 36, paragraph 8.
3.
The Registrar, with the agreement o f the Presidency and the Prosecutor, shall propose Staff
Regulations which include the terms and conditions upon which the staff of the Court shall be appointed,
remunerated and dismissed. The Staff Regulations shall be approved by the Assembly of States Parties.
4.
The Court may, in exceptional circumstances, employ the expertise o f gratis personnel offered by
States Parties, intergovernmental organizations or non-govemmental organizations to assist with the work
of any of the organs o f the Court. The Prosecutor may accept any such offer on behalf of the Office of the
Prosecutor. Such gratis personnel shall be employed in accordance with guidelines to be established by
the Assembly o f States Parties.

Article 45
Solemn undertaking
Before taking up their respective duties under this Statute, the judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy
Prosecutors, the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar shall each make a solemn undertaking in open court to
exercise his or her respective functions impartially and conscientiously.

Article 46
Removal from office
1.
A judge, the Prosecutor, a Deputy Prosecutor, the Registrar or the Deputy Registrar shall be
removed from office if a decision to this effect is made in accordance with paragraph 2, in cases where
that person:
(a) Is found to have committed serious misconduct or a serious breach o f his or her duties
under this Statute, as provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; or
(b)

Is unable to exercise the functions required by this Statute.

2.
A decision as to the removal from office o f a judge, the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor under
paragraph 1 shall be made by the Assembly o f States Parties, by secret ballot:
( a) In the case o f a judge, by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties upon a
recommendation adopted by a two-thirds majority of the other judges;
(b)

In the case o f the Prosecutor, by an absolute majority o f the States Parties;

(c) In the case o f a Deputy Prosecutor, by an absolute majority of the States Parties upon the
recommendation o f the Prosecutor.
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3.
A decision as to the removal from office of the Registrar or Deputy Registrar shall be made by an
absolute majority o f the judges.
4.
A judge. Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutor, Registrar or Deputy Registrar whose conduct or ability to
exercise the functions o f the office as required by this Statute is challenged under this article shall have
full opportunity to present and receive evidence and to make submissions in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. The person in question shall not otherwise participate in the consideration o f the
matter.

Article 47
Disciplinarv measures
A judge. Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutor, Registrar or Deputy Registrar who has committed
misconduct of a less serious nature than that set out in article 46, paragraph 1, shall be subject to
disciplinary measures, in accordance with the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
Article 48
Privileges and immunities
1.
The Court shall enjoy in the territory o f each State Party such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the fulfilment o f its purposes.
2.
The judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors and the Registrar shall, when engaged on or
with respect to the business o f the Court, enjoy the same privileges and immunities as are accorded to
heads o f diplomatic missions and shall, after the expiry o f their terms of office, continue to be accorded
immunity from legal process o f every kind in respect o f words spoken or written and acts performed by
them in their official capacity.
3.
The Deputy Registrar, the staff o f the Office o f the Prosecutor and the staff of the Registry shall
enjoy the privileges and immunities and facilities necessary for the performance of their functions, in
accordance with the agreement on the privileges and immunities of the Court.
4.
Counsel, experts, witnesses or any other person required to be present at the seat o f the Court shall
be accorded such treatment as is necessary for the proper ftinctioning o f the Court, in accordance with the
agreement on the privileges and immunities o f the Court.
5.

The privileges and immunities of:
(a)

A judge or the Prosecutor may be waived by an absolute majority of the judges;

(b)

The Registrar may be waived by the Presidency;

(c) The Deputy Prosecutors and staff o f the Office of the Prosecutor may be waived by the
Prosecutor;
(d)

The Deputy Registrar and staff o f the Registry may be waived by the Registrar.
Article 49
Salaries, allowances and expenses

The judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors, the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar shall
receive such salaries, allowances and expenses as may be decided upon by the Assembly o f States Parties.
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These salaries and allowances shall not be reduced during their terms of office.
Article 50
Official and working languages
1.
The official languages of the Court shall be Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and
Spanish. The judgements o f the Court, as well as other decisions resolving fundamental issues before the
Court, shall be published in the ofScial languages. The Presidency shall, in accordance with the criteria
established by the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, determine which decisions may be considered as
resolving fundamental issues for the purposes of this paragraph.
2.
The working languages of the Court shall be English and French. The Rules of Procedure and
Evidence shall determine the cases in which other official languages may be used as working languages.
3.
At the request of any party to a proceeding or a State allowed to intervene in a proceeding, the
Court shall authorize a language other than English or French to be used by such a party or State,
provided that the Court considers such authorization to be adequately justified.
Article 51
Rules o f Procedure and Evidence
1.
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence shall enter into force upon adoption by a two-thirds majority
o f the members o f the Assembly o f States Parties.
2.

Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence may be proposed by:
(a)

Any State Party;

(b)

The judges acting by an absolute majority; or

(c)

The Prosecutor.

Such amendments shall enter into force upon adoption by a two-thirds majority of the members of
the Assembly of States Parties.
3.
After the adoption o f the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, in urgent cases where the Rules do not
provide for a specific situation before the Court, the judges may, by a two-thirds majority, draw up
provisional Rules to be applied until adopted, amended or rejected at the next ordinary or special session
of the Assembly o f States Parties.
4.
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, amendments thereto and any provisional Rule shall be
consistent with this Statute. Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as well as provisional
Rules shall not be applied retroactively to the detriment o f the person who is being investigated or
prosecuted or who has been convicted.
5.
In the event o f conflict between the Statute and the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, the Statute
shall prevail.
Article 52
Regulations of the Court
1.
The judges shall, in accordance with this Statute and the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, adopt,
by an absolute majority, the Regulations of the Court necessary for its routine functioning.
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2.
The Prosecutor and the Registrar shall be consulted in the elaboration of the Regulations and any
amendments thereto.
3.
The Regulations and any amendments thereto shall take effect upon adoption unless otherwise
decided by the judges. Immediately upon adoption, they shall be circulated to States Parties for
comments. If within six months there are no objections from a majority o f States Parties, they shall remain
in force.
PART 5. INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
Article 53
Initiation o f an investigation
1.
The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an
investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In
deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether;
(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a
crime within the jurisdiction o f the Court has been or is being committed;
(b)

The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and

(c) Taking into account the gravity o f the crime and the interests o f victims, there are
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of
justice.
If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed and his or her
determination is based solely on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.
2.
If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution
because:
(a) There is not a sufficient legal or factual basis to seek a warrant or summons under article
58;
(b)

The case is inadmissible under article 17; or

(c) A prosecution is not in the interests o f justice, taking into account all the circumstances,
including the gravity of the crime, the interests o f victims and the age or infirmity o f the alleged
perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime;
the Prosecutor shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and the State making a refeiral under article 14 or the
Security Council in a case under article 13, paragraph (b), of his or her conclusion and the reasons for the
conclusion.
3.
(a) At the request of the State making a referral under article 14 or the Security Council under
article 13, paragraph (b), the Pre-Trial Chamber may review a decision o f the Prosecutor under paragraph
1 or 2 not to proceed and may request the Prosecutor to reconsider that decision.
(b)
In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review a decision o f the
Prosecutor not to proceed if it is based solely on paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c). In such a case, the decision of
the Prosecutor shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.
4.

The Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to initiate an investigation or
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prosecution based on new facts or information.

Article 54
Duties and powers o f the Prosecutor with respect to investigations
1.

The Prosecutor shall;
(a) In order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence
relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, in
doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally;
(b) Take appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution o f crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court, and in doing so, respect the interests and personal
circumstances o f victims and witnesses, including age, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph
3, and health, and take into account the nature o f the crime, in particular where it involves sexual
violence, gender violence or violence against children; and
(c)

2.

Fully respect the rights o f persons arising under this Statute.

The Prosecutor may conduct investigations on the territory of a State:
(a) In accordance with the provisions o f Part 9; or
(b) As authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 57, paragraph 3 (d).

3.

The Prosecutor may:
(a) Collect and examine evidence;
(b) Request the presence of and question persons being investigated, victims and witnesses;
(c) Seek the cooperation o f any State or intergovernmental organization or arrangement in
accordance with its respective competence and/or mandate;
(d) Enter into such arrangements or agreements, not inconsistent with this Statute, as may be
necessary to facilitate the cooperation o f a State, intergovernmentalorganization or person;
(e) Agree not to disclose, at any stage o f the proceedings, documents or information that the
Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose o f generating
new evidence, unless the provider o f the infoimation consents; and
(f) Take necessary measures, or request that necessary measures be taken, to ensure the
confidentiality o f information, the protection o f any person or the preservation of evidence.
Article 55
Rights o f persons during an investigation

1.

In respect of an investigation under this Statute, a person:
(a) Shall not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself or to confess guilt;
(b) Shall not be subjected to any form o f coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any other
form o f cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(c) Shall, if questioned in a language other than a language the person fully understands and
speaks, have, fi'ee o f any cost, the assistance o f a competent interpreter and such translations as
are necessary to meet the requirements of fairness; and
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(d) Shall not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, and shall not be deprived of his or
her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established in
this Statute.
2.
Where there are grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court and that person is about to be questioned either by the Prosecutor, or by national authorities
pursuant to a request made under Part 9, that person shall also have the following rights o f which he or
she shall be informed prior to being questioned;
(a) To be informed, prior to being questioned, that there are grounds to believe that he or she
has committed a crime within the jurisdiction o f the Court;
(b) To remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination o f guilt or
innocence;
(c) To have legal assistance of the person's choosing, or, if the person does not have legal
assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests of
justice so require, and without payment by the person in any such case if the person does not
have sufficient means to pay for it; and
(d) To be questioned in the presence o f counsel unless the person has voluntarily waived his or
her right to counsel.
Article 56
Role o f the Pre-Trial Chamber in relation
to a unique investigative opportunity
1.
(a)
Where the Prosecutor considers an investigation to present a unique opportunity to take
testimony or a statement from a witness or to examine, collect or test evidence, which may not be
available subsequently for the purposes of a trial, the Prosecutor shall so inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.
(b) In that case, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, upon request o f the Prosecutor, take such
measures as may be necessary to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the proceedings and, in particular,
to protect the rights o f the defence.
(c) Unless the Pre-Trial Chamber orders otherwise, the Prosecutor shall provide the relevant
information to the person who has been arrested or appeared in response to a summons in connection with
the investigation referred to in subparagraph (a), in order that he or she may be heard on the matter.
2.

The measures referred to in paragraph 1 (b) may include:
(a)

Making recommendations or orders regarding procedures to be followed;

(b)

Directing that a record be made o f the proceedings;

(c)

Appointing an expert to assist;

(d) Authorizing counsel for a person who has been arrested, or appeared before the Court in
response to a summons, to participate, or where there has not yet been such an arrest or
appearance or counsel has not been designated, appointing another counsel to attend and
represent the interests o f the defence;
(e) Naming one o f its members or, if necessary, another available judge of the Pre-Trial or
Trial Division to observe and make recommendations or orders regarding the collection and
preservation of evidence and the questioning o f persons;
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(f)

Taking such other action as may be necessary to collect or preserve evidence.

3.
(a) Where the Prosecutor has not sought measures pursuant to this article but the Pre-Trial
Chamber considers that such measures are required to preserve evidence that it deems would be essential
for the defence at trial, it shall consult with the Prosecutor as to whether there is good reason for the
Prosecutor’s failure to request the measures. If upon consultation, the Pre-Trial Chamber concludes that
the Prosecutor’s failure to request such measures is unjustified, the Pre-Trial Chamber may take such
measures on its own initiative.
(b)
A decision o f the Pre-Trial Chamber to act on its own initiative under this paragraph may be
appealed by the Prosecutor. The appeal shall be heard on an expedited basis.
4.
The admissibility of evidence preserved or collected for trial pursuant to this article, or the record
thereof, shall be governed at trial by article 69, and given such weight as determined by the Trial
Chamber.

Article 57
Functions and powers o f the Pre-Trial Chamber
1.
Unless otherwise provided in this Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall exercise its functions in
accordance with the provisions o f this article.
2.
(a) Orders or rulings o f the Pre-Trial Chamber issued under articles 15, 18, 19, 54, paragraph 2,
61, paragraph 7, and 72 must be concurred in by a majority o f its judges.
(b)
In all other cases, a single judge o f the Pre-Trial Chamber may exercise the functions
provided for in this Statute, unless otherwise provided for in the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence or by a
majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber.
3.

In addition to its other functions under this Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber may:
(a) At the request of the Prosecutor, issue such orders and warrants as may be required for the
purposes of an investigation;
(b) Upon the request o f a person who has been arrested or has appeared pursuant to a
summons under article 58, issue such orders, including measures such as those described in
article 56, or seek such cooperation pursuant to Part 9 as may be necessary to assist the person in
the preparation of hi; or her defence;
(c) Where necessary, provide for the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses, the
preservation o f evidence, the protection o f persons who have been arrested or appeared in
response to a summons, and the protection o f national security information;
(d) Authorize the Prosecutor to take specific investigative steps within the territory o f a State
Party without having secured the cooperation of that State under Part 9 if, whenever possible
having regard to the views of the State concerned, the Pre-Trial Chamber has determined in that
case that the State is clearly unable to execute a request for cooperation due to the unavailability
of any authority or any component of its judicial system competent to execute the request for
cooperation under Part 9.
(e) Where a warrant o f arrest or a summons has been issued under article 58, and having due
regard to the strength o f the evidence and the rights o f the parties concerned, as provided for in
this Statute and the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, seek the cooperation of States pursuant to
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article 93, paragraph 1 (k), to take protective measures for the purpose o f forfeiture, in particular
for the ultimate benefit o f victims.

Article 58
Issuance bv the Pre-Trial Chamber of a warrant o f arrest
or a summons to appear
1.
At any time aAer the initiation o f an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the application
o f the Prosecutor, issue a warrant o f arrest o f a person if, having examined the application and die
evidence or other information submitted by the Prosecutor, it is satisfied that:
(a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the
jurisdiction o f the Court; and
(b)

The arrest of the person appears necessary:
(i)

T 0 ensure the person's appearance at trial,

(ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the
court proceedings, or
(iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the commission of
that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction of the Court and which
arises out of the same circumstances.
2.

The application of the Prosecutor shall contain:
(a) The name of the person and any other relevant identifying information;
(b) A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court whichthe person is
alleged to have committed;
(c) A concise statement o f the facts which are alleged to constitute those crimes;
(d) A summary o f the evidence and any other information which establish reasonable grounds
to believe that the person committed those crimes; and
(e)

3.

The reason why the Prosecutor believes that the arrest o f the person is necessary.

The warrant of arrest shall contain:
(a) The name of the person and any other relevant identifying information;
(b) A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction o f the Court for which the
person’s arrest is sought; and
(c) A concise statement o f the facts which are alleged to constitute those crimes.

4.

The warrant o f arrest shall remain in effect until otherwise ordered by the Court.

5.
On the basis o f the warrant of arrest, the Court may request the provisional arrestor the arrest and
surrender o f the person under Part 9.
6.
The Prosecutor may request the Pre-Trial Chamber to amend the warrant of arrest by modifying or
adding to the crimes specified therein. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall so amend the warrant if it is satisfied
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed the modified or additional crimes.
7.

As an alternative to seeking a warrant o f arrest, the Prosecutor may submit an application
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requesting that the Pre-Trial Chamber issue a summons for the person to appear. If the Pre-Trial Chamber
is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed the crime alleged and
that a summons is sufHcient to ensure the person's appearance, it shall issue the summons, with or without
conditions restricting liberty (other than detention) if provided for by national law, for the person to
appear. The summons shall contain:
(a) The name of the person and any other relevant identifying information;
(b)

The specified date on which the person is to appear;

(c) A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court which the person is
alleged to have committed; and
(d)

A concise statement o f the facts which are alleged to constitute the crime.

The summons shall be served on the person.

Article 59
Arrest proceedings in the custodial State
1.
A State Party which has received a request for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender shall
immediately take steps to arrest the person in question in accordance with its laws and the provisions of
Part 9.
2.
A person arrested shall be brought promptly before the competent judicial authority in the
custodial State which shall determine, in accordance with the law o f thatState, that:
(a) The warrant applies to that person;
(b)

The person has been arrested in accordance withthe proper process; and

(c)

The person's rights have been respected.

3.
The person arrested shall have the right to apply to the competent authority in the custodial State
for interim release pending surrender.
4.
In reaching a decision on any such application, the competent authority in the custodial State shall
consider whether, given the gravity o f the alleged crimes, there are urgent and exceptional circumstances
to justify interim release and whether necessary safeguards exist to ensure that the custodial State can
fulfil its duty to surrender the person to the Court. It shall not be open to the competent authority o f the
custodial State to consider whether the warrant o f m e st was properly issued in accordance with article 58,
paragraph 1 (a) and (b).
5.
The Pre-Trial Chamber shall be notified o f any request for interim release and shall make
recommendations to the competent authority in the custodial State. The competent authority in the
custodial State shall give full consideration to such recommendations, including any recommendations on
measures to prevent the escape o f the person, before rendering its decision.
6.
If the person is granted interim release, the Pre-Trial Chamber may request periodic reports on the
status o f the interim release.
7.
soon

Once ordered to be surrendered by the custodial State, the person shall be delivered to the Court as
as possible.
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Article 60
Initial proceedings before the Court
1.
Upon the surrender o f the person to the Court, or the person's appearance before the Court
voluntarily or pursuant to a summons, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the person has been
informed of the crimes which he or she is alleged to have committed, and o f his or her rights under this
Statute, including the right to apply for interim release pending trial.
2.
A person subject to a warrant of arrest may apply for interim release pending trial. If the Pre-Trial
Chamber is satisfied that the conditions set forth in article 58, paragraph 1, are met, the person shall
continue to be detained. If it is not so satisfied, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall release the person, with or
without conditions.
3.
The Pre-Trial Chamber shall periodically review its ruling on the release or detention of the
person, and may do so at any time on the request of the Prosecutor or the person. Upon such review, it
may modify its ruling as to detention, release or conditions of release, if it is satisfied that changed
circumstances so require.
4.
The Pre-Trial Chamber shall ensure that a person is not detained for an unreasonable period prior
to trial due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor. If such delay occurs, the Court shall consider releasing
the person, with or without conditions.
5.
If necessary, the Pre-Trial Chamber may issue a warrant of arrest to secure the presence of a
person who has been released.
Article 61
Confirmation o f the charges before trial
1.
Subject to the provisions o f paragraph 2, within a reasonable time after the person’s surrender or
voluntary appearance before the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall hold a hearing to confirm the charges
on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial. The hearing shall be held in the presence of the Prosecutor
and the person charged, as well as his or her counsel.
2.
The Pre-Trial Chamber may, upon request o f the Prosecutor or on its own motion, hold
a hearing
in the absence of the person charged to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial
when the person has:
(a)

Waived his or her right to be present; or

(b) Fled or cannot.be found and all reasonable steps have been taken to secure his or her
appearance before the Court and to inform the person o f the charges and that a hearing to
confirm those charges will be held.
In that case, the person shall be represented by counsel where the Pre-Trial Chamber determines
that it is in the interests of justice.
3.

Within a reasonable time before the hearing, the person shall:
(a) Be provided with a copy o f the document containing the charges on which the Prosecutor
intends to bring the person to trial; and
(b)

Be informed o f the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely at the hearing.

The Pre-Trial Chamber may issue orders regarding the disclosure of information for the purposes
of the hearing.
4.

Before the hearing, the Prosecutor may continue the investigation and may amend or withdraw any
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charges. The person shall be given reasonable notice before the hearing o f any amendment to or
withdrawal o f charges. In case o f a withdrawal of charges, the Prosecutor shall notify the Pre-Trial
Chamber o f the reasons for the withdrawal.
5.At the hearing, the Prosecutor shall support each charge with sufficient evidence to establish
substantial grounds to believe that the person committed the crime charged. The Prosecutor may rely on
documentary or summary evidence and need not call the witnesses expected to testify at the trial.
6.

At the hearing, the person may:
(a)

Object to the charges;

(b)

Challenge the evidence presented by the Prosecutor; and

(c)

Present evidence.

7.
The Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the basis o f the hearing, determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged.
Based on its determination, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall:
(a) Confirm those charges in relation to which it has determined that there is sufficient
evidence, and commit the person to a Trial Chamber for trial on the charges as confirmed;
(b) Decline to confirm those charges in relation to which it has determined that there is
insufficient evidence;
(c)

Adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecutor to consider:
(i) Providing further evidence or conducting further investigation with respect to a
particular charge; or
(ii) Amending a charge because the evidence submitted appears to establish a
different crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.

8.
Where the Pre-Trial Chamber declines to confirm a charge, the Prosecutor shall not be precluded
from subsequently requesting its confirmation if the request is supported by additional evidence.
9.
After the charges are confirmed and before the trial has begun, the Prosecutor may, with the
permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber and after notice to the accused, amend the charges. If the Prosecutor
seeks to add additional charges or to substitute more serious charges, a hearing under this article to
confirm those charges must be held. After commencement of the trial, the Prosecutor may, with the
permission of the Trial Chamber, withdraw the charges.
10.
Any warrant previously issued shall cease to have effect with respect to any charges which have
not been confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber or which have been withdrawn by the Prosecutor.
11.
Once the charges have been confirmed in accordance with this article, the Presidency shall
constitute a Trial Chamber which, subject to paragraph 9 and to article 64, paragraph 4, shall be
responsible for the conduct o f subsequent proceedings and may exercise any function of the Pre-Trial
Chamber that is relevant and capable o f application in those proceedings.
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PART 6. THE TRIAL
Article 62
Place of trial
Unless otherwise decided, the place o f the trial shall be the seat of the Court.

Article 63
Trial in the presence of the accused
1.

The accused shall be present during the trial.

2.
If the accused, being present before the Court, continues to disrupt the trial, the Trial Chamber
may remove the accused and shall make provision for him or her to observe the trial and instruct counsel
from outside the courtroom, through the use of communications technology, if required. Such measures
shall be taken only in exceptional circumstances after other reasonable alternatives have proved
inadequate, and only for such duration as is strictly required.
Article 64
Functions and powers o f the Trial Chamber
1.
The functions and powers o f the Trial Chamber set out in this article shall be exercised in
accordance with this Statute and the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
2.
The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full
respect for the rights o f the accused and due regard for the protection o f victims and witnesses.
3.
Upon assignment o f a case for trial in accordance with this Statute, the Trial Chamber assigned to
deal with the case shall:
(a) Confer with the parties and adopt such procedures as are necessary to facilitate the fair and
expeditious conduct of the proceedings;
(b) Determine the language or languages to be used at trial; and
(c) Subject to any other relevant provisions of this Statute, provide for disclosure of
documents or information not previously disclosed, sufficiently in advance o f the commencement
of the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial.
4.
The Trial Chamber may, if necessary for its effective and fair functioning, refer preliminary issues
to the Pre-Trial Chamber or, if necessary, to another available judge o f the Pre-Trial Division.
5.
Upon notice to the parties, the Trial Chamber may, as appropriate, direct that there be joinder or
severance in respect of charges against more than one accused.
6.
In performing its functions prior to trial or during the course of a trial, the Trial Chamber may, as
necessary:
(a)

Exercise any functions o f the Pre-Trial Chamber referred to in article 61, paragraph 11 ;

(b) Require the attendance and testimony o f witnesses and production o f documents and other
evidence by obtaining, if necessary, the assistance o f States as provided in this Statute;
(c)

Provide for the protection o f confidential information;
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(d) Order the production o f evidence in addition to that already collected prior to the trial or
presented during the trial by the parties;
(e) Provide for the protection o f the accused, witnesses and victims; and
(f)

Rule on any other relevant matters.

7.
The trial shall be held in public. The Trial Chamber may, however, determine that special
circumstances require that certain proceedings be in closed session for the purposes set fbrdi in article 68,
or to protect confidential or sensitive information to be given in evidence.
8.
(a) At the commencement o f the trial, the Trial Chamber shall have read to the accused the
charges previously confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the
accused understands the nature o f the charges. It shall afford him or her the opportunity to make an
admission of guilt in accordance with article 65 or to plead not guilty.
(b)
At the trial, the presiding judge may give directions for the conduct of proceedings,
including to ensure that they are conducted in a fair and impartial manner. Subject to any directions of the
presiding judge, the parties may submit evidence in accordance with the provisions of this Statute.
9.
to:

The Trial Chamber shall have, inter alia, the power on application o f a party or on its own motion
(a)

Rule on the admissibility or relevance of evidence; and

(b) Take all necessary steps to maintain order in the course of a hearing.
10.
The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a complete record of the trial, which accurately reflects the
proceedings, is made and that it is maintained and preserved by the Registrar.

Article 65
Proceedings on an admission of guilt
1.
Where the accused makes an admission o f guilt pursuant to article 64, paragraph 8 (a), the Trial
Chamber shall determine whether;
(a)

The accused understands the nature and consequences of the admission o f guilt;

(b) The admission is voluntarily made by the accused after sufficient consultation with defence
counsel; and
(c)

The admission'of guilt is supported by the facts o f the case that are contained in:
(i)

The charges brought by the Prosecutor and admitted by the accused;

(ii) Any materials presented by the Prosecutor which supplement the charges and
which the accused accepts; and
(iii) Any other evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses, presented by the
Prosecutor or the accused.
2.
Where the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the matters referred to in paragraph 1 are established, it
shall consider the admission of guilt, together with any additional evidence presented, as establishing all
the essential facts that are required to prove the crime to which the admission of guilt relates, and may
convict the accused o f that crime.
3.
Where the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the matters referred to in paragraph 1 are
established, it shall consider the admission o f guilt as not having been made, in which case it shall order
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that the trial be continued under the ordinary trial procedures provided by this Statute and may remit the
case to another Trial Chamber.
4.
Where the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that a more complete presentation of the facts of the
case is required in the interests o f justice, in particular the interests of the victims, the Trial Chamber may:
(a) Request the Prosecutor to present additional evidence, including the testimony of
witnesses; or
(b) Order that the trial be continued under the ordinary trial procedures provided by this
Statute, in which case it shall consider the admission o f guilt as not having been made and may
remit the case to another Trial Chamber.
5.
Any discussions between the Prosecutor and the defence regarding modification o f the charges, the
admission o f guilt or the penalty to be imposed shall not be binding on the Court.

Article 66
Presumption o f innocence
1.
Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty before the Court in accordance with the
applicable law.
2.

The onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused.

3.
In order to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt o f the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
Article 67
Rights o f the accused
1.
In the determination o f any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, having regard
to the provisions of this Statute, to a fair hearing conducted impartially, and to the following minimum
guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail o f the nature, cause and content of the charge, in a
language which the accused fully understands and speaks;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation o f the defence and to communicate
freely with counsel o f the accused's choosing in confidence;
(c)

To be tried without undue delay;

^

(d) Subject to article 63, paragraph 2, to be present at the trial, to conduct the defence in
person or through legal assistance o f the accused's choosing, to be informed, if the accused does
not have legal assistance, o f this right and to have legal assistance assigned by the Court in any
case where the interests o f justice so require, and without payment if the accused lacks sufficient
means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the
attendance and examination o f witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him or her. The accused shall also be entitled to raise defences and to present
other evidence admissible under this Statute;
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(f) To have, free o f any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter and such translations as
are necessary to meet the requirements o f fairness, if any of the proceedings of or documents
presented to the Court are not in a language which the accused fiilly understands and speaks;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent, without such silence
being a consideration in the determination of guilt or iimocence;
(h)

To make an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her defence; and

(i) Not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden o f proof or any onus of
rebuttal.
2.
In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as soon as
practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she
believes shows or tends to show the innocence o f the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or
which may affect the credibility o f prosecution evidence. In case o f doubt as to the application o f this
paragraph, the Court shall decide.
Article 68
Protection o f the victims and witnesses and their
participation in the proceedings
1.
The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well
being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so doing, the Court shall have regard to all relevant
factors, including age, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and the nature o f the crime,
in particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or violence against
children. The Prosecutor shall take such measures particularly during the investigation and prosecution of
such crimes. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a
fair and impartial trial.
2.
As an exception to the principle of public hearings provided for in article 67, the Chambers o f the
Court may, to protect victims and witnesses or an accused, conduct any part o f the proceedings in camera
or allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means. In particular, such measures
shall be implemented in the case o f a victim o f sexual violence or a child who is a victim or a witness,
unless otherwise ordered by the Court, having regard to all the circumstances, particularly the views o f the
victim or witness.
3.
Where the personal interests o f the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views and
concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the
Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair
and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal representatives o f the victims
where the Court considers it appropriate, in accordance with the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
4.
The Victims and Witnesses Unit may advise the Prosecutor and the Court on appropriate
protective measures, security arrangements, counselling and assistance as referred to in article 43,
paragraph 6.
5.
Where the disclosure o f evidence or information pursuant to this Statute may lead to the grave
endangerment o f the security of a witness or his or her family, the Prosecutor may, for the purposes of any
proceedings conducted prior to the commencement o f the trial, withhold such evidence or information and
instead submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall be exercised in a manner which is not prejudicial
to or inconsistent with the rights o f the accused and a fair and impartial trial.
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6.
A State may make an application for necessary measures to be taken in respect of the protection of
its servants or agents and the protection o f confidential or sensitive information.
Article 69
Evidence
1.
Before testifying, each witness shall, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
give an undertaking as to the truthfulness o f the evidence to be given by that witness.
2.
The testimony of a witness at trial shall be given in person, except to the extent provided by the
measures set forth in article 68 or in the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence. The Court may also permit the
giving o f viva voce (oral) or recorded testimony of a witness by means o f video or audio technology, as
well as the introduction of documents or written transcripts, subject to this Statute and in accordance with
the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the
rights o f the accused.
3.
The parties may submit evidence relevant to the case, in accordance with article 64. The Court
shall have the authority to request the submission o f all evidence that it considers necessary for the
determination o f the truth.
4.
The Court may rule on the relevance or admissibility of any evidence, taking into account, inter
alia, the probative value of the evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair trial or
to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness, in accordance with the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
5.
The Court shall respect and observe privileges on confidentiality as provided for in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence.
6.
The Court shall not require proof o f facts of common knowledge but may take judicial notice of
them.
7.
Evidence obtained by means o f a violation of this Statute or internationally recognized human
rights shall not be admissible if;
(a)

The violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or

(b) The admission o f the evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the
integrity o f the proceedings.
8.
When deciding on the relevance or admissibility o f evidence collected by a State, the Court shall
not rule on the application o f the State's national law.
»

Article 70
Offences against the administration of justice
1.
The Court shall have jurisdiction over the following offences against its administration of justice
when committed intentionally:
(a) Giving false testimony when under an obligation pursuant to article 69, paragraph 1, to tell
the truth;
(b)

Presenting evidence that the party knows is false or forged;

(c) Corruptly influencing a witness, obstructing or interfering with the attendance or testimony
o f a witness, retaliating against a witness for giving testimony or destroying, tampering with or
interfering with the collection of evidence;
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(d) Impeding, intimidating or corruptly influencing an official o f the Court for the purpose of
forcing or persuading the official not to perform, or to perform improperly, his or her duties;
(e) Retaliating against an official o f the Court on account o f duties performed by that or
another official;
(f) Soliciting or accepting a bribe as an official o f the Court in connection with his or her
official duties.
2.
The principles and procedures governing the Court’s exercise o f jurisdiction over offences under
this article shall be those provided for in the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence. The conditions for
providing international cooperation to the Court with respect to its proceedings under this article shall be
governed by the domestic laws of the requested State.
3.
In the event o f conviction, the Court may impose a term o f imprisonment not exceeding five years,
or a fine in accordance with the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, or both.
4.
(a) Each State Party shall extend its criminal laws penalizing offences against the integrity o f its
own investigative or judicial process to offences against the administration o f justice referred to in this
article, committed on its territory, or by one o f its nationals;
(b)
Upon request by the Court, whenever it deems it proper, the State Party shall sübmit the case
to its competent authorities for the purpose o f prosecution. Those authorities shall treat such cases with
diligence and devote sufficient resources to enable them to be conducted effectively.
Article 71
Sanctions for misconduct before the Court
1.
The Court may sanction persons present before it who commit misconduct, including disruption of
its proceedings or deliberate refüsal to comply with its directions, by administrative measures other than
imprisonment, such as temporary or permanent removal from the courtroom, a fine or other similar
measures provided for in the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
2.
The procedures governing the imposition o f the measures set forth in paragraph I shall be those
provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Article 72
Protection o f national security information
1.
This article applies in any case where the disclosure o f the information or documents of a State
would, in the opinion o f that State, prejudice its national security interests. Such cases include those
falling within the scope of article 56, paragraphs 2 and 3, article 61, paragraph 3, article 64, paragraph 3,
article 67, paragraph 2, article 68, paragraph 6, article 87, paragraph 6 and article 93, as well as cases
arising at any other stage of the proceedings where such disclosure may be at issue.
2.
This article shall also apply when a person who has been requested to give information or
evidence has refused to do so or has referred the matter to the State on the ground that disclosure would
prejudice the national security interests o f a State and the State concerned confirms that it is o f the opinion
that disclosure would prejudice its national security interests.
3.
Nothing in this article shall prejudice the requirements of confidentiality applicable under article
54, paragraph 3 (e) and (f), or the application o f article 73.
4.
If a State leams that information or documents o f the State are being, or are likely to be, disclosed
at any stage of the proceedings, and it is o f the opinion that disclosure would prejudice its national
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security interests, that State shall have the right to intervene in order to obtain resolution of the issue in
accordance with this article.
5.
If, in the opinion of a State, disclosure of information would prejudice its national security
interests, all reasonable steps will be taken by the State, acting in conjunction with the Prosecutor, the
defence or the Pre-Trial Chamber or Trial Chamber, as the case may be, to seek to resolve the matter by
cooperative means. Such steps may include:
(a)

Modification or clarification o f the request;

(b) A determination by the Court regarding the relevance of the information or evidence
sought, or a determination as to whether the evidence, though relevant, could be or has been
obtained from a source other than the requested State;
(c)

Obtaining the information or evidence from a different source or in a different form; or

(d) Agreement on conditions under which the assistance could be provided including, among
other things, providing summaries or redactions, limitations on disclosure, use of in camera or ex
parte proceedings, or other protective measures permissible under the Statute and the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence.
6.
Once all reasonable steps have been taken to resolve the matter through cooperative means, and if
the State considers that there are no means or conditions under which the information or documents could
be provided or disclosed without prejudice to its national security interests, it shall so notify the
Prosecutor or the Court of the specific reasons for its decision, unless a specific description of the reasons
would itself necessarily result in such prejudice to the State's national security interests.
7.
Thereafter, if the Court determines that the evidence is relevant and necessary for the
establishment o f the guilt or innocence o f the accused, the Court may undertake the following actions:
(a) Where disclosure of the information or document is sought pursuant to a request for
cooperation under Part 9 or the circumstances described in paragraph 2, and the State has
invoked the ground for refusal referred to in article 93, paragraph 4:
(i) The Court may, before making any conclusion referred to in subparagraph 7 (a)
(ii), request further consultations for the purpose of considering the State's
representations, which may include, as appropriate, hearings in camera and ex parte:
(ii) If the Court concludes that, by invoking the ground for refusal under article 93,
paragraph 4, in the circumstances o f the case, the requested State is not acting in
accordance with its obligations under this Statute, the Court may refer the matter in
accordance with article 87, paragraph 7, specifying the reasons for its conclusion; and
(iii) The Court may make such inference in the trial o f the accused as to the existence
or non-existence of a fact, as may be appropriate in the circumstances; or
(b)

In all other circumstances:
(i)

Order disclosure; or

(ii) To the extent it does not order disclosure, make such inference in the trial o f the
accused as to the existence or non-existence o f a fact, as may be appropriate in the
circumstances.
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Article 73
Third-party information or documents
I f a State Party is requested by the Court to provide a document or information in its custody,
possession or control, which was disclosed to it in confidence by a State, intergovernmental organization
or international organization, it shall seek the consent of the originator to disclose that document or
information. If the originator is a State Party, it shall either consent to disclosure of the information or
document or undertake to resolve the issue o f disclosure with the Court, subject to the provisions of article
72. If the originator is not a State Party and refuses to consent to disclosure, the requested State shall
inform the Court that it is unable to provide the document or information because of a pre-existing
obligation o f confidentiality to the originator.
Article 74
Requirements for the decision
1.
All the judges o f the Trial Chamber shall be present at each stage o f the trial and throughout their
deliberations. The Presidency may, on a case-by-case basis, designate, as available, one or more alternate
judges to be present at each stage of the trial and to replace a member of the Trial Chamber if that
member is unable to continue attending.
2.
The Trial Chamber’s decision shall be based on its evaluation o f the evidence and the entire
proceedings. The decision shall not exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any
amendments to the charges. The Court may base its decision only on evidence submitted and discussed
before it at the trial.
3.
The judges shall attempt to achieve unanimity in their decision, failing which the decision shall be
taken by a majority of the judges.
4.

The deliberations of the Trial Chamber shall remain secret.

5.
The decision shall be in writing and shall contain a full and reasoned statement of the Trial
Chamber's findings on the evidence and conclusions. The Trial Chamber shall issue one decision. When
there is no unanimity, the Trial Chamber's decision shall contain the views of the majority and the
minority. The decision or a summary thereof shall be delivered in open court.
Article 75
Reparations to victims
1.
The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon
request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage,
loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which it is acting.
2.
The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.
Where appropriate, the Court may order that the award for reparations be made through the Trust
Fund provided for in article 79.
3.
Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite and shall take account of
representations from or on behalf o f the convicted person, victims, other interested persons or interested
States.
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4.
In exercising its power under this article, the Court may, after a person is convicted o f a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court, determine whether, in order to give effect to an order which it may
make under this article, it is necessary to seek measures under article 93, paragraph 1.
5.
A State Party shall give effect to a decision under this article as if the provisions o f article 109
were applicable to dûs article.
6.
Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights o f victims under national or
international law.
Article 76
Sentencing
1.
In the event o f a conviction, the Trial Chamber shall consider the appropriate sentence to be
imposed and shall take into account the evidence presented and submissions made during the trial that are
relevant to the sentence.
2.
Except where article 65 applies and before the completion o f the trial, the Trial Chamber may on
its own motion and shall, at the request of the Prosecutor or the accused, hold a further hearing to hear any
additional evidence or submissions relevant to the sentence, in accordance with the Rides o f Procedure
and Evidence.
3.
Where paragraph 2 applies, any representations under article 75 shall be heard during the further
hearing referred to in paragraph 2 and, if necessary, during any additional hearing.
4.

The sentence shall be pronounced in public and, wherever possible, in the presence o f the accused.
PART 7. PENALTIES
Article 77
Applicable penalties

1.
Subject to article 110, the Court may impose one of the following penalties on a person convicted
of a crime referred to in article 5 o f this Statute:
(a) Imprisonment for a specified number o f years, which may not exceed a maximum o f 30
years; or
(b) A term o f life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the
individual circumstances o f the convicted person.
2.

In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order:
(a) A fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) A forfeiture o f proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from that crime,
without prejudice to ftie rights o f bona fide third parties.
Article 7g
Determination o f the sentence

1.
In determining the sentence, the Court shall, in accordance with the Rules o f Procedure and
Evidence, take into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of
the convicted person.
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2.
In imposing a sentence of imprisonment, the Court shall deduct the time, if any, previously spent
in detention in accordance with an order of the Court. The Court may deduct any time otherwise spent in
detention in connection with conduct underlying the crime.
3.
When a person has been convicted o f more than one crime, the Court shall pronounce a sentence
for each crime and a joint sentence specifying the total period of imprisonment. This period shall be no
less than the highest individual sentence pronounced and shall not exceed 30 years imprisonment or a
sentence o f life imprisonment in conformity with article 77, paragraph 1 (b>

Article 79
Trust Fund
1.
A Trust Fund shall be established by decision of the Assembly o f States Parties for the benefit of
victims o f crimes within the jurisdiction o f the Court, and of the families o f such victims.
2.
The Court may order money and other property collected through fines or forfeiture to be
transferred, by order of the Court, to the Trust Fund.
3.
The Trust Fund shall be managed according to criteria to be determined by the Assembly o f States
Parties.
Article 80
Non-preiudice to national application of
penalties and national laws
Nothing in this Part affects the application by States of penalties prescribed by their national law,
nor the law of States which do not provide for penalties prescribed in this Part.
PART 8. APPEAL AND REVISION
Article 81
Appeal against decision of acquittal or conviction
or against sentence
1.
A decision under article 74 may be appealed in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence as follows:
(a)

The Prosecutor may make an appeal on any o f the following grounds:
(i)

Procedural error,

(ii)

Error of fact, or

(iii)

Error of law;

(b) The convicted person, or the Prosecutor on that person’s behalf, may make an appeal on
any o f the following grounds:
(i) Procedural error,
(ii)

Error of fact,

(iii)

Error of law, or
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(iv) Any other ground that affects the fairness or reliability of the proceedings or
decision.
2.
(a) A sentence may be appealed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, by
the Prosecutor or the convicted person on the ground of disproportion between the crime and the
sentence;
(b)
If on an appeal against sentence the Court considers that there are grounds on which the
conviction might be set aside, wholly or in part, it may invite the Prosecutor and the convicted person to
submit grounds under article 81, paragraph 1 (a) or (b), and may render a decision on conviction in
accordance with article 83;
(c)
The same procedure applies when the Court, on an appeal against conviction only,
considers that there are grounds to reduce the sentence under paragraph 2 (a).
3.
(a) Unless the Trial Chamber orders otherwise, a convicted person shall remain in custody
pending an appeal;
(b)
When a convicted person's time in custody exceeds the sentence of imprisonment imposed,
that person shall be released, except that if the Prosecutor is also appealing, the release may be subject to
the conditions under subparagraph (c) below;
(c)

In case o f an acquittal, the accused shall be released immediately, subject to the following;
(i) Under exceptional circumstances, and having regard, inter alia, to the concrete risk
o f flight, the seriousness of the offence charged and the probability o f success on
appeal, the Trial Chamber, at the request of the Prosecutor, may maintain the detention
o f the person pending appeal;
(ii) A decision by the Trial Chamber under subparagraph (c) (i) may be appealed in
accordance with the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.

4.
Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 (a) and (b), execution of the decision or sentence shall be
suspended during the period allowed for appeal and for the duration of the appeal proceedings.
Article 82
Anneal against other decisions
1.
Either party may appeal any o f the following decisions in accordance with the Rules o f Procedure
and Evidence:
(a)

A decision with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility;

(b) A decision granting or denying relelase of the person being investigated or prosecuted;
(c)

A decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to act on its own initiative under article 56, paragraph

3;
(d) A decision that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and expeditious
conduct o f the proceedings or the outcome o f the trial, and for which, in the opinion o f the PreTrial or Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially
advance the proceedings.
2.
A decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 57, paragraph 3 (d), may be appealed against by
the State concerned or by the Prosecutor, with the leave o f the Pre-Trial Chamber. The appeal shall be
heard on an expedited basis.
3. An appeal shall not o f itself have suspensive effect unless the Appeals Chamber so orders, upon
request, in accordance with the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
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4. A legal representative o f the victims, the convicted person or a bona fide owner of property
adversely affected by an order under article 75 may appeal against the order for reparations, as provided
in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Article 83
Proceedings on appeal
1.
For the purposes of proceedings under article 81 and this article, the Appeals Chamber shall have
all the powers o f the Trial Chamber.
2.
If the Appeals Chamber finds that the proceedings appealed from were unfair in a way that
affected the reliability o f the decision or sentence, or that the decision or sentence appealed from was
materially affected by error of fact or law or procedural error, it may;
(a)

Reverse or amend the decision or sentence; or

(b) Order a new trial before a different Trial Chamber.
For these purposes, the Appeals Chamber may remand a factual issue to the original Trial
Chamber for it to determine the issue and to report back accordingly, or may itself call evidence to
determine the issue. When the decision or sentence has been appealed only by the person convicted, or the
Prosecutor on that person's behalf, it cannot be amended to his or her detriment.
3.
If in an appeal against sentence the Appeals Chamber finds that the sentence is disproportionate to
the crime, it may vary the sentence in accordance with Part 7.
4.
The judgement o f the Appeals Chamber shall be taken by a majority o f the judges and shall be
delivered in open court. The judgement shall state the reasons on which it is based. When there is no
unanimity, the judgement o f the Appeals Chamber shall contain the views o f the majority and the
minority, but a judge may deliver a separate or dissenting opinion on a question o f law.
5.
The Appeals Chamber may deliver its judgement in the absence of the person acquitted or
convicted.
Article 84
Revision o f conviction or sentence
1. ' The convicted person or, after death, spouses, children, parents or one person alive at the time of
the accused's death who has been given express written instructions from the accused to bring such a
claim, or the Prosecutor on the person’s behalf, may apply to the Appeals Chamber to revise the final
judgement o f conviction or sentence on the grounds that:
(a)

New evidence has been discovered that:
(i) Was not available at the time of trial, and such unavailability was not wholly or
partially attributable to the party making application; and
(ii) Is sufficiently important that had it been proved at trial it would have been likely
to have resulted in a different verdict;

(b) It has been newly discovered that decisive evidence, taken into account at trial and upon
which the conviction depends, was false, forged or falsified;
(c) One or more o f the judges who participated in conviction or confirmation of the charges
has committed, in that case, an act o f serious misconduct or serious breach of duty of sufficient
gravity to justify the removal o f that judge or those judges from office under article 46.
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2.
The Appeals Chamber shall reject the application if it considers it to be unfounded. If it determines
that the application is meritorious, it may, as appropriate:
(a) Reconvene the original Trial Chamber;
(b)

Constitute a new Trial Chamber; or

(c)

Retain jurisdiction over the matter,

with a view to, after hearing the parties in the manner set forth in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
arriving at a determination on whether the judgement should be revised.

Article 85
Compensation to an arrested or convicted person
1.
Anyone who has been the victim o f unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to
compensation.
2.
When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence, and when
subsequently his or her conviction has been reversed on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact
shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage o f justice, the person who has suffered punishment
as a result o f such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non
disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him or her.
3.
In exceptional circumstances, where the Court finds conclusive facts showing that there has been a
grave and manifest miscarriage o f justice, it may in its discretion award compensation, according to the
criteria provided in the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, to a person who has been released from
detention following a final decision o f acquittal or a termination o f the proceedings for that reason.
PART 9. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
Article 86
General obligation to cooperate
States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions o f this Statute, cooperate fully with the
Court in its investigation and prosecution o f crimes within the jurisdiction o f the Court.
Article 87
. Requests for cooperation: general provisions
1.
(a) The Court shall have the authority to make requests to States Parties for cooperation. The
requests shall be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or any other appropriate channel as may be
designated by each State Party upon ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
Subsequent changes to the designation shall be made by each State Party in accordance with the
Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
(b)
When appropriate, without prejudice to the provisions o f subparagraph (a), requests may
also be transmitted through the International Criminal Police Organization or any appropriate regbnal
organization.
2.
Requests for cooperation and any documents supporting the request shall either be in or be
accompanied by a translation into an official language o f the requested State or one of the working
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languages o f the Court, in accordance with the choice made by that State upon ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession.
Subsequent changes to this choice shall be made in accordance with the Rules o f Procedure and
Evidence.
3.
The requested State shall keep confidential a request for cooperation and any documents
supporting the request, except to the extent that the disclosure is necessary for execution o f the request.
4.
In relation to any request for assistance presented under this Part, the Court may take such
measures, including measures related to the protection o f information, as may be necessary to ensure the
safety or physical or psychological well-being o f any victims, potential witnesses and their families. The
Court may request that any information that is made available under this Part shall be provided and
handled in a manner that protects the safety and physical or psychological well-being of any victims,
potential witnesses and their families.
5.
(a) The Court may invite any State not party to this Statute to provide assistance under this Part
on the basis o f an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis.
(b)
Where a State not party to this Statute, which has entered into an ad hoc arrangement or an
agreement with the Court, fails to cooperate with requests pursuant to any such arrangement or agreement,
the Court may so inform the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter
to the Court, the Security Council.
6.
The Court may ask any intergovernmental organization to provide information or documents. The
Court may also ask for other forms of cooperation and assistance which may be agreed upon with such an
organization and which are in accordance with its competence or mandate.
7.
Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court contrary to the
provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under
this Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States
Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.
Article 88
Availability of procedures under national law
States Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all of the
forms of cooperation which are specified under this Part.
Article 89
Surrender o f persons to the Court
1.
The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with the
material supporting the request outlined in article 91, to any State on the territory of which that person
may be found and shall request the cooperation o f that State in the arrest and surrender o f such a person.
States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions o f this Part and the procedure under their national
law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender.
2.
Where the person sought for surrender brings a challenge before a national court on the basis of
the principle o f ne bis in idem as provided in article 20, the requested State shall immediately consult with
the Court to determine if there has been a relevant ruling on admissibility. If the case is admissiHe, the
requested State shall proceed with the execution o f the request. If an admissibility ruling is pending, the
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requested State may postpone the execution o f the request for surrender o f the person until the Court
mdces a determination on admissibility.
3.
(a) A State Party shall authorize, in accordance with its national procedural law, transportation
through its territory o f a person being surrendered to the Court by another State, except where transit
through that State would impede or delay the surrender.
(b) A request by the Court for transit shall be transmitted in accordance with article 87. The
request for transit shall contain:

(c)

(i)

A description o f the person being transported;

(ii)

A brief statement o f the facts o f the case and their legal characterization; and

(iii) The warrant for arrest and surrender;
A person being transported shall be detained in custody during the period of transit;

(d) No authorization is required if the person is transported by air and no landing is scheduled
on the territory o f the transit State;
(e) If an unscheduled landing occurs on the territory o f the transit State, that State may require a
request for transit from the Court as provided for in subparagraph (b). The transit State shall detain the
person being transported until the request for transit is received and the transit is effected, provided that
detention for purposes o f this subparagraph may not be extended beyond 96 hours from the unscheduled
landing unless the request is received witiiin that time.
4.
If the person sought is being proceeded against or is serving a sentence in the requested State for a
crime different from that for which surrender to the Court is sought, the requested State, after making its
decision to grant the request, shall consult with the Court.
Article 90
Competing requests
1.
A State Party which receives a request from the Court for the surrender of a person under article
89 shall, if it also receives a request from any other State for the extradition o f the same person for the
same conduct which forms the basis o f the crime for which the Court seeks the person's surrender, notify
the Court and the requesting State o f that fact.
2.
Where the requesting State is a State Party, the requested State shall give priority to the request
from the Court if:
(a) The Court has, pursuant to article 18 or 19, made a determination that the case in respect of
which surrender is sought is admissible and that determination takes into account the
investigation or prosecution conducted by the requesting State in respect of its request for
extradition; or
(b) The Court makes the determination described in subparagraph (a) pursuant to the requested
State’s notification under paragraph 1.
3.
Where a determination under paragraph 2 (a) has not been made, the requested State may, at its
discretion, pending the determination o f the Court under paragraph 2 (b), proceed to deal with the request
for extradition from the requesting State but shall not extradite the person until the Court has determined
that the case is inadmissible. The Court's determination shall be made on an expedited basis.

226

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4.
If the requesting State is a State not Party to this Statute the requested State, if it is not under an
international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State, shall give priority to the request for
surrender from the Court, if the Court has determined tliat the case is admissible.
5.
Where a case under paragraph 4 has not been determined to be admissible by the Court, the
requested State may, at its discretion, proceed to deal with the request for extradition from the requesting
State.
6.
In cases where paragraph 4 ^ p lie s except that the requested State is under an existing
international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State not Party to this Statute, the
requested State shall determine whether to surrender the person to the Court or extradite the person to the
requesting State. In making its decision, the requested State shall consider all the relevant factors,
including but not limited to:
(a)

The respective dates of the requests;

(b) The interests o f the requesting State including, where relevant, whether the crime was
committed in its territory and the nationality o f the victims and of the person sought; and
(c)

The possibility o f subsequent surrender between the Court and the requesting State.

7.
Where a State Party which receives a request from the Court for the surrender of a person also
receives a request from any State for the extradition o f the same person for conduct other than that which
constitutes the crime for which the Court seeks the person's surrender:
(a) The requested State shall, if it is not under an existing international obligation to extradite
the person to the requesting State, give priority to the request from the Court;
(b) The requested State shall, if it is under an existing international obligation to extradite the
person to the requesting State, determine whether to surrender the person to the Court or to
extradite the person to the requesting State. In making its decision, the requested State shall
consider all the relevant factors, including but not limited to those set out in paragraph 6, but
shall give special consideration to the relative nature and gravity of the conduct in question.
8.
Where pursuant to a notification under this article, the Court has determined a case to be
inadmissible, and subsequently extradition to the requesting State is refused, the requested State shall
notify the Court o f this decision.

Article 91
Contents o f request for arrest and surrender
1.
A request for arrest an,d surrender shall be made in writing. In urgent cases, a request may be made
by any medium capable o f delivering a written record, provided that the request shall be confirmed
through the charuiel provided for in article 87, paragraph 1 (a).
2.
In the case o f a request for the arrest and surrender of a person for whom a warrant of arrest has
been issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 58, the request shall contain or be supported by:
(a) Information describing the person sought, sufficient to identify the person, and information
as to that person’s probable location;
(b)

A copy o f the warrant o f arrest; and

(c) Such documents, statements or information as may be necessary to meet the requirements
for the surrender process in the requested State, except that those requirements should not be
more burdensome than those applicable to requests for extradition pursuant to treaties or
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arrangements between the requested State and other States and should, if possible, be less
burdensome, taking into account the distinct nature o f the Court.
3.
In the case o f a request for the arrest and surrender o f a person already convicted, the request shall
contain or be supported by:
(a) A copy of any warrant o f arrest for that person;
(b) A copy o f the judgement o f conviction;
(c) Information to demonstrate that the person sought is the one referred to in the judgement of
conviction; and
(d) If the person sought has been sentenced, a copy o f the sentence imposed and, in the case of
a sentence for imprisonment, a statement o f any time already served and the time remaining to be
served.
4.
Upon the request o f the Court, a State Party shall consult with the Court, either generally or with
respect to a specific matter, regarding any requirements under its national law that may apply under
paragraph 2 (c). During the consultations, the State Party shall advise the Court of the specific
requirements of its national law.
Article 92
Provisional arrest
1.
In urgent cases, the Court may request the provisional arrest of the person sought, pending
presentation of the request for surrender and the documents supporting the request as specified in article
91.
2.
The request for provisional arrest shall be made by any medium capable of delivering a written
record and shall contain:
(a) Information describing the person sought, sufficient to identify the person, and information
as to that person's probable location;
(b) A concise statement o f the crimes for which the person's arrest is sought and of the facts
which are alleged to constitute those crimes, including, where possible, the date and location of
the crime;
(c) A statement o f the existence o f a warrant of arrest or a judgement o f conviction against the
person sought; and
(d)

A statement that a request for surrender of the person sought will follow.
«

^

3.
A person who is provisionally arrested may be released from custody if the requested State has not
received the request for surrender and the documents supporting the request as specified in article 91
within the time limits specified in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. However, the person may consent
to surrender before the expiration o f this period if permitted by the law of the requested State. In such a
case, the requested State shall proceed to surrender the person to the Court as soon as possible.
4.
The fact that the person sought has been released from custody pursuant to paragraph 3 shall not
prejudice the subsequent arrest and surrender o f that person if the request for surrender and the documents
supporting the request are delivered at a later date.
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Article 93
Other forms of cooperation
1.
States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions o f this Part and under procedures of national
law, comply with requests by the Court to provide the following assistance in relation to investigations or
prosecutions:
(a)

The identification and whereabouts o f persons or the location of items;

(b) The taking o f evidence, including testimony under oath, and the production of evidence,
including expert opinions and reports necessary to the Court;
(c) The questioning o f any person being investigated or prosecuted;
(d) The service o f documents, including judicial documents;
(e) Facilitating the voluntary appearance o f persons as witnesses or experts before the Court;
(f) The temporary transfer o f persons as provided in paragraph 7;
(g) The examination of places or sites, including the exhumation and examination o f grave
sites;
(h) The execution o f searches and seizures;
(i)

The provision o f records and documents, including official records and documents;

(j)

The protection o f victims and witnesses and the preservation o f evidence;

(k) The identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and assets and
instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, without prejudice to the rights
o f bona fide third parties; and
(1) Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law o f the requested State, with
a view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction o f the
Court.
2.
The Court shall have the authority to provide an assurance to a witness or an expert appearing
before the Court that he or she will not be prosecuted, detained or subjected to any restriction of personal
freedom by the Court in respect o f any act or omission that preceded the departure of that person from the
requested State.
3.
Where execution o f a particular measure o f assistance detailed in a request presented under
paragraph 1, is prohibited in the requested State on the basis of an existing fundamental legal principle of
general application, the requested State shall promptly consult with the Court to try to resolve the matter.
In the consultations, consideration should be given to whether the assistance can be rendered in another
manner or subject to conditions. If after consultations the matter cannot be resolved, the Court shall
modify the request as necessary.
4.
In accordance with article 72, a State Party may deny a request for assistance, in whole or in part,
only if the request concerns the production of any documents or disclosure of evidence which relates to its
national security.
5.
Before denying a request for assistance under paragraph 1 (1), the requested State shall consider
whether the assistance can be provided subject to specified conditions, or whether the assistance can be
provided at a later date or in an alternative manner, provided that if the Court or the Prosecutor accepts
the assistance subject to conditions, the Court or the Prosecutor shall abide by them.
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6.
If a request for assistance is denied, the requested State Party shall promptly inform the Court or
the Prosecutor o f the reasons for such denial.
7.
(a) The Court may request the temporary transfer o f a person in custody for purposes of
identification or for obtaining testimony or other assistance. The person may be transferred if the
following conditions are fulfilled:
(i)

The person freely gives his or her informed consent to the transfer; and

(ii) The requested State agrees to the transfer, subject to such conditions as that State
and the Court may agree.
(b) The person being transferred shall remain in custody. When the purposes o f the transfer
have been fulfilled, the Court shall return the person without delay to the requested State.
8.
(a) The Court shall ensure the confidentiality o f documents and information, except as required
for the investigation and proceedings described in the request.
(b) The requested State may, when necessary, transmit documents or information to the
Prosecutor on a confidential basis. The Prosecutor may then use them solely for the purpose of generating
new evidence.
(c) The requested State may, on its own motion or at the request o f the Prosecutor, subsequently
consent to the disclosure o f such documents or information. They may then be used as evidence pursuant
to the provisions of Parts 5 and 6 and in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
9.
(a) (i) In the event that a State Party receives competing requests, other than for surrender or
extradition, from the Court and from another State pursuant to an international obligation, the State Party
shall endeavour, in consultation with the Court and the other State, to meet both requests, if necessary by
postponing or attaching conditions to one or the other request.
(ii)
established in article 90.

Failing that, competing requests shall be resolved in accordance with the principles

(b)
Where, however, the request from the Court concerns information, property or persons
which are subject to the control o f a third State or an international organization by virtue of an
international agreement, the requested States shall so inform the Court and the Court shall direct its
request to the third State or international organization.
10.
(a) The Court may, upon request, cooperate with and provide assistance to a State Party
conducting an investigation into or trial in respect o f conduct which constitutes a crime within the
jurisdiction o f the Court or which constitutes a serious crime under the national law of the requesting
State.
(b)

(i)

The assistance provided under subparagraph (a) shall include, inter alia:
a. The transmission of statements, documents or other types of evidence
obtained in the course of an investigation or a trial conducted by the Court; and
b.

(ii)

The questioning o f any person detained by order o f the Court;

In the case o f assistance under subparagraph (b) (i) a:
a. If the documents or other types of evidence have been obtained with the
assistance o f a State, such transmission shall require the consent of that State;
b. If the statements, documents or other types of evidence have been
provided by a witness or expert, such transmission shall be subject to the
provisions of article 68.
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(c)
The Court may, under the conditions set out in this paragraph, grant a request for assistance
under this paragraph from a State which is not a Party to this Statute.
Article 94
Postponement o f execution o f a request in respect
o f ongoing investigation or prosecution
1.
If the immediate execution o f a request would interfere with an ongoing investigation or
prosecution o f a case different from that to which the request relates, the requested State may postpone the
execution of the request for a period of time agreed upon with the Court. However, the postponement
shall be no longer than is necessary to conq>lete the relevant investigation or prosecution in the requested
State. Before making a decision to postpone, the requested State should consider whether the assistance
may be immediately provided subject to certain conditions.
2.
If a decision to postpone is taken pursuant to paragraph 1, the Prosecutor may, however, seek
measures to preserve evidence, pursuant to article 93, paragraph 1 (j).
Article 95
Postponement of execution o f a request in
respect o f an admissibility challenge
Where there is an admissibility challenge under consideration by the Court pursuant to article 18
or 19, the requested State may postpone the execution o f a request under this Part pending a determination
by the Court, unless the Court has specifically ordered that the Prosecutor may pursue the collection of
such evidence pursuant to article 18 or 19.
Article 96
Contents of request for other forms of
assistance under article 93
1.
A request for other forms o f assistance referred to in article 93 shall be made in writing. In urgent
cases, a request may be made by any medium capable of delivering a written record, provided that the
request shall be confirmed through the channel provided for in article 87, paragraph I (a).
2.

The request shall, as applicable, contain or be supported by the following:
(a) A concise statement o f the purpose of the request and the assistance sought, including the
legal basis and the grounds for the request;
(b) As much detailed information as possible about the location or identification of any person
or place that must be found or identified in order for the assistance sought to be provided;
(c) A concise statement o f the essential facts underlying the request;
(d) The reasons for and details o f any procedure or requirement to be followed;
(e) Such information as may be required under the law of the requested State in order to
execute the request; and
(f)

Any other information relevant in order for the assistance so u ^t to be provided.

3.
Upon the request o f the Court, a State Party shall consult with the Court, either generally or with
respect to a specific matter, regarding any requirements under its national law that may apply under
paragraph 2 (e). During the consultations, the State Party shall advise the Court of the specific
requirements of its national law.
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4.
The provisions o f this article shall, where applicable, also apply in respect of a request for
assistance made to the Court.

Article 97
Consultations
Where a State Party receives a request under this Part in relation to which it identifies problems
which may impede or prevent the execution o f the request, that State shall consult with the Court without
delay in order to resolve the matter. Such problems may include, inter alia:
(a) Insufficient information to execute the request;
(b) In the case o f a request for surrender, the fact that despite best efforts, the person sought
cannot be located or that the investigation conducted has determined that the person in the
requested State is clearly not the person named in the warrant; or
(c) The fact that execution o f the request in its current form would require the requested State
to breach a pre-existing treaty obligation undertaken with respect to another State.
Article 98
Cooperation with resoect to waiver of immunitv
and consent to surrender
1.
The Couii may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State
or diplomatic immunity of a person or property o f a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation o f that third State for the waiver o f the immunity.
2.
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State
to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a
sending State is required to surrender a person o f that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.

Article 99
Execution o f requests under articles 93 and 96
1.
Requests for assistance shall be executed in accordance with the relevant procedure under the law
of the requested State and, unless prohibited by such law, in the manner specified in the request, including
following any procedure outlined therein or permitting persons specified in the request to be present at
and assist in the execution process.
2.
In the case of an urgent request, the documents or evidence produced in response shall, at the
request of the Court, be sent urgently.
3.

Replies from the requested State shall be transmitted in their original language and form.

4.
Without prejudice to other articles in this Part, where it is necessary for the successful execution of
a request which can be executed without any compulsory measures, including specifically the interview of
or taking evidence from a person on a voluntary basis, including doing so without the presence of the
authorities o f the requested State Party if it is essential for the request to be executed, and the examination
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without modification o f a public site or other public place, the Prosecutor may execute such request
directly on the territory o f a State as follows:
(a) When the State Party requested is a State on the territory of which the crime is alleged to
have been committed, and there has been a determination o f admissibility pursuant to article 18
or 19, the Prosecutor may directly execute such request following all possible consultations with
the requested State Party;
(b) In other cases, the Prosecutor may execute such request following consultations with the
requested State Party and subject to any reasonable conditions or concerns raised by that State
Party. Where the requested State Party identifies problems with the execution of a request
pursuant to this subparagraph it shall, without delay, consult with the Court to resolve the matter.
5.
Provisions allowing a person heard or examined by the Court under article 72 to invoke
restrictions designed to prevent disclosure of confidential information connected with national security
shall also apply to the execution of requests for assistance under this article.

Article 100
Costs
1.
The ordinary costs for execution o f requests in the territory of the requested State shall be borne
by that State, except for the following, which shall be borne by the Court:
(a) Costs associated with the travel and security of witnesses and experts or the transfer under
article 93 o f persons in custody;
(b)

Costs o f translation, interpretation and transcription;

(c) Travel and subsistence costs of the judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors, the
Registrar, the Deputy Registrar and staff o f any organ of the Court;
(d) Costs of any expert opinion or report requested by the Court;
(e) Costs associated with the transport of a person being surrendered to the Court by a
custodial State; and
(f) Following consultations, any extraordinary costs that may result from the execution o f a
request.
2.
The provisions o f paragraph 1 shall, as appropriate, apply to requests from States Parties to the
Court. In that case, the Court shall bear the ordinary costs o f execution.

Article 101
Rule of snecialitv
1.
A person surrendered to the Court under this Statute shall not be proceeded against, punished or
detained for any conduct committed prior to surrender, other than the conduct or course o f conduct which
forms the basis o f the crimes for which that person has been surrendered.
2.
The Court may request a waiver o f the requirements o f paragraph 1 from the State which
surrendered the person to the Court and, if necessary, the Court shall provide additional information in
accordance with article 91. States Parties shall have the authority to provide a waiver to the Court and
should endeavour to do so.
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Article 102
Use of terms
For the purposes of this Statute;
(a)
Statute.

"surrender" means the delivering up o f a person by a State to the Court, pursuant to this

(b)"extradition" means the delivering up o f a person by one State to another as provided by treaty,
convention or national legislation.

PART 10. ENFORCEMENT
Article 103
Role o f States in enforcement of
sentences of imprisonment
1.
(a) A sentence o f imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the Court from a list of
States which have indicated to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced persons.
(b) At the time of declaring its willingness to accept sentenced persons, a State may attach
conditions to its acceptance as agreed by the Court and in accordance with this Part.
(c) A State designated in a particular case shall promptly inform the Court whether it accepts the
Court's designation.
2.
(a) The State of enforcement shall notify the Court of any circumstances, including the exercise
of any conditions agreed under paragraph 1, which could materially affect the terms or extent of the
imprisonment. The Court shall be given at least 45 days' notice of any such known or foreseeable
circumstances. During this period, the State of enforcement shall take no action that might prejudice its
obligations under article 110.
(b)
Where the Court carmot agree to the circumstances referred to in subparagraph (a), it shall
notify the State of enforcement and proceed in accordance with article 104, paragraph 1.
3.
In exercising its discretion to make a designation under paragraph 1, the Court shall take into
account the following:
(a) The principle that States Parties should share the responsibility for enforcing sentences of
imprisonment, in accordance with principles o f equitable distribution, as provided in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence;
(b)
prisoners;

The application o f widely accepted international treaty standards governing the treatment of

(c)

The views o f the sentenced person;

(d)

The nationality o f the sentenced person;

(e) Such other factors regarding the circumstances o f the crime or the person sentenced, or the
effective enforcement o f the sentence, as may be appropriate in designating the State of enforcement.
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4.
If no State is designated under paragraph 1, the sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a
prison facility made available by the host State, in accordance with the conditions set out in the
headquarters agreement referred to in article 3, paragraph 2. In such a case, the costs arising out of the
enforcement o f a sentence o f imprisonment shall be borne by the Court.
Article 104
Change in designation o f State o f enforcement
1.

The Court may, at any time, decide to transfer a sentenced person to a prison of another State.

2.
A sentenced person may, at any time, apply to the Court to be transferred from the State of
enforcement.

Article 105
Enforcement o f the sentence
1.
Subject to conditions which a State may have specified in accordance with article 103, paragraph
1 (b), the sentence o f imprisonment shall be binding on the States Parties, which shall in no case modify
it.
2.
The Court alone shall have the right to decide any application for appeal and revision. The State of
enforcement shall not impede the making o f any such application by a sentenced person.
Article 106
Supervision o f enforcement of sentences and
conditions o f imprisonment
1.
The enforcement o f a sentence of imprisonment shall be subject to the supervision o f the Court
and shall be consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards governing treatment of
prisoners.
2.
The conditions of imprisonment shall be governed by the law o f the State o f enforcement and shall
be consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards governing treatment of prisoners; in no
case shall such conditions be more or less favourable than those available to prisoners convicted of similar
offences in the State o f enforcement.
3.

Communications between a sentenced person and the Court shall be unimpeded and confidential.
Article 107
Transfer of the person upon completion o f sentence

1.
Following completion o f the sentence, a person who is not a national of the State o f enforcement
may, in accordance with the law o f the State of enforcement, be transferred to a State which is obliged to
receive him or her, or to another State which agrees to receive him or her, taking into account any wishes
o f the person to be transferred to that State, unless the State o f enforcement authorizes the person to
remain in its territory.
2.
If no State bears the costs arising out o f transferring the person to another State pursuant to
paragraph 1, such costs shall be borne by the Court.
3.
Subject to the provisions o f article 108, the State of enforcement may also, in accordance with its
national law, extradite or otherwise surrender the person to a State which has requested the extradition or
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surrender o f the person for purposes o f trial or enforcement o f a sentence.

Article 108
Limitation on the prosecution or punishment of other offences
1.
A sentenced person in the custody o f the State o f enforcement shall not be subject to prosecution
or punishment or to extradition to a third State for any conduct engaged in prior to that person's delivery
to the State o f enforcement, unless such prosecution, punishment or extradition has been approved by the
Court at the request o f the State o f enforcement.
2.

The Court shall decide the matter after having heard the views o f the sentenced person.

3.
Paragraph 1 shall cease to apply if the sentenced person remains voluntarily for more than 30 days
in the territory o f the State o f enforcement after having served the full sentence imposed by the Court, or
returns to the territory of that State after having left it.
Article 109
Enforcement of fines and forfeiture measures
1.
States Parties shall give effect to fines or forfeitures ordered by the Court under Part 7, without
prejudice to the rights o f bona fide third parties, and in accordance with the procedure of their national
law.
2.
If a State Party is unable to give effect to an order for forfeiture, it shall take measures to recover
the value of the proceeds, property or assets ordered by the Court to be forfeited, without prejudice to the
rights of bona fide third parties.
3.
Property, or the proceeds o f the sale o f real property or, where appropriate, the sale o f other
property, which is obtained by a State Party as a result of its enforcement of a judgement of the Court
shall be transferred to the Court.
Article 110
Review bv the Court concemine reduction o f sentence
1.
The State of enforcement shall not release the person before expiry of the sentence pronounced by
the Court.
2.
The Court alone shall have the right to decide any reduction o f sentence, and shall rule on the
matter after having heard the person.
3.
When the person has served two thirds of the sentence, or 25 years in the case of life
imprisonment, the Court shall review the sentence to determine whether it should be reduced. Such a
review shall not be conducted before that time,
4.
In its review under paragraph 3, the Court may reduce the sentence if it finds that one or more of
the following factors are present;
(a) The early and continuing willingness of the person to cooperate with the Court in its
investigations and prosecutions;
(b) The voluntary assistance of the person in enabling the enforcement o f the judgements and
orders o f the Court in other cases, and in particular providing assistance in locating assets subject
to orders of fine, forfeiture or reparation which may be used for the benefit of victims; or
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(c) Other factors establishing a clear and significant change of circumstances sufficient to
justify the reduction of sentence, as provided in the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
5.
If the Court determines in its initial review under paragraph 3 that it is not appropriate to reduce
the sentence, it shall thereafter review the question o f reduction o f sentence at such intervals and applying
such criteria as provided for in the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
Article 111
Escape
If a convicted person escapes fi-om custody and flees the State of enforcement, that State may,
after consultation with the Court, request the person’s surrender from the State in which the person is
located pursuant to existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements, or may request that the Court seek the
person’s surrender, in accordance with Part 9. It may direct that the person be delivered to the State in
which he or she was serving the sentence or to another State designated by the Court.

PART 11. ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES
Article 112
Assemblv of States Parties
1.
An Assembly o f States Parties to this Statute is hereby established. Each State Party shall have one
representative in the Assembly who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. Other States which
have signed this Statute or the Final Act may be observers in the Assembly.
2.

The Assembly shall:
(a)

Consider and adopt, as appropriate, recommendations o f the Preparatory Commission;

(b) Provide management oversight to the Presidency, the Prosecutor and the Registrar
regarding the administration o f the Court;
(c) Consider the reports and activities of the Bureau established under paragraph 3 and take
appropriate action in regard thereto;
(d)

Consider and decide the budget for the Court;

(e)

Decide whether to alter, in accordance with article36, the number of judges;

(f) Consider pursuant to article 87, paragraphs 5 and 7, any question relating to non
cooperation;
(g) Perform any other function consistent with this Statute or the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.
3.
(a) The Assembly shall have a Bureau consisting of a President, two Vice-Presidents and 18
members elected by the Assembly for three-year terms.
(b) The Bureau shall have a representative character, taking into account, in particular,
equitable geographical distribution and the adequate representation of the principal legal systems of the
world.
(c) The Bureau shall meet as often as necessary, but at least once a year. It shall assist the
Assembly in the discharge o f its responsibilities.
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4.
The Assembly may establish such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary, including an
independent oversight mechanism for inspection, evaluation and investigation of the Court, in order to
enhance its efficiency and economy.
5.
The President o f the Court, the Prosecutor and the Registrar or their representatives may
participate, as appropriate, in meetings of the Assembly and o f the Bureau.
6.
The Assembly shall meet at the seat of the Court or at the Headquarters of the United Nations once
a year and, when circumstances so require, hold special sessions. Except as otherwise specified in this
Statute, special sessions shall be convened by the Bureau on its own initiative or at the request of one
third o f the States Parties.
7.
Each State Party shall have one vote. Every effort shall be made to reach decisions by consensus
in the Assembly and in the Bureau. If consensus cannot be reached, except as otherwise provided in the
Statute:
(a) Decisions on matters o f substance must be approved by a two-thirds majority of those
present and voting provided that an absolute majority of States Parties constitutes the quorum for
voting;
(b) Decisions on matters o f procedure shall be taken by a simple majority o f States Parties
present and voting.
8.
A State Party which is in arrears in the payment o f its financial contributions towards the costs of
the Court shall have no vote in the Assembly and in the Bureau if the amount o f its arrears equals or
exceeds the amount o f the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The Assembly may,
nevertheless, permit such a State Party to vote in the Assembly and in the Bureau if it is satisfied that the
failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control o f the State Party.
9.

The Assembly shall adopt its own rules o f procedure.

10.
The official and working languages o f the Assembly shall be those o f the General Assembly of
the United Nations.
PART 12. FINANCING
Article 113
Financial Regulations
Except as otherwise specifically provided, all financial matters related to the Court and the
meetings o f die Assembly o f States Parties, including its Bureau and subsidiary bodies, shall be governed
by this Statute and the Financial Regulations and Rules adopted by the Assembly of States Parties.
Article 114
Pavment of expenses
Expenses o f the Court and the Assembly o f States Parties, including its Bureau and subsidiary
bodies, shall be paid from the funds o f the Court.
Article 115
Funds of the Court and o f the Assemblv of States Parties
The expenses of the Court and the Assembly of States Parties, including its Bureau and subsidiary
bodies, as provided for in the budget decided by the Assembly o f States Parties, shall be provided by the
following sources:
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(a)

Assessed contributions made by States Parties;

(b) Funds provided by the United Nations, subject to the approval of the General Assembly, in
particular in relation to the expenses incurred due to referrals by the Security Council.
Article 116
Voluntarv contributions
Without prejudice to article 115, the Court may receive and utilize, as additional funds, voluntary
contributions from Governments, international organizations, individuals, corporations and other entities,
in accordance with relevant criteria adopted by the Assembly o f States Parties.
Article 117
Assessment o f contributions
The contributions o f States Parties shall be assessed in accordance with an agreed scale of
assessment, based on the scale adopted by the United Nations for its regular budget and adjusted in
accordance with the principles on which that scale is based.

Article 118
Annual audit
The records, books and accounts of the Court, including its annual financial statements, shall be
audited annually by an independent auditor.
PART 13. FINAL CLAUSES
Article 119
Settlement of disputes
1.
Any dispute concerning the judicial functions of the Court shall be settled by the decision o f the
Court.
2.
Any other dispute between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application
o f this Statute which is not settled through negotiations within three months o f their commencement shall
be referred to the Assembly o f States Parties. The Assembly may itself seek to settle the dispute or may
make recommendations on further means o f settlement of the dispute, including referral to the
International Court o f Justice in conformity with the Statute o f that Court.
%

>

Article 120
Reservations
No reservations may be made to this Statute.

Article 121
Amendments
1.
After the expiry o f seven years from the entry into force o f this Statute, any State Party may
propose amendments thereto. The text o f any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the SecretaryGeneral o f the United Nations, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties.
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2.
No sooner than three months from the date o f notification, the Assembly of States Parties, at its
next meeting, shall, by a majority of those present and voting, decide whether to take up the proposal. The
Assembly may deal with the proposal directly or convene a Review Conference if the issue involved so
warrants.
3.
The adoption o f an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review
Conference on which consensus cannot be reached shall require a two-thirds majority of States Parties.
4.
Except as provided in paragraph 5, an amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties one
year after instruments o f ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-General o f the
United Nations by seven-eighths o f them.
5.
Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 o f this Statute shall enter into force for those States
Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments o f ratification
or acceptance. In respect o f a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not
exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State
Party's nationals or on its territory.
6.
If an amendment has been accepted by seven-eighths o f States Parties in accordance with
paragraph 4, any State Party which has not accepted the amendment may withdraw from this Statute with
immediate effect, notwithstanding article 127, paragraph 1, but subject to article 127, paragraph 2, by
giving notice no later than one year after the entry into force o f such amendment.
7.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall circulate to all States Parties any amendment
adopted at a meeting of the Assembly o f States Parties or at a Review Conference.
Article 122
Amendments to provisions o f an institutional nature
1.
Amendments to provisions o f this Statute which are of an exclusively institutional nature, namely,
article 35, article 36, paragraphs 8 and 9, article 37, article 38, article 39, paragraphs 1 (first two
sentences), 2 and 4, article 42, paragraphs 4 to 9, article 43, paragraphs 2 and 3, and articles 44, 46, 47
and 49, may be proposed at any time, notwithstanding article 121, paragraph 1, by any State Party. The
text o f any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-General o f the United Nations or
such other person designated by the Assembly o f States Parties who shall promptly circulate it to all States
Parties and to others participating in the Assembly.
2.
Amendments under this article on which consensus carmot be reached shall be adopted by the
Assembly of States Parties or by a Review Conference, by a two-thirds majority of States Parties. Such
amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties six months after their adoption by the Assembly or,
as the case may be, by the Conference.
Article 123
Review of the Statute
1.
Seven years after the entry into force o f this Statute the Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments to this Statute. Such review may include,
but is not limited to, the list o f crimes contained in article 5. The Conference shall be open to those
participating in the Assembly o f States Parties and on the same conditions.
2.
At any time thereafter, at the request o f a State Party and for the purposes set out in paragraph 1,
the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, upon approval by a majority o f States Parties, convene
a Review Conference.
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3.
The provisions o f article 121, paragraphs 3 to 7, shall apply to the adoption and entry into force of
any amendment to the Statute considered at a Review Conference.
Article 124
Transitional Provision
Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a party to this Statute, may
declare that, for a period o f seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it
does not accept the jurisdiction o f the Court with respect to the category o f crimes referred to in article 8
when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory. A declaration under
this article may be withdrawn at any time. The provisions o f this article shall be reviewed at the Review
Conference convened in accordance with article 123, paragraph 1.
Article 125
Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1.
This Statute shall be open for signature by all States in Rome, at the headquarters of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, on 17 July 1998. Thereafter, it shall remain open for
signature in Rome at the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs of Italy until 17 October 1998. After that date, the
Statute shall remain open for signature in New York, at United Nations Headquarters, until 31 December
2000 .
2.
This Statute is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States. Instruments of
ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3.
This Statute shall be open to accession by all States. Instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 126
Entry into force
1.
This Statute shall enter into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the
date o f the deposit of the 60th instrument o f ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2.
For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Statute after the deposit of the
60th instrument o f ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Statute shall enter into force on the
first day of the month after the 60th day following the deposit by such State of its instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
Article 127
Withdrawal
1.
A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of
the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.
2.
A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this
Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its
withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and
proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were
commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way
the continued consideration of any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the
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date on which the withdrawal became effective.
Article 128
Authentic texts
The original of this Statute, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall
send certified copies thereof to all States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective
Governments, have signed this Statute.
DONE at Rome, this 17th day of July 1998.
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